The role and behaviour of Chinese agricultural enterprises in sub-Saharan Africa : case studies of Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo by Asanzi Mbeyata, Philippe
i 
 
THE ROLE AND BEHAVIOUR OF CHINESE AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES IN 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:  CASE STUDIES OF MOZAMBIQUE AND THE 
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 
 
PHILIPPE ASANZI MBEYATA 
 
 
Dissertation presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of 
Political Science at Stellenbosch University 
 
Supervisor: 
Professor Scarlett Cornelissen 
 
 
Stellenbosch       
December 2013 
ii 
 
 
 
 
DECLARATION 
 
I hereby declare that the entirety of the work contained herewith is my own, original work 
and that it has not been previously, in part or entirely, submitted to any other University.  
 
 
 
Signature:                                                                                   Date: November 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
iii 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study aims to understand the motivations underlying the activities of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises operating on the African continent as well as the way in which 
institutional contexts – the physical and legal environments – shape their behaviours and/or 
modes of entry into local industries. Understanding the strategic motives of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises operating in Africa as well as the extent to which they implement 
those motives on the ground and the way in which they respond to local laws is crucial for 
assessing the medium- to long-term impacts of their activities on the welfare of African 
populations and forests.  
This dissertation relies on Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm to understand the motivations 
informing the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises as well as on new institutional 
theory to study the behaviours and/or modes of entry of Chinese agricultural enterprises into 
local industries.  
This research is based on two case studies: Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. As far as data collection is concerned, it relied on secondary sources of data such as 
scholarly articles and books; official documents and legislation; and newspaper articles. This 
study also drew on primary sources of data, which consisted of documents obtained during 
the fieldwork such as contracts between Chinese agricultural enterprises and African 
governments, official documents from Chinese agricultural enterprises as well as semi-
structured interviews. Thirty-two semi-structured interviews were conducted with various 
stakeholders – including managers of Chinese agricultural enterprises, employees of these 
enterprises, farmers, officials from ministries of agriculture and researchers – in Mozambique 
and the DRC between April to June 2011. The data collected were analysed with the help of 
the qualitative analysis software: atlas.ti. 
The preliminary results collected and analysed in this study suggest that the motivations of 
Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique and the DRC are: 1) to acquire 
farmlands in order to grow food crops and sell them mainly in local markets; 2) to supply 
agricultural commodities – cash and food crops – for Chinese markets; and 3) to provide 
agricultural aid by introducing new varieties of crops imported from China and offering 
training to farmers, students and technicians. However, the provision of agricultural aid is a 
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secondary motivation of Chinese agricultural enterprises. The motivations informing the 
activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique and the DRC are 
globally consistent with China‟s foreign policy as these enterprises primarily aim to better 
position themselves in local markets and to access agricultural commodities for the benefit of 
Chinese markets. 
Furthermore, the preliminary results of this study also indicate that the institutional contexts 
in Mozambique and the DRC appear to affect the behaviours and/or modes of entry of 
Chinese agricultural enterprises into local industries. As such, the poor provision of 
infrastructure in rural areas appears to delay further investments by Chinese agricultural 
enterprises. Also, the complex process of gaining access to land and the weak regulatory 
capacity in the monitoring and implementation of the land laws appear to hinder investments 
by Chinese agricultural enterprises and in some instances lead to the cancellation of 
investments. In the specific case of the DRC, the weak enforcement of land titles appears to 
discourage further investments. The unfavourable institutional context depicted above has 
prompted Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in the DRC to adopt new models of 
business revolving around less risky or smaller agricultural projects.  
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OPSOMMING 
 
Hierdie studie ontleed die motiewe van Chinese landbou-ondernemings werksaam op die 
Afrika-vasteland, asook hoe die institusionele konteks, te wete die fisiese en wetlike 
raamwerke, sulke ondernemings se werkverrigtinge en/of toetreewyses tot plaaslike 
industrieë beïnvloed. ‟n Begrip van wat die strategiese motiewe van Chinese landbou-
ondernemings is, hoe hulle daardie motiewe op voetsoolvlak implementeer, en hoe hulle aan 
landswette gehoor gee, is noodsaaklik om die middel- tot lang-termyn impakte wat die 
ondernemings op die welstand van Afrika bevolkinge en op woudgebiede het, te peil. 
 
Hierdie studie maak gebruik van Dunning se eklektiese paradigma om Chinese landbou-
ondernemings se motiewe te ontleed. Dit pas ook die nieu-institusionele teorie toe om die 
werksaamhede en marktoetredes van die ondernemings na te spoor. 
 
Die navorsing is op twee gevallestudies gebaseer: Mosambiek en die Demokratiese 
Republiek van die Kongo (DRK). Dit het van sekondêre bronne soos vakwetenskaplike 
referate en boeke; amptelike dokumentasie en wetsakte; en persartikels gebruik gemaak. Die 
studie het ook primêre databronne gebruik. Laasgenoemde bestaan uit dokumentasie wat deur 
die loop van die veldnavorsing ingesamel is, onder meer kontrakte tussen Chinese landbou-
ondernemings en Afrika staatslui; amptelike dokumentasie van Chinese landbou-
ondernemings; en semi-gestruktureerde onderhoude. Daar is met verskeie belangegroepe in 
Mosambiek en die DRK - soos die bestuurders van Chinese landbou-ondernemings en hul 
werknemers, boere, landbou-amptenare en navorsers – onderhoude gevoer. In geheel is 32 
semi-gestruktureerde onderhoude in die periode April – Junie 2011 gevoer. Die data is met 
behulp van die kwalitatiewe ontledingsprogrammatuur atlas.ti ontleed. 
 
Die voorlopige bevindinge en ontledings stel voor dat die volgende motiewe die 
werksaamhede van Chinese landbou-ondernemings in Mosambiek en die DRK bepaal: 1) om 
landerye te bekom om sodoende kos aan te kweek en dit veral aan plaaslike markte te 
verkoop; 2) om landbouware, te wete kontant en kos, aan Chinese markte te voorsien; 3) om 
hulpverlening te verskaf deur die bekendstelling van nuwe tipes gewasse uit China, en deur 
die opleiding van boere, studente en tegnici. Die verskaffing van hulpverlening in die 
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landbou bedryf is egter van sekondêre belang vir Chinese landbou-ondernemings. Die 
motiewe van Chinese landbou-ondernemings werksaam in Mosambiek en die DRK strook 
met China se oorhoofse buitelandse beleid omdat hierdie ondernemings primêr daarop uit is 
om hulself beter in plaaslike markte te posisioneer en om tot die voordeel van Chinese markte 
landbouware te bekom. 
 
Voorts, die voorlopige bevindinge dui ook aan dat die institusionele kontekste in Mosambiek 
en die DRK die werksaamhede en/of die toetrede van Chinese landbou-ondernemings in 
plaaslike industrieë beïnvloed. Swak infrastruktuur in landelike gebiede blyk meer beleggings 
deur Chinese landbou-ondernemings te striem. Die ingewikkelde proses om grond te bekom 
en gebrekkigheid in die regulering, monitering en implementering van landbouwette blyk ook 
Chinese beleggings te kortwiek, en in sommige gevalle lei dit tot die opskorting van 
beleggings. In die geval van die DRK, wil dit voorkom asof gebrekkige afdwinging van 
grondaktes verdere belegging ontmoedig. Die ongunstige institutionele konteks wat hier 
geskets is, het Chinese landbou-ondernemings werksaam in die DRK aangemoedig om nuwe 
sakemodelle toe te pas, wat belegging in kleiner landbou projekte of met minder risiko‟s, 
beteken. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and context for the study 
One of the most significant developments in the global political and economic arena since the 
beginning of the 21
st
 century has surely been the emergence of China as a global powerhouse.  
In just over a decade Chinese foreign direct investment and trade with the rest of the world 
have grown considerably. From 2003 to 2012 Chinese exports to the rest of the world rose by 
approximately 90.7%. During the same period Chinese foreign investment grew by 95.1%
1
 
(Ministry of Commerce, People‟s Republic of China, 2013). In contrast, between 1999 and 
2009 China‟s share of world exports rose from 3 to 10% (The Economist, 2010).  At the same 
time China‟s share of the global flow of foreign direct investments reached 5% in 2010 
(Statistical Bulletin of China‟s Outward Foreign Direct Investment, 2010). The top 
destinations of Chinese exports are the European Union, the US and Hong Kong, together 
accounting for 54.3% of Chinese exports (Starmass International, 2011-2013). The main 
recipients of Chinese foreign direct investment are Asian countries, which attract 71.9% of 
Chinese foreign investments. Most Chinese foreign investments are in the following 
industries: leasing and business services; wholesale and retailing; finance; and mining 
(Statistical Bulletin of China‟s Outward Foreign Direct Investment, 2010).   As a result of the 
surge in its exports since the turn of the new century, China has accumulated a huge amount 
of foreign reserves, estimated at more than US$3 trillion in March 2011 (The Economist, 
2011). The Chinese government has used most of its foreign reserves to purchase US 
government securities. Hence, a substantial portion of China‟s massive foreign reserves are in 
the form of US bonds (The Economist, 2011).   
Besides the fact that China is steadily emerging as a significant global investor, especially in 
the Asian region, the country continues to attract a huge amount of foreign investment. 
According to the World Bank, China attracted 20% of all foreign direct investments to 
developing countries over the last decade  (World Bank: Foreign Direct Investment – The 
China Story, 2010).  In addition to that, in the first semester of 2012 China overtook the US 
                                                          
1
 It should be noted that these statistics do not control for the cumulative level of inflation during the 
specified period of analysis.  
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as the first destination of foreign direct investment in the World (Reuters, 2012). The success 
of China in attracting foreign direct investment in recent time is due to the country‟s low-cost 
but competitive labour markets, the size of its domestic markets as well as the liberalisation 
policy adopted by the Chinese government after the admission of the country to the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 (World Bank: Foreign Direct Investment – The China 
Story, 2010).  
1.1.2 China and Africa 
China‟s economic interactions with Africa are on a smaller scale compared to those with 
other regions of the world, such as Europe, North America, South-East Asia and Latin 
America. In 2009 Chinese exports to Africa accounted for only 3.96% of the country‟s total 
exports, while Chinese imports from Africa accounted for 4.3% of its total imports 
(Trademark Southern Africa, 2012). Similarly, in 2010 Chinese investments to Africa 
accounted for only 4.1% of the country‟s foreign direct investments (Statistical Bulletin of 
China‟s Outward Foreign Direct Investment, 2010).  While Chinese trade with and 
investments in Africa are still limited, they are nevertheless growing fast. In absolute terms, 
during the period stretching from 1990 to 2009 Chinese imports from Africa rose from 
US$368 million to US$1005.56 billion. During the same period Chinese exports to Africa 
grew from US$692 million to US$47.64 billion (Trademark Southern Africa, 2012). 
Moreover, Chinese foreign direct investment in Africa rose from US$911 million to US$68 
billion between 2000 and 2010 (Kobylinski, 2012).  In relative terms, total trade between 
China and Africa increased by 600% between 2000 and 2007 (Lafarge, 2009). Furthermore, 
from 2003 to 2006 China‟s foreign direct investment in Africa increased by 421% (Lafarge, 
2009).  Concerning the structure of trade between China and Africa, the bulk of Chinese 
exports to Africa consist of machinery and transport equipment as well as manufactured 
goods (Trademark Southern Africa, 2012). On the other hand, Chinese imports from Africa 
consist mainly of raw materials such as fossil oil and minerals (Trademark Southern Africa, 
2012). Fossil oil alone accounts for more than 70% of Chinese imports from Africa (Taylor, 
2009).  Moreover, Chinese foreign investment in Africa has been mainly concentrated on the 
oil, mining and construction industries, and to lesser extents on the manufacturing and 
agriculture sectors (China Business Review, 2009). In this context it is not surprising that the 
main trade partners of China and the principal investment destinations of Chinese companies 
in Africa are resource-rich countries such as South Africa, Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, Zambia 
and Algeria (China Business Review 2009; Trademark Southern Africa, 2012).  More 
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importantly, in the resource-rich countries of Africa China has used a model combining 
investment, trade and development assistance. Through this model, Chinese banks provide 
concessionary loans to Africa‟s resource rich countries for the construction of infrastructure 
by Chinese construction companies. The loans are repaid, partially or entirely, through the 
exploitation and imports of oil or minerals by Chinese oil and mining enterprises (Vines, 
2006; Sachikonye, 2008; Marysse & Geenen, 2009; Esteban, 2009).       
The sharp increase in Chinese trade with and investments in Africa has generated lots of 
commentary and interest from scholars (Taylor, 2006, 2009; Tull, 2006; Holslag, 2006; 
Shelton & Le Pere, 2006,2007; Li, 2007; Kaplinsky, 2008; Alden, 2007, 2008). In particular, 
China‟s heavy involvement in Africa‟s oil and mineral industries has generated the most 
criticisms. Scholars have been concerned about the implications of Chinese investments and 
trade in oil and minerals for the long-term political stability and economic development of 
Africa‟s resource-rich countries. A number of issues have raised concerns among scholars: 
the nature of African states; the resource curse discourse; and the strategy of the Chinese 
government to foster close and personalized ties with African political rulers. Scholars such 
as Taylor (2006), Tull (2006), Esteban (2009), Marysse and Geenen (2009), and Sachiknoye 
(2008) hold that African political elites are often politically fragmented. Therefore, they 
assert that these elites organize themselves into political factions that compete for access to 
power – or its preservation – while economic development is relegated to a secondary 
objective. Taylor (2006) and Tull (2006) further argue that factional infighting between elites 
is exacerbated by the availability of natural resources. These scholars claim that African 
ruling elites are more concerned with the control of areas rich in natural resources and have 
little incentive to invest in institutions and human resources, since their wealth and political 
survival depend not on the development of productive factors but instead on revenues 
generated by the exploitation of natural resources. Taylor (2006), Tull (2006), Holslag 
(2006), Alden (2008), Esteban (2009), Marysse and Geenen (2009) and Sachiknoye (2008) 
further hold that it is within this particular context of political factionalism and dictatorship 
that China intends to foster close and personalized relationships with political elites in 
resource-rich countries by providing them with a wide array of instruments such as 
unconditional loans, grants, aids in the form of infrastructure, weapons and diplomatic 
backing. These scholars argue that by providing African rulers with such wide-ranging 
support, China is likely to undermine the transition of the resource-rich countries to 
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democracy and a free market economy, which will therefore affect their long-term political 
stability and economic development.   
Furthermore, Taylor (2006), Tull (2006), Holslag (2006), Alden (2008), Esteban (2009), 
Marysse and Geenen (2009), Sachiknoye (2008) and Lee (2006) argue that the close and 
personalized relationships that China is trying to establish with African political elites aim to 
secure their support and trust in order to facilitate access by Chinese corporations to Africa‟s 
oil and minerals. Therefore, these scholars view Chinese endeavours in Africa‟s resource-rich 
countries mainly through two theoretical perspectives. First, a group of the scholars cited 
above analyses Chinese actions through the lens of mercantilism. In the mercantilist 
perspective, Chinese involvement in the resource-rich countries of Africa aims to advance 
China‟s national interests by accessing oil and minerals for the benefit of the Chinese 
economy. A second group of scholars studies Chinese forays in the resource-rich countries 
through the lens of Cox‟s historical materialism. China is perceived here as attempting to 
forge close relations with African ruling elites and establish new organizations – embodying  
rules, values and norms – that would lead to a new world order sympathetic to Chinese 
economic interests.  
However, while much of the focus has fallen on China‟s involvement in Africa‟s oil and 
minerals sectors, there has been comparatively little scholarly interest in the Asian country‟s 
involvement in Africa‟s agriculture sector. Yet a study on Chinese engagement in Africa‟s 
agriculture sector is important for a number of reasons. First, the Chinese government and its 
agricultural enterprises have displayed more interests in Africa‟s agriculture over the recent 
years (Sun, 2011; Brautigam & Xiaoyang, 2009; Hairong & Sautman, 2010). Second, the 
bulk of the African population lives in rural areas and depends on agriculture for its 
livelihood. Indeed, in sub-Saharan Africa the agriculture sector accounts on average for 35% 
of GDP and employs 64% of the population (World Bank, World Agriculture Report, 
2008:27). Finally, despite the remarkable achievements in other parts of the world in the area 
of agricultural technologies, sub-Saharan Africa‟s agriculture sector continues to suffer from 
low productivity in subsistence farming (AATF, 2009). As a result, sub-Saharan Africa is the 
only region in the world where poverty and malnutrition continue to grow in absolute and 
relative terms (The China Monitor, May 2009). Over half of the hungry people are 
subsistence farmers who cannot grow enough food to feed their families and escape poverty 
(AATF, 2009). Therefore China can play a role in reducing poverty and hunger in Africa as it 
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possesses the agricultural technology, skills and capital that could be valuable to African 
countries.  
 
1.1.3 Chinese involvement in Africa’s agriculture 
Chinese agricultural involvement in Africa began in 1959 in the form of state-to-state aid 
projects (Hairong & Sautman, 2010). This was a time when China was competing with 
Taiwan for strategic influence in Africa. In this context Chinese involvement in Africa‟s 
agriculture was a response to Taiwan‟s Vanguard Operation, which aimed to establish small 
and medium-scale rice and vegetables demonstration farms in Africa to train smallholders 
(Brautigam & Xiaoyang, 2009; Brautigam,2009:237). During this period China established 
state farms in several African countries, such as the 3 200 hectare Mbarali farm in Tanzania 
and the 250 hectare Kobo farm in Guinea (Brautigam & Xiaoyang, 2009).  Moreover, China 
sent technical personnel to help establish state farms in Africa. From the mid-1950s to the 
mid-1980s 15-20% of China‟s aid to Africa went to more than 120 agricultural development 
projects in 44 African countries (Brautigam, 1998:43, cited in Hairong & Sautman, 2010).  
The implementation of market reforms in the 1980s in China enabled the creation of Chinese 
state-owned enterprises from the previous departments of the central and provincial 
agricultural ministries (Brautigam & Xiaoyang, 2009). Following this, the first Chinese state-
owned agricultural enterprises started operating in Africa in the 1980s (Sun, 2011; Hairong & 
Sautman, 2010).  Often Chinese state-owned agricultural enterprises were involved in joint 
ventures projects with African governments – in countries such as Zambia, Mali, Guinea and 
Sierra-Leone – in order to revive former aid projects that had collapsed following the 
departure of Chinese technicians (Brautigam & Xiaoyang, 2009). Since the mid-1990s, 
Chinese state-owned enterprises have been joined by private Chinese agricultural enterprises, 
including small-scale family enterprises (Sun, 2011). In recent times the number of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises operating on the African continent has been rising, although it is still 
small compared to the number of mining, oil or construction companies operating in Africa. 
Chinese agricultural enterprises are operating in several African countries such as Zambia, 
Mozambique, Uganda, Nigeria, Cameroon, DRC, Mali, Tanzania and Sierra Leone (Sun, 
2011). Hairong and Sautman (2010) estimate the number of Chinese agricultural enterprises 
operating in Zambia at 20 – among which six state-owned enterprises. 
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Chinese agricultural enterprises active on the African continent are involved in the growing 
of agricultural commodities for commercial purposes (Hairong & Sautman, 2010; Sun, 2011; 
Brautigam & Xiaoyang, 2009). In addition to this, the Chinese government is still involved in 
African agriculture – through partnerships with Chinese agricultural enterprises. First, the 
Chinese government continues to fund aid projects initiated during the cold war. However 
these aid projects are now managed by Chinese state-owned enterprises (Brautigam & 
Xiaoyang, 2009; Sun 2011). Second, the Chinese government has funded the construction of 
14 Chinese agricultural demonstration centres across Africa. These centres are to be managed 
by top Chinese provincial agricultural enterprises and central agricultural research institutes 
(Brautigam & Xiaoyang, 2009; Sun, 2011).  Finally, the Chinese government has also 
encouraged its state-owned agricultural enterprises to invest in Africa under its „going global‟ 
policy (Freeman et al., 2008; Brautigam & Xiaoyang, 2009; Brautigam, 2009:256; Sun, 
2011).   
1.2 Rationale of the study  
It is undeniable that the nature of Chinese agricultural engagement in Africa‟s agriculture has 
changed over the last five decades. In the past Chinese engagement in Africa‟s agriculture 
was influenced by political and diplomatic factors, and sought to enhance Chinese influence 
in Africa and to establish closer ties with African governments. In that context Chinese 
engagement in African agriculture was led by state departments. Nowadays, the strategic 
motives of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Africa are more complex (Brautigam 
& Xiaoyang, 2009). The difficulty in understanding the strategic motives of Chinese 
agricultural engagement with Africa is because of the presence of multiple Chinese actors on 
the ground, such as private agricultural companies, small-scale family enterprises, state-
owned agricultural enterprises and the Chinese government. Therefore, Chinese current 
engagement in African agriculture embodies several overlapping patterns such as 
government-agricultural enterprise partnerships, investments by state-owned and private 
enterprises and investments by small-scale family enterprises.  
The changing nature of Chinese engagement in African agriculture is occurring at a time 
when the extent of arable land in China is rapidly diminishing as a result of growing 
urbanization and pollution (Hale, 2005; Horto, 2009; Alvarenga, 2008). Chinese analyst Li 
Ping claims that between 1996 and 2006 China lost 8.67 million hectares of farmland due to 
urbanization and pollution (Ping, 2008). Therefore, millions of Chinese farmers have been 
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pushed off their land by the encroachment of cities and by land degradation. These new 
pressures have prompted some of these farmers to seek land in Africa and South America 
(Alvarenga, 2009; Brautigam & Xiaoyang, 2009). Besides that, the shift in the eating habits 
of millions of Chinese consumers as a result of rising incomes, coupled with the  scarcity of 
agricultural land, renders food security a daunting task for the Chinese government in the 
years ahead (Horto, 2009). Therefore several Chinese analysts have warned that China might 
be forced in the future to develop agriculture production abroad to guarantee domestic food 
security (Ping, 2008; Callick, 2008; Wenju, n.d, cited in Brautigam & Xiaoyang, 2009: 698). 
The mounting presence of Chinese agricultural enterprises in Africa has sparked some 
concerns about the strategic motives of these enterprises (Brautigam & Xiaoyang, 2009; 
Brautigam, 2009; 258; Hairong & Sautman, 2010). Observers have started to question 
whether the growing involvement of Chinese agricultural enterprises – as well as the Chinese 
government – in Africa‟s agriculture reflects a profit-seeking strategy under a capitalist 
framework, or whether this is part of a wider plan which includes the acquisition of large 
expanses of farmland and the growing of foodstuffs and other agricultural enterprises for 
Chinese markets (Horto, 2008; Brautigam & Xiaoyang, 2009; Brautigam, 2009; Hairong & 
Sautman, 2010).  Freeman et al. (2008), Horto (2008) and Biopact (2007) hold that 
acquisition of huge tracts of land in Africa by Chinese agricultural enterprises and farmers – 
to produce agricultural commodities, especially land-intensive crops such as cotton, palm oil 
and sugarcane, for Chinese markets – could lead to significant displacements of rural 
communities and the destruction of forests.    
Therefore, an assessment of the strategic motivations informing the activities of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises operating in Africa is important, if the aim is to understand the effects 
or impacts of those activities on the welfare of rural and urban populations, as well as on the 
forests, in the medium to long term.  However, probing the motivations underlying the 
activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Africa is not enough to make 
credible projections regarding the effects of those enterprises. While the strategic motives 
underlying the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises will be important in determining 
the effects of those activities on African populations and forests, the institutional contexts – 
the physical and legal environments that determine the behaviour of Chinese agricultural 
enterprises on the ground – will also play a role. Indeed, the extent to which Chinese 
agricultural enterprises will effectively implement their strategic motives and their responses 
to local laws and regulations will be equally important in determining the effects of Chinese 
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agricultural investments on local populations and the forests in the medium to long term. 
Therefore, assessing the nature of institutional contexts is important in understanding the 
effects of Chinese agricultural enterprises on African populations and forests. However, 
given that institutional contexts are the products of specific sets of institutions (Williamson, 
2000; North, 1990), an extensive understanding of the natures of institutional contexts 
prevailing in African countries also entails an examination of the character and dynamic of 
institutions.  
1.3 Aims of the study 
This study has two aims. The first is to understand the motivations informing the activities of 
Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique and the DRC.  The motivations of 
Chinese agricultural enterprises are defined as the internal and external strategic goals that 
prompt Chinese agricultural enterprises to invest in Mozambique and the DRC.  
The second aim is to comprehend the manner in which the institutional contexts in 
Mozambique and the DRC affect the behaviour and/or the modes of entry of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises into local industries. Drawing on the work of North (1990, 1994, 
2005) and Williamson (2000), this study defines institutions as the sets of informal 
constraints, formal rules and enforcement mechanisms that determine the structure of 
incentives in a society, and hence, the performance of its economy over time.  
1.3.1 Research and sub-research questions  
This study poses two research questions, which correspond to the aims mentioned above. 
Accordingly, the first research question posited in this study is the following: What are the 
motivations informing the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in 
Mozambique and the DRC?  
The second research question posited in the study is the following: In what way do the 
institutional contexts in Mozambique and the DRC affect the behaviour and/or modes of 
entry of Chinese agricultural enterprises into local industries?  
The above research questions are then broken down into seven sub-research questions:  
 What are the nature and objectives of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in 
Mozambique and the DRC? In particular, the study seeks to uncover whether Chinese 
agricultural corporations active in each country are state-owned or private entities; 
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whether they are new enterprises or multinational enterprises with operations in other 
parts of the world; and finally, what the corporations‟ area of specialization or 
primary mission is. 
  What kinds of commodities are produced by each Chinese agricultural enterprise and 
what is the market(s) for which these commodities are destined? 
 What is the size of farmlands secured by each Chinese agricultural enterprise and are 
these fully operational? 
 What is the scope and importance of Chinese agricultural aid delivered by Chinese 
agricultural enterprises in Mozambique and the DRC? 
 How sustainable and effective is the agricultural aid provided by Chinese agricultural 
enterprises in both countries?  
 What is the nature of the institutional contexts – relative to the agriculture sector – 
prevailing in Mozambique and the DRC? 
 How do those institutional contexts shape the behaviour and/or the modes of entry of 
Chinese agricultural enterprises?   
1.4 Literature review  
1.4.1 Motivations 
 Little scholarly research has been devoted to the Chinese engagement in Africa‟s agriculture. 
The few scholars who have studied China‟s endeavours in Africa‟s agriculture have sought to 
understand the motivations informing the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises 
operating, or aiming to operate, in Africa. 
A first group of scholars such as Brautigam (2009), Brautigam and Xiaoyang (2009) and 
Brautigam and Ekman (2012) analyse Chinese agricultural engagement through the 
frameworks of government-agricultural enterprise partnerships as well as private and state-
owned agricultural investments. These scholars argue that Chinese agricultural engagement – 
through government-state-owned agricultural enterprises partnerships, in particular the 
agricultural demonstration centres – aim to ensure the sustainability of the aid projects and 
enable Chinese agricultural enterprises to get a foothold in Africa. In addition to that, these 
scholars hold that Chinese private and state-owned agricultural enterprises operating in 
Africa generally aim to grow foodstuffs and sell them in local African markets. These 
scholars thus view Chinese agricultural engagement in the African agricultural sector as 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
10 
 
mutually beneficial, as Chinese agricultural enterprises realize profitable business, while 
African countries benefit in accessing modern agricultural technologies and knowledge, and 
are able to reduce food insecurity.  
 Sun (2011) also analyses Chinese engagement in African agriculture by way of partnerships 
between government-agricultural enterprises as well as private and state-owned agricultural 
investments. Sun (2011) claims that Chinese engagement in the African agriculture sector is 
aimed at helping to develop this sector – through the government-agricultural enterprises 
partnerships – and at accessing key agricultural commodities that the Chinese economy needs 
by way of private and state-owned agricultural investments. Sun (2011) also perceives the 
Chinese foray into Africa‟s agriculture as being mutually beneficial, as African countries are 
likely to benefit from Chinese agricultural technologies and support in rural infrastructural 
developments  in order to reduce hunger and poverty, while at the same time China is likely 
to access specific agricultural commodities that the country needs.  
Hairong and Sautman (2010) study Chinese agricultural engagement in African agriculture 
only from the framework of Chinese state-owned agricultural investments. They hold that, for 
the moment, Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Africa aim to acquire farmlands 
and realize profits by growing and selling agricultural commodities in local markets. Taking 
Zambia as a case study, Hairong and Sautman (2010) perceive Chinese agricultural 
engagement in that country as part of an agro-capitalist mode of engagement. Indeed, they 
hold that Chinese state-owned agricultural enterprises operating in Zambia are bound to their 
headquarters in China through contractual arrangements that oblige them to realize profits. 
Also, Chinese state-owned agricultural enterprises employ casual workers in order to 
minimize costs.     
Finally, Freeman et al. (2008) conduct a prospective analysis on Chinese engagements in 
foreign agriculture. Regarding future Chinese engagement in Africa‟s agriculture, Freeman et 
al. (2008) hold that – given China‟s increasing reliance on imports of agricultural 
commodities to satisfy its internal needs, on the one hand, and African countries‟ inability to 
develop their agricultural sectors in order to supply world markets with additional 
commodities, on the other – Chinese agricultural enterprises might decide to acquire 
farmlands in Africa and directly produce agricultural commodities for Chinese markets. As 
such, Freeman et al. (2008) hold that future Chinese engagement in Africa‟s agriculture could 
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adversely affect the wellbeing of local communities and the ecosystem, if not well tailored to 
local realities.  
1.4.2 Institutions 
A World Bank study: Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t and Why (1998) pointed to 
the crucial roles of institutional environments in ensuring the success of projects funded by 
foreign aid. Institutional environments are also important in ensuring the success of 
agricultural projects, regardless whether these are implemented by smallholder farmers for 
subsistence purposes, or by commercial farmers, or agribusiness corporations (World Bank: 
World Agriculture Report, 2008). In the case of African countries – where the agricultural 
sector is generally dominated by smallholder farmers, with the notable exception of a handful 
of countries such as South Africa and Zimbabwe – institutions and institutional contexts have 
usually hindered the entrepreneurship talents of smallholder farmers (Ake, 1996; Eicher, 
1998).  
North (1990:47) distinguishes between institutions and organizations. Formal institutions are 
defined as constituting the rules of the game that partially determine the incentives structures 
of a society and hence the performance of its economy.  In contrast, North (1990:73) defines 
organizations as structures that carry out specific missions in society to further the objectives 
of their creators. North (1990) further argues that the types of organizations that emerge and 
flourish depend on the structure of incentives provided in that society.   
In Africa institutions – such as political leaders and local governments – have usually 
undermined the progress of organizations that promote the interests of smallholders – such as 
cooperatives, farm organizations, extension services and universities (Ake, 1996; Eicher, 
1998; Oettle et al, 1998). In the aftermath of the independence of African countries, political 
elites usually implemented policies that were detrimental to the interests of smallholders. 
Instead, political leaders gave pre-eminence to industrial projects as well as to large state 
farms (Ake, 1996; Eicher, 1998).  
The agricultural policies implemented in much of post-colonial Africa favoured higher 
taxation of smallholders through the double-price mechanisms inherited from the colonial 
era. Marketing boards operated by African governments purchased agricultural commodities 
from peasants at below market prices and sold them at world prices (Ake, 1996; Eicher, 
1998). Also, the taxes collected from smallholders were seldom invested back in the rural 
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areas by local and central governments to support the development of roads, schools and 
health centres (Ake, 1996; Eicher, 1998). Moreover, African governments maintained 
overvalued currencies that enabled them to ensure cheap imports of consumer goods – 
destined for urban populations – but in the process rendered more expensive the exports of 
agricultural goods produced by smallholders (Ake, 1996).  Furthermore, in some African 
countries such as in Ghana African governments reduced the portion of funding allocated to 
agricultural extension services (Eicher, 1998). Finally, the bias of political elites against 
smallholders discouraged them from formalizing customary land laws in order to ensure – 
through policy making – the effective access to communal lands by historical, lineage-based 
and pastoralist (seasonal) groups – including women – belonging to a particular community . 
The absence of the formalization of customary laws made possible the appropriation of land 
by powerful chiefs, outsiders and bureaucrats.  As a result of the above policies implemented 
by African elites since the 1960s, the institutional contexts in most of African countries 
related to the agriculture sector were unfavourable as smallholders struggled to access 
affordable and acceptable inputs, credits, insurance, schools, roads and health centres.   
From the 1980s several African countries implemented structural adjustment programmes 
under the auspices of the World Bank and the IMF. The structural adjustment programmes 
dismantled the elaborate system of public agencies that provided smallholders with access to 
land, credit, insurance, input and cooperative organization ( World Bank: World Agriculture 
Report, 2008:138).  The rational for the dismantling of public agencies was to allow the 
private sector to play a greater role in providing the mentioned services to smallholders with 
the aim of reducing their cost, improving their quality and eliminating their regressive bias 
(World Bank: World Agriculture Report, 2008:138).  However, this did not really happen as 
in some cases the state limited the entry of the private sector, while in others the private 
sector partially emerged only to serve the interests of commercial farmers, while smallholders 
were exposed to service delivery gaps, extensive market failures and high transaction costs 
and risks ( World Bank: World Agriculture Report, 2008:138). Therefore, the institutional 
contexts in several African countries remain unfavourable, especially for smallholders, 
because of poor infrastructure services, insecure land ownership, inadequate and asymmetric 
financial markets and unavailable insurance markets (World Bank: World Bank Agriculture 
Report, 2008).    
As indicated earlier, little scholarly empirical research has been conducted on the motivations 
underlying the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Africa. Therefore 
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this study intends to enhance our understanding of the motivations informing the activities of 
Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Africa by conducting more empirical research 
on this particular topic. Furthermore, in the literature on China-Africa relations, the effects of 
institutional contexts on the behaviour of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Africa 
have largely been ignored. Thus this study intends to provide more analyses on this topic as 
well.  
1.5 Research design and methodology 
This study relies on an embedded multiple case study design (Yin, 2009; Remenyi, 2012). It 
consists of two case studies, Mozambique and the DRC. The two case studies were chosen on 
the basis of their accessibility as well as their similarities. Concerning their similarities, it 
revolves around three points. First, Chinese agricultural enterprises have showed obvious 
interests in investing in both countries. Second, Mozambique and the DRC each possess 
significant areas of fertile land with sufficient water. Last, the institutions and institutional 
contexts in Mozambique and the DRC bear some resemblances, especially regarding the 
customary land tenure systems. However, due to diverse policies pursued by the two states 
after their respective independences, the potency of customary laws –including that of 
customary land tenure systems – differs across Mozambique and the DRC (Mamdani, 1996).    
In light of the above similarities, it was anticipated that the results of this study will be quite 
similar for the two case studies. The unit of analysis is the Chinese agricultural enterprise and 
this study focuses on more than one Chinese agricultural enterprise, namely those in 
Mozambique and the DRC. This study defines an enterprise in line with Coase‟s (1937) 
description of the firm. Therefore, the enterprise is defined here as a hierarchical structure – 
an organisation – in which the allocation of resources is performed with the objective of 
realizing profits.    
This study relies on a qualitative methodology. The research methods used to collect data are 
divided between secondary and primary sources of data. Secondary sources of data consist of 
academic materials such as scholarly articles and books; official documents such as reports of 
international institutions such as the World Bank as well as official legislation such as land 
laws; and articles from private sources such as newspaper articles. The primary sources of 
data consist of documents obtained in the field work such as contracts between Chinese 
agricultural enterprises and governments as well as official documents from Chinese 
agricultural enterprises, on the one hand, and semi-structured interviews, on the other.   
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Semi-structured interviews were conducted with various stakeholders knowledgeable about 
the motives and behaviours of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique and 
the DRC. These stakeholders are comprised of managers of Chinese agricultural enterprises, 
official from the ministries of agriculture and agricultural research centres, leaders of civil 
society, researchers and farmers and/or employees of Chinese agricultural enterprises. In 
Mozambique 18 semi-structured interviews were conducted in the following locations: 
Maputo, Gaza and Sofala provinces. In the DRC 14 semi-structured interviews were 
conducted; all the interviews took place in and around Kinshasa.  Most of the interviews were 
recorded with an MP3 voice recorder and subsequently transcribed. Interview data were 
analysed by means of the qualitative data analysis software: atlas. ti. Codes were created to 
capture the ideas or concepts identified from the data as well as from the literature. For each 
case study the codes that showed the highest occurrences, as well as the most critical codes, 
were selected and integrated in order to produce broader categories. The categories were then 
compared in order to generate conceptual frameworks.  
1.6 Theoretical framework 
It is the view of this study that the traditional perspectives of International Political Economy 
(IPE) are not suitable to provide guidance in answering the main research questions posited in 
section 1.3, mainly as a result of their complexity. Further explanations will be provided in 
chapter 3. Therefore, this study makes use of two theoretical frameworks outside the 
discipline of Political Science. 
 First, it relies on Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm to study the motivations informing the 
activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique and the DRC. 
Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm is an empirical framework from the field of international 
business that intends to explain the determinants of firms‟ foreign direct investments. 
Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm basically holds that the determinants of a firm‟s foreign direct 
investments will be determined by the combination of its ownership, locational and 
internalisation advantages, as well as by the context pertaining to the features of the political 
economy or the industry in the home or recipient country (Dunning, 2000, 2001).  Dunning‟s 
eclectic paradigm is appropriate for this study because it allows the study of complex 
phenomena by comparing several concepts or theories and assessing the significance of each 
concept or theory in explaining the problem at hand.   
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Second, this study relies on new institutional theory to understand the behaviours of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique and the DRC. New institutional theory 
originates from the field of microeconomics and seeks to explain how institutions – 
understood as constituted of informal constraints, formal rules and enforcement mechanisms 
– structure the external environments that humans derive and how these in turn shape the 
trajectories of organisations and hence the performances of economies through time (North, 
1990, 1994, 2005). New institutional theory is appropriate for this study, since it allows for 
in-depth analyses by accounting for the role of informal constraints, formal rules and 
enforcement mechanisms in the making of the institutional contexts that prevail in 
Mozambique and the DRC.  
1.7 Limitations and delimitations 
The findings outlined in this study are unique given that this dissertation draws on the results 
from empirical research conducted in Mozambique and the DRC.  However, there are some 
limitations regarding the scope of the above findings. First, as mentioned above, the 
fieldwork research conducted in Mozambique and the DRC did not cover the whole of the 
Mozambican and Congolese territories. Second, as result of time and financial constraints, 
the researcher did not have the opportunity to embark on a second field visit in Mozambique 
and the DRC in order to collect more information.   
In addition to that, for the purpose of clarity and simplification, this study adopts a narrow 
definition of the agriculture sector by defining it as the activity consisting of the cultivation 
and production of crops as well as the raising of livestock and sea foods. Activities related to 
the exploitation of forest resources are excluded from this definition. In addition, this study 
focuses its analysis only on contemporary Chinese agricultural involvement in Africa.  
 1.8 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter 1 provides a short introduction to the study. It starts by introducing the rationale of 
the study. It then presents the aims of the study, including the main and sub-research 
questions. The chapter also outlines a short literature review on the main research questions 
posited in the study. It also highlights the research design and methods used in the study. It 
then discusses the theoretical frameworks applied in the study and provides reasons for their 
application. Finally, Chapter 1 ends with a short discussion on the limitations and the 
delimitations of the study.  
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Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature on China-Africa relations, with a focus on 
Chinese engagement in African agriculture. The chapter focuses on the main claims of 
scholars and the ways in which they have conceptualised China-Africa relations. Scholarship 
is divided between macro-level and sector-level approaches. The chapter starts with a review 
of China-Africa relations in terms of foreign and diplomatic relations, and of economic 
domains. It then discusses China-Africa relations from the perspectives of the oil, mining and 
infrastructure sectors. The rest of the chapter deals with Chinese engagement in the African 
agriculture sector. The chapter concludes with a discussion of this study‟s main contributions 
to existing scholarship on China-Africa relations.    
Chapter 3 presents the theoretical frameworks used in the study. It starts by providing a 
summary of the main theoretical perspectives in the field of international political economy. 
The chapter then establishes linkages between concepts used by scholars in the literature on 
China-Africa relations and the main theoretical perspectives of international political 
economy. The chapter also introduces the reader to Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm and new 
institutional theory, and reviews some scholarly works in which scholars have relied on the 
two theoretical frameworks to conduct their analyses. The chapter finally explains why the 
theoretical frameworks chosen are suitable for this study and the way in which they will 
guide the researcher‟s analyses of the research questions.  
Chapter 4 explains in details the research design and methodology that was followed in this 
study. This includes an explanation of the measurement instruments, sample design, data 
collection procedure, problems encountered in the fieldwork and data analysis.   
Chapter 5 provides a background and contextual study that aims to enhance the 
understanding of the motivations and behaviour of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating 
in Mozambique and the DRC. It starts by outlining the characteristics of the agriculture 
sectors in Mozambique and the DRC. It then describes the institutional contexts prevailing in 
the two countries and points to the way in which they affect the activities of smallholders and 
foreign investors.  The chapter details the customary land tenure systems in Mozambique and 
the DRC, and discusses the way in which they shape the content of the land law in both 
countries. Finally, the chapter discusses the political economy prevailing in China and the 
way in which it encourages Chinese outward investments – including agricultural 
investments.  
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Chapter 6 presents the findings and analyses on the motivations informing the activities of 
Chinese agricultural enterprises in Mozambique and the effects of the institutional context on 
their behaviours and/or modes of entry into local industries.  
Chapter 7 outlines the findings and analyses on the motivations underlying the activities of 
Chinese agricultural enterprises in the DRC and the way in which the institutional context 
affects their behaviours and/or modes of entry into local industries.  
Chapter 8 starts by revisiting the aims of this study as well as the main research questions. 
The chapter outlines the main conclusions for each case study and then proceeds to compare 
them and draw the necessary implications for theoretical generalisation. Chapter 8 further 
discusses the theoretical frameworks and the research methodology used in the study by 
emphasizing their strengths and limitations. Finally, the chapter ends with a set of 
recommendations to the governments in Mozambique and the DRC. The recommendations 
focus on the needs to formulate and implement sound decentralisation processes in order to 
resolve problems related to complex processes of gaining access to land, and the poor 
monitoring and enforcement of the land laws. The recommendations also emphasise the need 
to design indigenous institutional models in order to ensure effective transfer and adaptation 
of Chinese agricultural technologies in Mozambique and the DRC.   
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CHAPTER 2:  LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, this study has two aims. The first is to understand the 
motivations underlying the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in 
Mozambique and the DRC. The second is to investigate the manner in which institutional 
contexts in both countries affect the behaviour and/or the modes of entry of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises into local industries. 
This chapter intends to contribute toward achieving those aims by providing a comprehensive 
review of the literature on China-Africa relations, with an emphasis on studies on Chinese 
involvements into Africa‟s agriculture sector. The chapter starts by revisiting scholarship in 
the broader field of China-Africa studies before focusing on Chinese endeavours in Africa‟s 
agriculture. In addition to that, the chapter discuses the literature in term of the approach 
followed by scholars or the emphasis given to China-Africa relations. It organizes scholarship 
according to macro-level and sectoral approaches.  
2.2 Macro-level approach 
The level of approach – macro versus sectoral level – relates to the scope or scale of concepts 
or processes studied by scholars. A macro-level approach refers to general processes such as 
diplomacy, foreign relations, investment and trade. In contrast, the sectoral approach pertains 
to particular processes that are more limited in scope such as investments in the oil or in the 
agriculture sector.  The macro-level approach will be twofold: foreign relations and 
diplomatic issues, on the one hand, and economic relations, on the other.   
2.2.1 Foreign relations and diplomatic issues       
One group of scholars analyses the relations between China and Africa through the spectrum 
of standard foreign relations and diplomacy. These authors endeavour to understand the 
contemporary relations between China and African countries through the ideologies that 
guided their interactions during the Cold War period as well as through a perceived similar 
experience in their respective struggles for independence. They generally perceive China-
Africa relations as embodying an historical friendship that shape the nature of the present 
encounters between the two parties. Ultimately, these scholars consider Chinese political and 
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diplomatic engagements with the African continent as an attempt to create a more just and 
equal world order.  
Li (2007) holds that while China‟s policies towards Africa have changed since the end of the 
Cold War, the principles underpinning China-Africa relations have remained intact. Li (2007) 
acknowledges that China‟s current African policy is shaped primarily by Beijing‟s economic 
interests – in contrast to the ideological factors which dominated China‟s African policy 
during much of the Cold war. However, he argues that relations between China and Africa 
continue to be guided by the sacrosanct principles of mutual interests and non-interference. 
He holds that China‟s principle of non-interference stems from the fact that Beijing considers 
African countries as true friends and that it understands their political and economic realities 
because of its similar historical experience of colonialism and imperialism.  Li (2007) further 
argues that mutual benefit in the relations between China and Africa is reflected in areas such 
as aid for infrastructure, fair trade and debt cancellation. Shelton (2007) and Le Pere and 
Shelton (2006:38; 2007) agree with Li on this issue. For instance, Shelton (2007:50) argues 
that China has a clear and compassionate understanding of Africa‟s struggle for independence 
and its economic problems because of Beijing‟s own similar historical experience. Shelton 
argues that the common experience of colonialism and the support provided by China to 
African liberation movements in their struggle against colonialism and imperialism serve as 
the foundation for friendly relations between the two sides.  In addition to that, Le Pere and 
Shelton (2007:209) praise China‟s support for African regional organisations such as the AU 
and NEPAD. They believe that China‟s multilateral co-operations with Africa in the 
framework of the AU and FOCAC could help the continent solve problems related to peace 
and security. More important, Le Pere and Shelton (2007) hold that multilateral co-operation 
between China and Africa is likely to advance the agenda of the global South with the long-
term objective of creating a more just and equitable international order.   
On their part, Sautman and Hairong (2008), concur with Li that China‟s African policy is 
primarily driven by economic imperatives, which seek to enlarge the wealth and power of the 
Asian country. They assert, however, that Chinese activities on the African continent 
increasingly mirror those of Western countries as they tend to replicate the old developed 
states‟ patterns of exploitation of resources, oppressive labour regimes, disadvantageous 
terms of trade and support for authoritarian rulers. Nonetheless, Sautman and Hairong (2008) 
argue that despite fundamental similarities in the Chinese and Western approaches to Africa, 
there are still important differences. First, they argue that China promotes the development of 
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Africa through its investments and support for human resources. Second, they claim that 
China shares close political ideologies and approaches to socio-economic development with 
African countries. Therefore, Sautman and Hairong (2008) claim that such similarities enable 
China to be more sensitive to the situation in African countries and this restrains it from tying 
onerous conditions to its development aids.   
2.2.2 Economic relations  
Other scholars approach the current relations between China and Africa from a macro-
economic perspective. In other words, these academics attempt to explain the current 
interactions between China and Africa through assessments of the effects of Chinese trade 
and investments in Africa on the broader economies of African countries. In this perspective, 
scholars have relied on concepts informed by theories of factor endowment and product life 
cycle to make their assessments of the effects of Chinese trade and investments on the 
economies of African countries. The factor endowment theory builds on Ricardo‟s 
comparative advantage theory. This theory starts from the premise that nations maximize 
their welfare from specialization and trade. In addition to that, it seeks to predict the patterns 
of production and international trade. The theory predicts that a country will manufacture and 
export products for which the required factors of production are abundant, and import 
products for which the required factors of production are scarce (Gillies, 2005). Concepts 
related to the factor endowment theory have been used to analyse trade relations between 
China and Africa. The product life cycle is a theory of international economics that seeks to 
explain the trajectory of the location of the manufacture of innovative products through time. 
The product life cycle theory in essence holds that new products first emerged in developed 
countries with significant technological and scientific bases as well as market sizes and 
capital. Over time, once innovative products have been standardized and are produced on a 
massive scale, they are relocated to less developed countries with lower production costs in 
order to make the business more profitable and preserve market share (Vernon, 1966, 1979). 
Concepts linked to the product life cycle theory have been borrowed to explain Chinese 
investments in African manufacturing.  
Le Pere and Shelton (2006; 2007) point to the complementary nature of Chinese and African 
economies, which promotes trade between both sides. They claim that Sino-African trade is 
beneficial to both parties, since China access Africa‟s oil and minerals while African 
consumers benefit from cheap Chinese manufactured goods.  Moreover, Le Pere and Shelton 
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claim that African states – especially the resource-rich ones – amass considerable revenues 
from exporting their oil and minerals to China.  
Kaplinsky focuses his analyses on the impact of trade between China and Africa on the 
industrialization of the continent. Kaplinsky (2008) holds that the emergence of China as an 
economic giant is likely to have negative effects on Africa‟s industrialization. Kaplinsky 
argues that Chinese manufacturers of clothes, textiles and shoes compete with African 
manufacturers of the same products for African markets. He claims that such competition 
hurts Africa‟s industrial sector because of cheaper Chinese products. As a result, Kaplinsky 
(2008) claims that imports of Chinese manufactured goods have undermined the formal 
manufacturing sector in countries such as Nigeria, South Africa and Zambia. Furthermore, he 
argues that Chinese and African manufacturers also compete for international markets such as 
those of the US and Europe.  As a matter of illustration, Kaplinsky (2008) argues that African 
clothing exports to the US fell by 26% in 2007, following the removal of US and European 
quotas on Chinese textile and clothing exports in 2005 – which sparked a surge in Chinese 
exports. Likewise, he holds that before 2005, wood industries in South Africa and Ghana 
were important provider of garden furniture to Europe. Nevertheless, from 2005 Europe‟s 
major exporters of garden furniture ceased sourcing from South Africa and Ghana and 
instead turned to cheap Chinese and Vietnamese garden furniture. Kaplinsky (2008) 
concludes that China is therefore a direct and indirect competitor to Africa for African and 
world markets, and that Chinese competition is hindering the development of Africa‟s 
clothing, textile and wood industries.  
Alden, like Kaplinsky, holds that cheap Chinese manufacturing goods are displacing jobs in 
Africa. Alden (2007) argues that textiles and clothing imported from China have threatened 
to wipe out companies in South Africa, Lesotho, Kenya, Mauritius and Nigeria, while 
hundreds of thousands of jobs have been displaced. Alden (2005, 2007) also alludes to the 
significant migration of Chinese small merchants to Africa. He claims that, once in Africa, 
Chinese migrants convert themselves into retailers with the help of long-established Chinese 
business networks on the continent. Alden (2007:49-50) further contends that Chinese 
retailers sell their products at lower prices compared to African retailers, since they can rely 
on cheaper and larger superior supplies from China and exploitation of family labour. Alden 
claims that the emergence of Chinese small-scale retailers in Africa – who are involved in the 
trade of basic commodities such as clothes, foods and vegetables – threatens to displace 
African retailers.  
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Finally, Brautigam (2003) and Freeman (2008) are of the view that Chinese business 
networks are starting to establish themselves in Africa in order to escape rising production 
costs and increasing regulations in China. They argue that the establishment of Chinese 
companies in Africa can contribute to the industrialization of the continent by facilitating the 
diffusion of technologies and skills. Brautigam (2003) explains that in Mauritius and Nnewi 
(Nigeria) the presence of Chinese business networks facilitated linkages between Chinese and 
local businesses, which enabled the transfer of skills and technologies from the former to the 
latter. She argues that ultimately Mauritian and Nigerian entrepreneurs took ownership of the 
businesses. Brautigam (2009:214) also notes that Chinese leather companies have moved to 
Ethiopia as a result of the tightening of the structure of taxes and environmental laws in 
China. She points out that Chinese investments in the Ethiopian leather industry forced local 
companies to innovate and compete with Chinese companies. Brautigam (2003; 2009) refers 
to such processes of appropriation of foreign technologies and skills by local entrepreneurs as 
flying geese.  
2.3 Sectoral approach   
Another group of scholars approaches the contemporary relations between China and Africa 
by focusing their analysis on the involvement of Chinese actors on specific sectors of the 
economy. These scholars concentrate on the oil and mining and construction sectors. The 
works of these scholars have been guided by concepts informed by the mercantilist approach 
and Robert Cox‟s historical materialism. Mercantilism is an approach of IPE that holds that 
in an anarchical world the state has the obligation to promote its national interests in order to 
ensure the survival and prosperity of the country. This approach will be discussed in detail in 
the following chapter. Scholars relying on this understanding of mercantilism perceive 
Chinese forays into Africa as mainly intended to access oil, minerals and other natural 
resources for the benefit of the Chinese markets and economy as well as to promote the 
expansion of Chinese enterprises in African markets.  
Cox‟s historical materialism – also known as Cox Critical Theory (CCT) – is built around a 
dynamic interaction between three layers: social forces, forms of states and world orders 
(Cox & Sinclair, 1996:54). CCT holds that changes in the organisation of production generate 
new social forces, which in turn lead to changes in the forms of states and world orders (Cox 
& Sinclair, 1996:100). The patterns of social forces in the dominant states shape the forms of 
those states and tend to be reproduced at two levels: first, at the global level through the 
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establishment of organisations that promotes rules, values and ideologies favourable to the 
interests of dominant groups; second, within lesser developed countries through the 
imposition of rules, values and norms that attempt to reproduce social relations prevailing in 
the dominant countries (Cox & Sinclair, 1996). Therefore, institutions at both the global and 
national levels not only maintain a particular political and social order, but also mirror the 
interests of transnational dominant classes. In this perspective, CCT is closely linked to the 
notion of hegemony as developed by Antonio Gramsci (Leysens, 2008:123-125). Scholars 
relying on CCT perceive the actions of China in Africa as intended to reproduce the patterns 
of social relations existing in China by supporting African authoritarian elites in resource-rich 
states and attempting to establish international organisations that embody norms and values 
closely related to China‟s economic interests, as well as to those of Chinese and African 
political elites.    
Holslag (2006) analyses the involvement of China with the countries of Central Africa.  In 
particular, he focuses on Chinese investments in natural resources – oil and minerals. Holslag 
(2006) endeavours to understand Chinese investments in Central Africa‟s natural resources 
from the theoretical perspective of mercantilism. He defines China as a typical Asian neo-
mercantilist state. He claims that, on the one hand, Beijing is eager to comply with 
international norms and standards – such as the open flows of capital, free trade and 
transparency of financial markets – by embracing global financial institutions.  On the other 
hand, China continues to play a critical role in the management of its own economy – by 
retaining a monopoly over trade regulation and monetary policy, and encouraging state-
owned companies to expand their activities abroad through various incentive policies.  
Holslag (2006) argues that Chinese neo-mercantilist policies are being implemented in 
Africa. He holds that the main objective of Beijing‟s African policy is to access raw materials 
– oil and minerals – which are used in the manufacturing of export products. Taking the 
Central Africa region as a case study, Holslag claims that the Chinese state strongly supports 
the operations of Chinese state-owned companies that seek to access  minerals, oil and raw 
materials in that part of Africa. In this perspective, Holslag holds that the Chinese 
government has used a wide array of tools such as high-level visits, non-interference 
diplomacy, loans and investment in infrastructure, to promote the outward expansions of its 
enterprises. He claims that the ability of the Chinese state to use such a wide array of tools in 
a coherent well-defined strategy that serves the national interest reflects a clear mercantilist 
policy on the part of the Chinese government. 
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Tull (2006) argues that there are little doubts that natural resources – mainly oil – are at the 
core of China‟s economic interests in Africa or perhaps even its overall interest in the 
continent. Tull maintains that in terms of China‟s imports from Africa, nine of its ten most 
important trade partners are resource-rich states, the majority of them endowed with oil 
deposits. Just like Holslag, Tull perceives Chinese involvements with Africa‟s resource-rich 
countries as embodying a neo-mercantilist strategy. Tull (2006) claims that China uses 
various tools and strategies in order to cultivate the favour of governments of oil-producing 
countries and, therefore, obtain privileged access to their resources on behalf of Chinese 
state-owned oil companies. According to him, the tools used by the Chinese government to 
charm African leaders include soft loans, development assistance, investments in 
infrastructure, arms deliveries and diplomatic backing. Furthermore, Tull (2006) argues that 
China targets states that are isolated by the West through internationally backed sanctions, 
such as Sudan and Zimbabwe. He contends that in such countries Beijing can easily position 
itself as a strategic actor in the economic arena without having to worry about fierce Western 
competitions.  
Vines (2006), Davies and Corkin (2007), and Corkin et al. (2008) focus on Chinese 
investments in Africa‟s infrastructure. Vine (2006) argues that in post-conflict countries such 
as Liberia and Angola, Chinese investments in infrastructure such as roads, railways and 
schools made a great difference in the daily lives of local populations and enabled these 
countries to rebuild their shattered economies. Corkin et al. (2008) hold  that over the past 
decade Chinese construction companies have become active on the African continent – 
building roads, bridges, hydroelectric and irrigation schemes, hospitals and schools. They 
claim that it is especially in the resource-rich countries of Africa – such as in Angola, Zambia 
and Sudan – where Chinese construction companies are more active. They acknowledge that 
the building of infrastructure in the resource-rich countries of Africa reflects a mercantilist 
strategy by China as it enables Beijing to more easily access oil and raw materials to fuel its 
burgeoning economy. However, Corkin et al. (2008) claim that it is often the most resource-
rich African countries that are in dire need of infrastructure. Thus they hold that Chinese 
investment in infrastructure helps to improve the lives of African people. Furthermore, they 
argue that Chinese state-owned construction companies are able to receive funding from the 
Chinese government through the aid projects and establish their footprints in the African 
construction sector. They argue that several Chinese state-owned construction companies that 
came to Africa to implement the aid projects of the Chinese government have succeeded in 
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expanding their businesses locally or regionally by way of signing contracts with African 
governments or the private sector.   
Taylor analyses Chinese involvement in Africa‟s oil sector as well as the implications of this 
for the political stability of African countries. Taylor (2006; 2009) holds that access to oil is 
the cornerstone of current Chinese endeavours in Africa. According to him, oil accounts for 
at least 70% of Chinese imports from Africa. Taylor (2006) claims that China has been using 
“oil diplomacy” in order to secure access to Africa‟s oil. He defines China‟s “oil diplomacy” 
as covering the wide array of tools – such as maintaining the principles of non-interference 
and state sovereignty, soft loans, grants and arms delivery – employed by Beijing in order to 
charm African authoritarian leaders and in the process obtain privileged access to oil. 
However, Taylor goes further than Holslag and Tull in their analyses of the patterns of 
China‟s quest for African oil and minerals. For Taylor (2006), China‟s “oil diplomacy” does 
not simply reflect a mercantilist strategy on the part of Beijing, but reveals flexible - 
hegemonic behaviour from the Asian country. Taylor (2006) claims that China‟s hegemonic 
activities in Africa arise from the coincidence of interests between China and African 
political elites, especially those of resource-rich nations. He contends that China helps 
maintains these elites in power through a combination of actions, while in exchange Beijing 
gets preferential access to oil. 
Carmody and Taylor (2009) have argued more recently that China uses either soft or robust 
diplomacy – depending on local conditions in a country – in order to maintain authoritarian 
regimes in power in client states. Taking Zambia and Sudan as case studies, they explain how 
China has used different actions in order to strengthen the power of political leaders in its two 
“client states”. In the case of Zambia, they argue that in the aftermath of the 2007 presidential 
election China used soft power in the form of economic instruments to strengthen the power 
base of its ally, President Patrick Mwanawasa, who was under strong pressures from the 
opposition. In the case of Sudan, the two scholars argue that China has used more robust 
diplomacy in order to shield the Khartoum government from international sanctions.  They 
claim that China‟s strong economic interests in Sudan prompted Beijing to repeatedly try to 
block or water down UN Security Council resolutions that sought to impose sanctions on the 
Sudanese government for its bloody war in the country‟s Western Darfur region. In addition 
to that, they also claim that China has provided heavy weaponry, including fighter jets, to the 
Sudanese government and is currently building three arm factories in Sudan. Therefore, 
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Carmody and Taylor conclude that China is using a flexible hegemony (“flexigemony”) in 
order to secure long-term access to African oil and minerals.  
Alden (2008) shares a similar view to that of Taylor (2006) and Carmody and Taylor (2009). 
He argues that China promotes the “Beijing Consensus” – which is predicated on the 
principles of non-interference in domestic affairs and the promotion of sovereignty of states – 
in its interactions with African countries. For Alden (2008), the “Beijing Consensus” has 
great appeal amongst African autocrats who resist Western efforts to promote democratic 
transition on the continent. Thus, Alden (2008) holds that the “Beijing Consensus” allows 
China to win the support and trust of African leaders and gain privileged access to profitable 
business contracts. Alden (2008) holds that such development clearly undermines the 
economic interests of Western countries, which perceive the maturation of African political- 
democratic institutions as crucial in building successful market economies within the 
framework of the liberal state. He claims that should China continue to favour African 
authoritarian regimes as a means to obtain political influence in the near future, it is likely 
that Western countries will quietly abandon their plans for the democratic transformation of 
the African continent in order to compete for access to energy and mineral resources with 
China. For Alden, such an outcome will have negative effect for Africa‟s political stability 
and development.  
Lee (2006) draws a parallel between Chinese and American actions in Africa. She argues that 
Chinese and American actions in Africa are guided by hegemonic ambitions. Lee holds that 
such hegemonic ambitions manifest themselves as two facets. She labels the first facet as that 
of “Saving Africa” and claims it consists of various economic programmes officially destined 
to alleviate poverty on the African continent. She claims that such development agendas are 
often used by Western countries and China as a platform to compete for political influence in 
Africa, since each of them seeks to appear as the most committed power in the struggle 
against the marginalization of the continent in the world economy. She defines the second 
facet as “Naked imperialism” and claims that it is guided by a capitalist drive that aims to 
exploit Africa‟s riches at the expense of its people and the environment. She claims that in 
this new “scramble” for Africa, neither China nor Western countries hide their pretentions to 
access African natural resources. More important, Lee maintains that both China and the 
West use the “saving Africa” facet as a strategy to disguise their hegemonic ambitions in 
order to exploit Africa‟s natural resources.   
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Habib (2008) assess the economic and political implications of the Chinese foray into Africa 
for its natural resources. Habib (2008) attempts to draw a comparison between Chinese and 
American current and future actions on the African continent. He acknowledges the existence 
of a new scramble for Africa involving China, the United States and to a lesser extent India. 
However, contrary to Lee and Taylor, Habib perceives China not as a present hegemonic 
power, but instead as a possible future one. Habib (2008) argues that at present, China cannot 
be perceived as an hegemonic power like the United States, since Beijing‟s approach to 
development assistance has provided much relief to a “debt-laden and poverty-stricken” 
developing world. He claims that we should recognize that the emergence of China as an 
economic giant has freed Africa from Western imperialism. However, Habib (2008) 
embraces the analyses of Lee and Taylor as far as future relations between China and Africa 
are concerned.  He holds that China‟s future actions in Africa will be far more conditioned by 
competition with other powers rather than by the noble commitments enshrined in its foreign 
policy. He maintains that since the USA is already behaving as a hegemonic power in Africa, 
it is probable that in the near future China also will behave as such. Habib claims that future 
competition between China and other powerful nations – especially the USA – for access to 
Africa‟s natural resources could lead to neo-colonial relations, proxy wars and ultimately 
political instability and economic destruction.  
2.4 Sectoral approach – the agriculture sector  
As I mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the primary focus of this review of the 
scholarship on China-Africa relations is on Chinese engagements in Africa‟s agriculture. The 
works of scholars focus on the motivations informing the activities of Chinese agricultural 
enterprises in Africa. There have been four views expressed in the literature on the 
motivations informing the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Africa. A 
first group of scholar argues that the motivations  of Chinese agricultural enterprises and 
farmers operating in Africa are to provide agricultural aid in order to help develop Africa‟s 
agriculture, contribute to the attainment of food security, and to generate profits by getting 
involved in commercial activities. This group of scholars relies on the principle of mutual 
cooperation and the law of supply and demand of microeconomics. The law of supply and 
demand holds, among other things, that in competitive markets firms aim to maximize their 
profits by adjusting their production depending on the market price and demand elasticity 
(Dorfman, 1972:13). The second group of scholars claims that the motivations of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises operating in Africa are twofold. First, these enterprises aim to grow 
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and transfer to China specific agricultural commodities in order to produce biofuel and feed 
animals. Second, they aim to help African countries develop their agriculture sector by way 
of exchanges of agricultural technologies and skills. The work of this group is informed by 
concepts of the mercantilist approach to international political economy. The third group of 
scholar holds that the motivations of Chinese agricultural enterprises – especially state-owned 
– operating in Africa are to acquire long term assets – in this case farmland – in order to get 
involved in commercial activities and generate profits. The work of this group of scholar is 
informed by the law of demand and supply of microeconomics. The last group of scholar 
argues that the motivations of Chinese agricultural enterprises, especially state-owned, could 
soon be linked to China‟s national security policy, as Chinese agricultural enterprises might 
attempt in the near future to grow food in Africa and ship it to China in order to prevent riots 
and uprisings over food shortages there. The work of this group of academics is also 
informed by concepts of the mercantilist approach to international political economy.   
Brautigam and Xiaoyang (2009) and Brautigam (2009) aim to explain the motivations of 
Chinese state-owned and private agricultural enterprises involved in Africa‟s agriculture 
sector. They begin by retracing the history of Chinese involvement in Africa‟s agriculture 
sector. They hold that China‟s involvement in Africa‟s agriculture is not something recent. 
They argue that China‟s agricultural cooperation with the African continent began during the 
Cold War, when Beijing was competing with Taiwan for political influence in Africa. They 
claim that at the time Chinese involvement in Africa‟s agriculture sector was driven by 
ideological imperatives, as Beijing sought to circumvent the influence of Taiwan on the 
continent. Brautigam (2009), and Brautigam and Xiaoyang (2009) further claim that after the 
recognition of the People‟s Republic of China by most African countries in 1971, Taiwan 
abandoned most of its demonstration farms in Africa, which were subsequently taken over by 
China. However, they argue that while the state-owned farms established by China were 
successful in their first years of operation, they soon collapsed after the departure of Chinese 
technicians. Brautigam (2009) and Brautigam and Xiaoyang (2009) claim that in the 1980s 
China went through several structural changes as the economy departed from the model of a 
planned economy and moved towards becoming a market-friendly economy. One of several 
reflections of those structural changes was the formation of the first Chinese agricultural 
corporations for the purpose of foreign investments. They argue that in the mid-1980s China 
initiated a project aimed at revitalizing the old projects though joint ventures involving 
Chinese state-owned enterprises and African governments. However, Brautigam and 
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Xiaoyang (2009) assert that this initiative produced disappointing results as a result of the 
reservations of several African governments.  
Brautigam (2009:247), and Brautigam and Xiaoyang (2009) claim that after the millennium 
the Chinese government established a roadmap in order to encourage and support the 
investments of large Chinese agricultural enterprises – state-owned and private – in Africa. 
Brautigam (2009:247) also argues that the above roadmap identified agricultural technology 
and seed cultivation as two areas where Chinese enterprises could be competitive. The 
roadmap therefore suggested the establishment of agricultural demonstration centres across 
Africa, as these centres would create opportunities for Chinese agricultural enterprises. 
Brautigam (2009:249) argues that leading Chinese agricultural enterprises were selected, 
mostly from strong agricultural provinces, in order to manage the agricultural demonstration 
centres in Africa. Brautigam (2009:249) further holds that the Chinese ministry of commerce 
would provide three years of grant support to the selected Chinese agricultural enterprises 
during which they would “explore how to operate in a commercial, sustainable, and mutually 
beneficial way”.  
Furthermore, Brautigam (2009:249), Brautigam and Xiaoyang (2009) claim that the pursuit 
of commercial profits is not the sole motivation of the establishment of agricultural 
demonstration centres in Africa. They hold that in the light of the very high rate of collapse of 
former Chinese agricultural projects established in Africa, Chinese policy makers believe that 
the only manner to assure the sustainability of current Chinese agricultural projects in Africa 
is to allow Chinese agricultural enterprises to manage them. Brautigam (2009:249) further 
holds that each Chinese agricultural enterprise or institution selected to manage the 
agricultural demonstration centres in Africa had commit to do so for a minimum of five to 
eight years, if the recipient country agreed. Brautigam (2009:249), Brautigam and Xiaoyang 
(2009) claim that Chinese agricultural demonstration centres account for a new model of 
cooperation that combines business imperatives and agricultural aid. In addition to that, 
Brautigam (2009) holds that Chinese policy makers believe that by providing agricultural aid 
to African countries, Beijing could offset negative reactions to Chinese exploitation of the 
mineral and oil resources in Africa. Brautigam (2009), and Brautigam and Xiaoyang (2009) 
challenge claims about the existence of large Chinese farmlands in Africa that aim to grow 
food for Chinese markets. Brautigam (2009:258), and Brautigam and Xiaoyang (2009) 
dispute some media  reports according to which ZTE, one of China‟s largest 
telecommunication companies, planned to establish a joint-venture project of 3 million 
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hectares in the DRC. They argue that in reality the story was less alarming, since ZTE 
intended to get involved in 100 000 hectares of land for its palm project. Moreover, 
Brautigam (2009:258), and Brautigam and Xiaoyang (2009) also contest media  reports on 
the alleged pledge made by China to invest US$800 million in Mozambique‟s Zambezi 
Valley to modernise the country‟s agriculture sector.  
Brautigam and Ekman (2012) refute allegations of the existence of two memorandums of 
understanding (MOU) allegedly signed between the Chinese and Mozambican governments 
in 2006 and 2007 to create settlements for thousands of Chinese farmers in the Zambezi 
valley in order to produce rice for Chinese markets. Brautigam and Ekman (2012) claim that 
there is no empirical evidence to attest the existence of either such MOUs or their subsequent 
cancellations by the Mozambican government because of local outrage. They also dispute 
claims in the media according to which Mozambicans do not consume rice and point to 
descriptive statistics that indicate the country‟s rising imports of rice. For Brautigam and 
Ekman (2012) the bulk of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique run 
modest aid projects that also include a commercial dimension. Also, they claim that Chinese 
agricultural enterprises aim to sell their products locally. In conclusion, they claim that the 
activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique are not informed by 
China‟s national security policy.  
Brautigam and Xiaoyang (2009), Brautigam (2009), and Brautigam and Ekman (2012) make 
sound assessments of the current motivations informing the activities of Chinese agricultural 
enterprises operating in Africa. However, these authors fail to provide convincing arguments 
as to whether the business and the aid components of Chinese agricultural enterprises 
managing the aid projects can be successfully reconciled in order to achieve a mutually 
beneficial scenario for African countries and Chinese agricultural enterprises.     
Sun (2011) also endeavours to understand the motivations informing the activities of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique. She presents a strong case on the 
motivations informing the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Africa.  
In particular, she establishes a connection between the motives of Chinese agricultural 
enterprises operating in Africa and the structural constraints on the productivity of the 
Chinese agricultural sector.  
Sun (2011) argues that China‟s agricultural sector is facing several challenges that are likely 
to undermine its agricultural output in the future. According to her, these challenges include 
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the volatility of world food prices; pollution of water; climate change; and urbanisation and 
industrialisation. She holds that as the result of accelerated urbanisation and industrialisation, 
China‟s arable land areas decreased by 8.71 million hectares from 1996 to 2006. In addition 
to that, as many as 40-50 million farmers have lost their cultivated land as a result of 
confiscation of collective land areas for purposes of urbanisation and industrialisation. 
Despite the decline of arable land areas in China, Sun claims that China‟s demand for 
agricultural products is expected to grow by double-digit figures over the next 25 years. Sun 
holds that in the coming years China will increasingly rely on foreign exports to meet its 
demand for crops such as soybeans, palm oil and cotton. According to Sun (2011), it is 
against this backdrop that the Chinese government has been encouraging its agricultural 
enterprises to invest abroad. She asserts that as part of China‟s policy to diversify its sources 
of energy – by shifting from fossil fuel to biofuel – the Chinese government encourages 
foreign investments in  “minor crops” such as cassava, palm oil and sugarcane in order to 
produce biofuel. Sun (2011) argues that the Chinese government does not promote the 
production of biofuel through staple food crops in order to preserve food security. 
Furthermore, Sun (2011) argues that specialised Chinese banks, such as the China 
Development Bank (CDB) and China Exim Bank, play an important role in funding Chinese 
foreign agricultural investments.  
Sun (2011) holds that Chinese agricultural investments in Africa are led by private and state-
owned agricultural enterprises. She argues that although Chinese state-owned agricultural 
enterprises were the sole Chinese actors in Africa‟s agriculture prior to the 1990s, they have 
since been joined by many private Chinese agricultural enterprises. Sun (2011) claims that 
many of these Chinese private agricultural enterprises are family or small-scale enterprises. 
She argues that despite the fact that the small-scale enterprises are more flexible and adapt 
quickly to local conditions, they are less competitive than the state-owned agricultural 
enterprises, since the latter possess superior capital and human resources. Thus, she contends 
that Chinese state-owned agricultural enterprises are usually able to prevail over private 
enterprises in competitions for tenders on state-funded aid projects in African countries.  
Sun (2011) identifies a dozen Chinese agricultural enterprises involved in the growing of 
agricultural commodities such as rice, cassava, sugar and vegetables in a couple of African 
countries. The products of these enterprises are mostly destined for local markets, although 
they are sometimes meant for Chinese and world markets.  
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Sun (2011) further argues that in recent years China has changed the priorities of its aid 
policy in Africa, shifting its focus from areas such as construction to agricultural 
development, health and education. Sun holds that China is increasingly involved in the 
provision of agricultural aid in Africa. She argues that as from 2009 China launched the 
construction of agricultural demonstration centres in various African countries. She holds that 
the objective of the centres will be to provide training to local people as well as serve as a 
platform for collaboration between Chinese and local experts. She also explains that between 
2007 and 2009 China sent 104 agricultural technology experts to 33 African countries to 
assist in the crafting of agricultural development plans. She claims that the Chinese 
government intends to help African countries develop their agricultural sector in order to 
alleviate hunger and poverty on the continent.   
Sun (2011) perceives the China-Africa agricultural cooperation as a sort of mutually 
beneficial relationship, as China could source food and agricultural commodities in Africa to 
meet the needs of its markets and the Chinese economy, while at the same time provide 
African agriculture with the necessary help in infrastructure, skills and technology.  Sun notes 
that China has extensive experience in both traditional and modern agricultural technology. 
In particular, China has comparative advantages in agricultural activities involving labour-
intensive production and processing such as fisheries, gardening and poultry farming. She 
also argues that Chinese agricultural technologies, such as hybrid rice seedling, are based on 
world standards and have contributed to the development of Chinese agriculture. Thus, she 
argues that Africa‟s agriculture can benefit enormously from China‟s agricultural 
technologies. However, she holds that Chinese agricultural technologies will have to be 
adopted and adapted to local African conditions in order to protect the environment and meet 
the needs of local people. Thus, she claims that the challenge for Africa countries is to adapt 
Chinese technologies and use them according to the nutrition and food security needs of the 
population.   
Helen Lei Sun holds that the extent to which Chinese agricultural investments will ultimately 
contribute to the development of Africa‟s agriculture will mainly depend on indigenous 
institutional arrangements as well as the ability of local governments to deliver change at 
grassroots level and coordinate economic activities between farmers and markets. She claims 
that one of the main impediments to the development of the agriculture sector in Africa for a 
long time has been pervasive institutional arrangements that have hampered the 
entrepreneurship and wealth-creation spirit of smallholder farmers.  
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Sun (2011) makes solid assessments of the motivations informing the activities of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises operating in Africa. However, just like the previous authors, Sun does 
not put forward convincing arguments as to how the commercial activities of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises can be successfully reconciled with the provision of agricultural aid 
within the framework of the aid projects funded by the Chinese government.    
Hairong and Sautman (2010) use Zambia as a case study to investigate the motivations of 
Chinese state-owned enterprises in Africa‟s agricultural sector. Hairong and Sautman (2010) 
identify three modes of China‟s engagement with the African continent in the field of 
agriculture. The three modes of engagement are: agro-socialist mode, which was in operation 
until the 1980s; agro-capitalist or win-win mode, which was launched in the 1990s; and an 
agro-imperialism mode, which is more of a speculative idea based on the potential of the 
Chinese state to encourage large Chinese agricultural enterprises to embark on large-scale 
agricultural ventures in Africa involving large tracts of farmland.  
Like Brautigam (2009), Hairong and Sautman (2010) trace the beginning of China‟s 
involvement in the African agricultural sector to the 1960s, when Beijing was first competing 
for political influence with the West and then later with the Soviet Union as well. They 
categorize China‟s endeavours in African agriculture during that period as agro-socialism 
because of the goals, principles and methods that shaped the process of the implementation of 
agricultural projects.  First, Hairong and Sautman (2010) argue that the goal of China‟s 
involvement in African agriculture was to support the other Africa states in their struggle for 
development – as Beijing firmly believed that the development of African countries would 
enhance the power of the whole developing world in relation to the West and the Soviet 
Union. Second, Hairong and Sautman hold that China‟s engagement with African agriculture 
during that period occurred through state-to-state aid projects and did not aim to generate 
profits for the Chinese government. They argue that China helped African countries establish 
large farms such as Tanzania‟s Ubongo farm and the M‟pourie rice farm in Mauritania. Last, 
Hairong and Sautman claim that Chinese technicians and workers heading to Africa went 
through a training process intended to instil discipline and a high work ethic as well as to 
make them aware of the cultural specificities of the respective countries to which they were 
assigned in order to present behaviours that could have hurt China‟s image. As a result, 
Hairong and Sautman claim that Chinese workers maintained close and good relationships 
with African workers and their projects were usually carried out successfully.  
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Hairong and Sautman (2010) hold that the current engagement of Chinese state-owned 
enterprises in Zambia‟s agriculture sector is part of the agro-capitalist mode of engagement. 
They argue that the agro-capitalist mode of engagement coincided with the implementation of 
market reforms in China, which repositioned the Asian country in the global capitalist 
system. Hairong and Sautman claim that since the market reforms of the 1980s, Chinese 
state-owned enterprises are obliged to be profit oriented. They claim that the management of 
state-owned enterprises has been separated from their ownership through management 
contracts that provide flexibility to managers. In this way, the state is the owner and sets the 
direction, while managers are given a free hand. Moreover, both scholars argue that the 
introduction of the labour contract system in 1986 and the housing reforms in 1988 made 
possible the commodification of labour. As a result of these reforms, Hairong and Sautman 
claim that Chinese state-owned agricultural enterprises operating in Zambia behave in 
“typical agro-capitalist fashion”, employing wage labour and pursuing profit maximization. 
Hairong and Sautman (2010) identify six Chinese state-owned agricultural enterprises 
operating in Zambia – owning farmlands of between 40 to 4 100 hectares and produce food 
crops for local markets. They argue that managers of these corporations are bound in 
contractual relations with their respective headquarters in China. According to Hairong and 
Sautman (2010), the contractual relations oblige and motivate Chinese managers to make 
profits and determine the sharing of profits between managements and headquarters. Hairong 
and Sautman argue that the rate of success of Chinese state-owned agricultural enterprises in 
Zambia varies significantly, with about half of them turning a profit. Moreover, on the issue 
of wage labour, they hold that Chinese state-owned agricultural enterprises employ casual 
and permanent workers and at least three of these enterprises are members of the Zambia 
National Farmers Union (ZFU) and pay their local workers in accordance with ZFU 
standards. In light of the analysis outlined above, Hairong and Sautman (2010) hold that for 
moment, the motivation of Chinese state-owned agricultural enterprises operating in Zambia 
is to generate profits.  
Furthermore, on the issue of transfer of technology, Hairong and Sautman note that in late 
2008 Jilin Agricultural University partnered with the University of Zambia (UNZA) to build 
an agricultural demonstration Centre on UNZA‟s campus, with the aim of facilitating the 
diffusion of Chinese modern agricultural technologies in Zambia. According to Hairong and 
Sautman, when the Chinese ambassador to Zambia consulted Chinese managers on the 
matter, they questioned the relevance of the creation of a Chinese agricultural demonstration 
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Centre in Zambia. They claimed that modern agricultural technology is already in use in 
Zambia by commercial farms – mostly white-owned – and the problem was more about the 
application of the technologies by small-scale Zambian farmers and the means of transferring 
them from commercial to smallholder  farmers. Thus, Hairong and Sautman argue that the 
extent to which the agricultural demonstrations centre can benefit local farmers is still 
unclear.  
They argue that the agro-imperialism phase has been associated in the media with land-
grabbing destined to create foreign-owned plantations in Africa – often amounting to 
hundreds of thousands of hectares – in order to produce foods or biofuels for foreign markets. 
They claim that this mode of engagement is more of a rumour than reality, as far as Chinese 
agricultural enterprises are concerned. For them, reports that tend to imply Chinese land-
grabbing in Africa are fuelled by apprehensions about China in Western media, because of 1) 
the hegemony of the communist party in China, and 2) the perception of China as the main 
competitor to the West. They argue that reports by Western media according to which China 
ZTE Agribusiness acquired 2.8 million hectares of farmland in the DRC to establish a palm 
plantation are unfounded. They claim that, in reality, ZTE Agribusiness Congo only planned 
to obtain 1 million hectares of farmland in the DRC. They further argue that over time it 
turned out that ZTE Agribusiness Congo did not succeed in acquiring any farmland at all for 
its palm project. Moreover, Hairong and Sautman assert that in the case of Zambia the 
implementation of the proposed joint venture between China‟s Wuham Kaidi Holdings and 
the Zambian firm Biomass for the creation of a 700 000-hectares plantation to grow Jatropha 
was postponed, mostly as a result of internal political squabbles.  
Hairong and Sautman (2010) argue that the acquisition of large tracts of land by Chinese 
agricultural enterprises is currently not part of China‟s national security goals. They argue 
that the Chinese government has opposed the acquisition of large estates for food security and 
is instead pushing for policies that would enable Chinese agricultural enterprises to generate 
profits and contribute to the development of African agriculture. However, Hairong and 
Sautman argue that in recent times several enterprises from Middle Eastern countries as well 
as those from countries such as South Korea have shown an interest in acquiring large tracts 
of farmlands in Africa to grow food for their respective markets. In addition to that, Hairong 
and Sautman assert that the emergence of lucrative markets for biofuels, particularly in 
Europe, has also increased the premium on the part of Western agricultural companies for 
large-scale agricultural projects in Africa. Thus, Hairong and Sautman argue that if these new 
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dynamics over Africa‟s agriculture lead to a new phase of “agro-imperialism” on the 
continent, then China might also consider that it is an internationally acceptable practice and 
therefore join the land-grabbing ventures. They argue that such a scenario is especially 
plausible given that the Chinese state possesses the means to promote activities associated 
with land grabbing in Africa.   
Hairong and Sautman (2010) provide a sound evaluation of the motivations of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises operating in Zambia. However, they fail to provide more information 
on the role of the Chinese government in the endeavours of Chinese agricultural enterprises 
operating in Zambia and the implications of such a role for their strategic motives. 
Freeman, Holslag and Weil (2008) assess the future developments of Chinese agricultural 
policies in the light of the rising structural constraints faced by the country‟s agriculture 
sector. They also evaluate the implications of such policy shifts for European agricultural 
enterprises and farmers, and for African and Asian agriculture.  
Freeman et al. (2008) begin by arguing that over recent years the demand for agricultural 
commodities in China has been continuously increasing to the point that in 2003 China 
became a net importer of agricultural commodities. Freeman et al. (2008) hold that the 
Chinese government considers the inability of its agriculture sector to provide sufficient food 
to the Chinese population as a national security problem, given that the increased reliance on 
agricultural imports in a context of volatility of global food markets could lead to a surge in 
food prices that could in turn provoke social unrest. Freeman et al. (2008) contend that the 
inability of China to satisfy its agricultural needs has many causes. First, they allude to 
China‟s limited farming land, as the country is home to 20% of the world population but 
possesses no more than 7% of its farmland. Second, Freeman et al. hold that industrial 
production – both for export and domestic consumption – has been a major contributor to the 
rise of agricultural imports. They take the example of China‟s rubber and cotton imports, 
which have grown considerably in recent years because of the strong growth of motor vehicle 
production and the manufactured goods. Third, Freeman et al. point to the rise in the annual 
incomes of Chinese citizens, which led to a more diversified diet and greater consumption of 
meat. Furthermore, Freeman et al. hold that the tendency of Chinese farmers to move away 
from the production of grains to the more lucrative cultivation of fruit and vegetables has also 
spurred imports. Finally, Freeman et al. claim that China‟s accession to the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) in 2001 resulted in policy shifts – especially the reduction of import 
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tariffs on agricultural commodities – that spurred the importing of agricultural goods in 
subsequent years.   
Freeman et al. (2008) argue that China‟s imports of agricultural commodities are expected to 
grow at double-digit rates over the next 25 years. They rely on forecasts from the Food and 
Agriculture Policy Research Institute (FAPRI), which projected that China‟s imports of 
soybean will increase from 33.7 million tons in 2007/2008 to 52 million tons in 2017/2018. 
Palm oil imports are forecast to increase from 5.5 million tons in 2007/2008 to 10.8 million 
tons in 2017/2018. Cotton imports are expected to increase from 3 million tons to 6.1 million 
tons in the same period. In addition, the FAPRI also projected that China will shift from 
being a net exporter of 2.3 million tons of wheat in 2007/2008 to importing 1.4 million tons 
of wheat in 2017/2018. By contrast, the FAPRI expected China to increase its rice exports 
from 435 000 to 739 000 tons over the same period.  Freeman et al. argue that the bulk of 
China‟s agricultural imports originate from a handful of countries. They claim that North and 
Latin America supply 76% of China‟s soybeans imports, 48% of wheat and 46% of maize, 
while Asia supplies most of China‟s non-grain foodstuffs and rubber imports. They claim that 
Africa accounts for only 4% of China‟s agricultural imports, with cotton accounting for 45% 
of total agricultural imports. 
Freeman et al. (2008) hold that given the continuing surge in demand for agricultural 
commodities in China, Chinese policy makers are currently contemplating several policy 
options that will enable the country to better respond to the problems provoked by shortages 
of agricultural commodities. Freeman et al. (2008) hold that the first option envisaged by the 
Chinese government is to invest more resources in the agriculture sector. For instance, they 
argue that in 2008 the Chinese communist party central committee adopted a new set of 
reforms intended to improve the rural economy with the aim of doubling incomes by 2020. 
Freeman et al. (2008) argue that the second option considered by the Chinese government is 
the abolition of import costs – mainly by reducing imports tariffs on agriculture goods. The 
third option, according to them, is the restriction of exports for certain products such as rice 
in order to ensure sufficient internal supply. This policy has already taken the form of export 
bans and export taxes. Another policy option is the provision of agricultural aid to boost 
production abroad. Freeman et al. (2008) argue that the Chinese government believes that 
promoting agricultural production abroad through agricultural aid will boost the global 
agricultural supply and alleviate wider global supply problems troubling China. Finally, 
Freeman et al. (2008) claim that Chinese leaders are willing to push for an outward 
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agricultural policy to resolve China‟s shortages of agricultural commodities. They argue that 
agriculture features amongst the sectors that are eligible to receive government‟s support as 
part of China‟s outward investment policy.  
Freeman et al. (2008) warn that regardless of the pertinence of policies adopted by the 
Chinese government, the shortage of farmland will continue to be a major factor determining 
the extent to which China will rely on agricultural imports. They argue that in the meantime 
is not clear which policy options China will employ to resolve its shortages of agricultural 
commodities. Nevertheless, they assert that given the inability of Chinese agriculture to 
produce all the commodities the country needs, it is very probable that China will continue 
relying on the agricultural markets of North and Latin America as well as those of Asian 
states to acquire additional commodities. In addition to that, they argue that Beijing might 
decide to embark on direct land acquisition in the more unstable and institutionally weak 
countries of Africa. They warn that such move in securing land ownership in Africa might 
have negative effects on the wellbeing of local communities and the ecosystem, if not well 
tailored to local realities.  
Freeman et al. (2008) make a sound projection on the motivations that could inform the 
activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises in Africa in the medium term. However, such 
projections are not based on empirical research.  
2.5 Methodologies applied  
Most scholars who have studied China-Africa relations have relied on secondary sources of 
data such as books, newspaper reports and scholarly articles in order to collect information on 
particular aspects of China-Africa relations. However, besides these secondary sources, 
academics have also depended on primary sources of data to collect relevant information, 
although this has occurred more seldom. The primary sources of data have consisted of field 
visits, interviews and archival documents.   As far as Chinese engagements in African 
agriculture are concerned, few scholars have also relied on primary sources of data. This is 
with the notable exception of Brautigam, who has conducted fieldwork research in China and 
Africa – Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Zambia. As well as Hairong and Sautman, who have 
conducted interviews with managers of Chinese agricultural enterprises in Zambia.    
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2.6 Gap in the literature  
The above literature review has focused on scholarship dealing with contemporary Chinese 
involvement in Africa‟s agriculture sector. As I have already mentioned, academics interested 
in this sector have focused their attention on the motivations informing the activities of 
Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Africa. In the previous chapter I defined 
motivations in this study as the striving for the internal and external strategic goals that 
prompt Chinese agricultural enterprises to invest in Mozambique and the DRC. As I also 
stated in the previous chapter, understanding the motivations informing the activities of 
Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Africa is important, since it is the nature of the 
motivations – coupled with the institutional contexts prevailing in Africa – that will 
determine the impact of the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises on the welfare of 
rural and urban populations and the environment in Africa. Little empirical work has been 
conducted on the motivations informing the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises in 
Africa. In Part of our knowledge is being shaped by superficial analyses or media reporting 
that tells only a part of the story. Therefore, this study aims to enhance our understanding of 
this issue by carrying out more primary and original research.  
In the literature on Chinese involvement in African agriculture sector, scholars have made 
very few – and mostly vague – references to institutions and the way in which they affect the 
activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises. Sun (2011) broadly discusses the institutional 
context related to sub-Saharan Africa‟s agriculture sector and the way in which it has affected 
the activities of smallholders. However, she falls short of discussing how this institutional 
context has affected the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating on the 
continent. For her part, Brautigam (2009) provides a more comprehensive analysis of the way 
in which the institutional context in Sierra Leone – in particular customary land tenure system 
and political squabbles – has affected the operations of the Chinese agricultural enterprise 
Complaint, which operates the Magbass sugar industrial complex since 2003. Brautigam 
(2009) shows how the customary land tenure system and local political rivalries played a role 
in undermining the ability of the Sierra Leonean government to enforce the contract it had 
signed with Complaint on the leasing of arable land to the Chinese enterprise. Generally, 
scholars studying Chinese involvement in Africa‟s agriculture sector have ignored issues 
related to institutional environments and the way in which they shape the entrepreneurship 
possibilities of Chinese agricultural enterprises. Therefore, as I argued in Chapter 1, besides 
the motivations underlying the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises, this study will 
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also focus on institutional contexts – the physical and legal environments – especially the 
way in which they shape the behaviours and/or modes of entry of Chinese agricultural 
enterprises operating in Mozambique and the DRC.  
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CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 
3.1 Introduction 
 Scholars of China-Africa relations have relied on concepts informed by theories located 
within the approaches of the international political economy to provide explanations of 
particular aspects of Sino-African relations. However, while academics have relied on such 
concepts, they have often refrained from using or developing theories or approaches to guide 
their studies of China-Africa relations. This is particularly true concerning the phenomenon 
of Chinese involvement in African agriculture. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to 
introduce theoretical frameworks or approaches that will guide our understanding of the 
motivations informing the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in 
Mozambique and the DRC, as well as the way in which the institutional contexts in both 
countries affect their behaviours and/or modes of entry into local industries.    
This study will rely on Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm in order to understand the motivations of 
Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique and the DRC. The new 
institutional theory will be used to investigate the way in which institutional contexts in 
Mozambique and the DRC affect the behaviours and/or modes of entry of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises. This chapter has four parts. In the first, I provide a definition of the 
discipline of international political economy (IPE) and outline its main approaches. In the 
second, I offer a brief overview of the way in which the approaches of IPE have influenced 
the work of scholars in the literature on China-Africa relations. I subsequently highlight the 
limits of these approaches in addressing the two main research questions posited in this study. 
In the third, I introduce Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm and discuss its application in this study. 
In the last part, I introduce new institutional theory and argue for its relevance to this study.    
3.2 International political economy (IPE) 
3.2.1 Definition of IPE 
Before providing a definition of the discipline of IPE, it is perhaps necessary to begin by 
providing a definition of the field of political economy more generally. The discipline of 
political economy focuses on the fundamental interactions between politics and economics, 
or put differently, between the state and markets. Politics is the collective process – drawing 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
42 
 
in competing interests and values of different actors – that determines the nature and 
distribution of power in a society (Balaam & Veseth, 1996; O‟Brien & Williams, 2004; Gill 
& Law, 1988). Economics revolves around the decentralized and individualistic markets that 
allocate scarce resources to different users in order to create the maximum amount of wealth 
in a society (Balaam & Veseth, 1996; O‟Brien & Williams, 2004; Gill & Law, 1988). Politics 
is generally associated with the pursuit of power in the interests of the collectivity, the 
national interest, while economics – in the context of a capitalist society – is related to private 
wealth creation.  
Since politics centres on the allocation and distribution of power and economics focuses on 
the allocation and distribution of scare resources, it then follows that politics structures 
economics, while economics influences politics.  This is because those who possess the 
ability to command resources have power, while those who can command power have the 
ability to influence how and where resources are allocated (Balaam & Veseth, 1996; O‟Brien 
& Williams, 2004; Leysens & Thompson, 2006).   
However, while the state and markets are intertwined, they often do not share the same 
objectives or the same values. The objective of the state is to promote national interests – at 
least those of the dominant groups in society – through collective action. Therefore, the 
action of the state strongly embodies the value of equity or equality as it aims to advance the 
collective interest. On the other hand, the aim of markets is to promote the interests of the 
individuals who comprise them. In this way, markets embody the value of efficiency – 
needed in order to maximize wealth creation (Balaam & Veseth, 1996).  Thus, the 
contradiction of objectives and values between the state and markets signifies the existence of 
a fundamental tension between the two entities. Therefore, political economy is the “field of 
study that analyzes the problems and questions arising from the parallel existence and 
dynamic interaction of „state‟ and „market‟ in the modern world” (Balaam & Veseth, 1996: 
6).  
The dynamic interactions between the state and markets take place in a globalised world in 
which the activities of several actors are not restricted to national boundaries. This is 
particularly the case of multinational corporations (MNCs), international organizations as 
well as the states themselves (Leysens & Thompson, 2006). In this way, states and markets 
are connected by global systems of production, exchange and distribution (Balaam & Veseth, 
1996:13).  Therefore, as opposed to political economy, which confines its interest to the 
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analysis of the fundamental tensions arising from the dynamic interactions between the state 
and markets, the field of IPE extends this assessment to look at the ways in which the states 
and markets of the world are connected to one another, and the arrangements that have 
evolved to connect them (Balaam & Veseth, 1996:13). Susan Strange puts this more 
eloquently:  
[ IPE] concerns the social, political, and economic arrangements affecting the global 
systems of production, exchange, and the distribution and the mix of values reflected 
therein. Those arrangements are not divinely ordained, nor are they the fortuitous 
outcome of blind chance. Rather they are the result of human decisions taken in the 
context of man-made institutions and sets of self-set rules and norms (Strange, 
1988:18). 
In today‟s world the production, exchange and distribution of power and wealth between and 
within countries are the products of a network of bargains between and among states and 
markets. Strange (1988) claims that such a network of bargains is determined by two types of 
power: relational and structural power.  She defines relational power as “the power of A to 
get B to do something that they would not otherwise do”. Structural power “is the power to 
shape and determine the structures of the global political economy within which other states, 
their political institutions, their economic enterprises and (not least) their scientists and other 
professional people have to operate” (Strange, 1988:24-25). In other words, structural power 
may be described as the sets of formal and informal institutions that govern the behaviours of 
states and markets in the international political economy (Balaam & Veseth, 1996:13). 
Nowadays, structural power is increasingly more important than relational power. Strange 
(1988:26) argues that structural power is dispersed into four separate but related structures of 
power: security, production, finance and knowledge.   
3.2.2 Main perspectives of IPE 
Scholars of IPE have relied on several approaches to guide their studies on the global system 
of production, exchange and distribution of power and wealth between and among states and 
markets and the institutions and values that inform them. While some scholars have relied on 
approaches to predict future events in the world, others have used theories to view and 
interpret the prevailing international political economy. As Balaam and Veseth (1996:15) put 
it: “the theories of IPE are not just abstract academic scribbling; they guide the thoughts and 
actions of men and women in all sorts of ways and so shape and condition the world”. Thus, 
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in order to understand the way in which individuals, organizations and states think and 
behave within the spheres that define IPE, one needs to understand its theories. A word of 
caution is needed here. IPE approaches should not be considered as theories but rather as 
particular perspectives of looking at the world. In this sense, they are more theoretical 
frameworks or schools of thought than theories.  This means that a particular approach of IPE 
can encompass several theories that share its vision of the world.  
There are three main approaches that have been traditionally used to explain developments in 
the global international economy: mercantilism or economic nationalism; liberalism; and 
structuralism.  
Mercantilism, also termed economic nationalism, or statism, is the oldest approach of IPE. 
Mercantilism is the equivalent in the field of IPE of the realist approach of mainstream 
international relations. Mercantilism, like realism, shares an anarchical view of the world. In 
this context, mercantilism states that each state strives for survival, at minimum, and 
universal domination, at maximum (Donnelly, 2005). Moreover, mercantilism points to an 
intimate connection between power and wealth, as the marginal acquisition of wealth 
generates more power (O‟Brien & Williams, 2004). It holds that the state is the central 
instrument through which individuals can fulfil their goals of achieving security and 
prosperity. Thus, economic policy should be directed toward creating wealth and power to 
enhance the independence and national security of the state (Balaam & Veseth, 1996). 
Mercantilism further holds that even when states are animated by good intentions, the 
anarchical structure of the international system –and the uncertainty that it generates –prevent 
them from cooperating with their rivals (Donnelly, 2005; Gill & Law, 1988; O‟Brien & 
Williams, 2004). Instead, states are driven into competitions with their adversaries, which 
constrain them into choices that lead to sub-optimal outcomes. In this manner, mercantilism 
holds that states aim for relative gains rather than absolute benefits, as each state seeks to 
gain more security or wealth than its rivals. In other words, states are satisfied with conflicts 
that leave them worse off as long as their rivals are left even worse off (Donnelly, 2005:39). 
Thus, mercantilism sees the pursuit of power and wealth as a zero-sum game – one state‟s 
gain is another state‟s loss. Furthermore, for mercantilism, the market and market relations 
are shaped by political power. Hence, economic activity is subordinated to political goals and 
objectives (O‟Brien & Williams, 2004; Gill & Law, 1988; Keohane & Nye, 1989). 
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Historically, mercantilism referred to the policies implemented by European states from the 
16
th
 through to the 18
th
 centuries, which sought to enhance their economic and military 
strength through protectionist trade policies – particularly with their newly acquired colonies. 
Nowadays, mercantilism or neo-mercantilism accounts for the various ways in which states 
attempt to promote the expansion of their firms or industries in order to promote their 
independence and national security (Balaam & Veseth, 1996). However, more states define 
their security interests in economic terms – the protection and promotion of their strategic 
industries (Balaam & Veseth, 1996; Gill & Law, 1988). States might seek to protect strategic 
industries against foreign rivals or attempt to export more than they import (O‟Brien & 
Williams, 2004:18). Conversely, states might also seek to promote the outward expansion of 
strategic firms through a mixture of fiscal policies (Balaam & Veseth, 1996).  
The liberal approach draws considerably from the field of economics, in particular from 
theories such as comparative advantage as well as supply and demand and the operation of 
markets (O‟Brien &Williams, 2004; Burchill, 2005; Gill & Law, 1988). In contrast to 
mercantilism, liberalism has a more idealistic vision of the world. Liberals tend to minimize 
the role of force and coercion in human affairs and emphasize the ability of individuals to 
cooperate in order to achieve mutually beneficial gains. Liberals perceive interactions 
between individuals as a positive sum game – each party to the game wins (Burchill, 
2005:65; Gill & Law, 1988:45). Therefore, liberalism places a greater premium on the 
freedom of the individual and the creation of wealth through the free operation of markets. 
Liberalism holds that individuals in pursuit of self-interests maximize the benefits of 
economic exchange for society (O‟Brien & Williams, 2004).  The maximization of wealth 
accruing to society occurs through the virtues of the market – such as Smith‟s invisible hand 
or Havel‟s essence of life. Moreover, Liberalism also holds that cooperation between 
individuals and nations reduces the potential for violent conflicts, as trade and foreign 
investments decrease the power of war-orientated elites and unite citizens of different nations 
in a common and peaceful enterprise (Burchill, 2005:63; Gill & Law, 1988:45). Finally, 
liberalism shows a distaste for the state, which is perceived as inhibiting the entrepreneurial 
spirit of individuals as well as the virtues of markets. For 18
th
-century liberals such as Smith 
and Ricardo the state should be confined to providing minimalist functions such as security 
and order (Balaam & Veseth, 1996). However, the 19
th
- century liberal Mill advocates a more 
robust role of the state in markets in order to reduce inequalities by providing social services 
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such as education to the poor. On a general note, there is no consensus among liberals on the 
acceptable threshold of the state‟s interference in markets. 
In the domain of international political economy, liberalism promotes free trade between 
nations. In fact, liberals argue that free trade makes nations efficient and enables all the 
players to gain from cheaper products, increased production as well as scientific and technical 
innovations (Balaam & Veseth, 1996; Burchill, 2001; Gill & Law, 1988; Keohane & Nye, 
1989). Today, the global economy is largely governed by liberal principles. The international 
trade regime is based upon the principle of free trade; capital circulates around the globe 
without great difficulty and the all forms of economic activity are increasingly liberalized 
(O‟Brien & Williams, 2004).  
The third theoretical approach that has dominated the field of IPE is the structuralist 
approach. The structuralist approach is also referred as the critical approach, since it aims to 
question the way in which the world is organized and eventually change it (O‟Brien & 
Williams, 2004; Gill & Law, 1988).  The structuralist approach is rooted in Marxist theories 
and attempts to address structural problems that are overlooked by both mercantilism and 
liberalism (O‟Brien & Williams, 2004; Balaam & Veseth, 1996; Gill & Law, 1988).  
Although rooted in Marxist theories, the structuralist approach is evident in several theories 
such as Marxist theories, neo-Gramscian theories, feminist and environmental theories. All 
these theories have in common their propensity to explain the nature of oppression between 
and within countries in terms of structural factors (O‟Brien & Williams, 2004).  In this sense, 
Marxist theories attempt to explain the backward position of developing countries in the 
international political economy by the exploitation and dominance of their working classes by 
MNCs from rich countries. In the Marxist perspective the state is the representative of a class 
interests rather than the guarantor of the collective interest.  In the same way, neo-Gramscian 
theories – which are nevertheless rooted in Marxism – stress the role of transnational classes 
and ideology in shaping the patterns of exploitation between and within countries (O‟Brien & 
Williams, 2004: 24).  In the domain of international political economy, the structuralist 
approach perceives the structures of the global economy as conflictual and hierarchical, and 
hence favourable to the interests of global capital, the West and the leading capitalist power, 
the United States (O‟Brien & Williams, 2004:26). In this context, economic relations are 
viewed as zero-sum game – since the structure of the global economy is fundamentally 
conflictual. The structuralist approach holds that conflict within the sphere of international 
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political economy manifests itself within as well as between states, opposing dominant forces 
to subordinate classes (O‟Brien & Williams, 2004:28).    
3.3 IPE approaches and China-Africa relations                     
3.3.1 Approaches used in the China-Africa literature  
As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, scholars of China-Africa relations have relied 
on concepts informed by theories within IPE approaches in order to guide their analyses on 
Chinese forays into Africa. In some instances scholars have relied on concepts located in 
more than one IPE approach.    
A first group of scholars has undertaken their studies of China-African relations through 
concepts informed by mercantilism. These scholars of China-Africa relations have perceived 
contemporary Chinese endeavours on the African continent as embodying a form of 
economic nationalism. They generally argue that the main objective of the current Chinese 
foray into Africa is to access natural resources – mainly oil – in order to sustain its economic 
growth. These scholars argue that China has devised an array of policies and instruments 
such as subsidies, soft credit, arms sales and diplomatic backing to gain access to African 
natural resources through its state-owned enterprises.  
A second group of scholars has relied on concepts informed by the liberal approach to 
explain Chinese current engagements with Africa. These scholars have used various concepts 
of neoclassical economic theories – such as the product life-cycle theory and factor 
endowment theory – to account for Chinese trade with Africa as well as Chinese investments 
in Africa. On the issue of trade, these scholars generally hold that Chinese and African 
economies are complementary and that Chinese goods are cheaper than those produced on 
the African continent. Regarding investments, scholars generally argue that Chinese 
manufacturing companies are likely to move to Africa in the medium term because of rising 
production costs in China. They claim that Chinese investments in manufacturing have the 
potential to trigger positive effects for local economies in the form of employment and 
diffusion of technologies and skills.      
A third cohort of scholars has made use of concepts informed by the structuralist approach to 
comprehend particular aspects of China-Africa relations. Scholars who have been influenced 
by these concepts can be divided into two groups. The first group consists of scholars who 
perceive China as the leader of developing countries or the global South. As such, these 
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scholars consider China and African countries as development partners in their attempt to 
empower the global south in order to create a new global order. Thus, these scholars have 
mostly explained current Chinese endeavours in Africa as an attempt to help African 
countries develop their economies. The second group of scholars is influenced by concepts of 
derived from Gramscian theories, as indicated in the last chapter. These scholars suspect 
China of seeking to impose a new world order that is favourable to its economic interests and 
yet exploitative of the bulk of African people. They perceive the aggressive Chinese policies 
to access oil in Africa and its geopolitical alliances with authoritarian regimes – in the context 
of bilateral relations or through the gradual establishment of institutions – as part of a strategy 
to establish a new global order sympathetic to Chinese economic interests.    
3.3.2 Limitations of the traditional approaches of IPE         
The above dominants perspectives of IPE are, unfortunately, not suitable for addressing the 
two main research questions posited in this study. In other words, the mercantilist, the liberal 
and structuralist perspectives are not appropriate to allow an in-depth investigation of the 
motivations underlying the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in 
Mozambique and the DRC, as well as the manner in which the institutional contexts in both 
countries affect their behaviour and/or modes of entry into local industries.   
As noted in chapter 1, the motivations underlying the current activities of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises operating in Africa are somewhat complex, given the presence of 
various Chinese actors, such as Chinese government, state-owned agricultural enterprises and 
private agricultural enterprises –including family-scale enterprise. In this context, it appears 
that the current Chinese agricultural foray into Africa embodies at least two dimensions. 
First, it embodies a business or economic oriented dimension, given that the goal of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises, especially the private ones, is probably to get involved in profitable 
business ventures abroad. Indeed, in conformity with one of the main assumptions of 
microeconomics, managers of Chinese private enterprises should be perceived as rational 
individuals seeking to maximise their own utilities.  
Second, the contemporary activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises in Africa also 
exemplify a political or strategic dimension, insofar as the activities of these enterprises, 
especially the state-owned enterprises, also mirror the interests and goals of the Chinese 
government. In such a context, it is quite likely that the motivations of Chinese agricultural 
enterprises operating in Mozambique and the DRC embody some strands of mercantilist, 
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liberal and even structuralist perspectives of IPE. Therefore, neither the realist-mercantilist 
nor the liberal, nor the structuralist approaches are suitable, in isolation, to provide 
comprehensive explanations on the motivations underlying the activities of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique and the DRC.     
The behaviour of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique and the DRC is 
equally a complex phenomenon. As mentioned in the preceding chapters, the behaviour of 
Chinese agricultural enterprises in the two countries is likely to be constrained by the nature 
of institutional contexts –the legal and physical environments prevailing on the ground. 
Given that the institutional contexts are the outcome of specific institutions, understanding 
the former requires a comprehensive assessment of the latter. However, assessing institutions 
is a complex task in itself since institutions do not only encompass the formal rules of the 
game but also extend to the customs, values and traditions that have strong bearing on the 
formal rules. In this perspective, none of the traditional perspectives of IPE is suited to 
provide an in-depth investigation of the meso issues – institutions – and the manner in which 
they determine the institutional contexts in Mozambique and the DRC.     
In light of the limits of the traditional perspectives of IPE to help address the two main 
research questions posited in this study, this dissertation will rely on two theoretical 
frameworks borrowed from other disciplines to answer its main research questions.  
First, Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm will be used to understand the motivations underlying the 
activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises in Mozambique and the DRC.  This paradigm, as 
it will be mentioned below, is not a theory but rather an envelope of several perspectives of 
international business. In addition, Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm, as it will be further 
discussed below, contains a contextual variable that enables scholars to capture specific 
features related to the political economy, industrial particularities and features of rival firms, 
in both countries of origins and recipient countries. In this context, Dunning‟s eclectic 
paradigm is pertinent for this study insofar as it will enable the integration of all the 
dimensions embodied in the motivations underlying the activities of Chinese agricultural 
enterprises operating in Mozambique and the DRC into one analytical framework.   
Second, this study will rely on the new institutional theory to understand the manner in which 
the institutional contexts in Mozambique and the DRC shape the behaviour and/or the modes 
of entry of Chinese agricultural enterprises. The new institutional theory is useful for this 
study as it will allow for an extensive study of institutions and institutional contexts – by 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
50 
 
focusing on both informal constraints and formal rules and the manner in which they derive 
specific institutional contexts in Mozambique and the DRC.  
3.4 Dunning’s eclectic paradigm      
Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm – also known as the OLI paradigm – is an empirical framework 
of international business that aims to explain the determinants of international production
2
 
(Dunning, 2000, 2001; Estrella, 2001). In another words, it seeks to explicate the motives and 
configurations of foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinational corporations (MNCs) 
(Dunning 2000, 2001). The OLI paradigm seeks to explain why, when and where MNCs 
embark on FDI (Dunning, 2001).  The above paradigm was put forward for the first time in 
1976 by John Dunning during the Nobel Symposium in Stockholm (Dunning, 2001; Estrella, 
2001). The initial formulation of the paradigm was a response to the growing role of 
international production and multinational enterprises in the world economy (Estrella, 2001). 
The OLI paradigm also emerged as a result of the increasing numbers of competing theories 
in the disciplines of macroeconomic, microeconomic and misoeconomic studies, all 
attempting to explain the determinants of international production (Estrella, 2001). Dunning‟s 
eclectic paradigm should not be viewed as a theory but rather as an envelope or a synthesis of 
several theories in the field of international business such as internalization theory, industrial 
organization theories and locations theories (Dunning, 2000; Estrella, 2001; Cantwell & 
Narula, 2001). This model is therefore intended to provide an overall framework for 
empirical research that would draw the attention of the researcher to the most relevant 
theories for the problem at hand (Cantwell & Narula, 2001). Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm 
also provides an outline for a comparison between theories by establishing their points of 
contact and clarifying the relationship between different levels of analysis and the different 
questions theorists have addressed (Cantwell & Narula, 2001). The OLI paradigm does not 
assess which theories should be used or how different theories should best be synthesized, but 
rather provides a framework to facilitate such processes (Cantwell & Narula, 2001). 
Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm posits that the motives and extent of the added-value activities 
of MNCs can only be fully understood if they are applied to a predefined context (Dunning, 
2000, 2001). Thus, the OLI paradigm is context specific as the configuration and motives of 
FDI are likely to vary across firms, regions, countries or industries. It is precisely the holistic 
                                                          
2
 According to Dunning, international production is production financed by FDI and undertaken by 
multinational corporations. 
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nature of the OLI paradigm and its contextual specificity that account for the strength of the 
model and its relevance in explaining the determinants of international production. It has 
therefore been the most influential framework for the empirical investigation of determinants 
of FDI over several decades (Dunning, 2000; Stoian & Filippaios, 2008; Cantwell & Narual, 
2001).             
Dunning (2001) asserts that at any given point in time the extent and pattern of international 
production will be determined by the configuration of three sets of forces.  
1) The Ownership advantages (O) variable: these are the net advantages that firms of one 
nationality possess over those of another nationality in supplying a particular market 
or set of markets. Such advantages might arise as a result of firms‟ strategic 
ownership (i.e. superior managerial and/or technological capabilities) or of access to 
income-generating assets (i.e. capital). The ownership advantage tends to compensate 
for the additional costs associated with setting up and operating abroad, costs which 
are not faced by domestic enterprises (Stoian & Filippaios, 2008; Erdener & Shapiro, 
2005).  
2) The Locational advantages (L) variable: these are the specific advantages that accrue 
to firms for locating their value-adding activities outside their national boundaries 
(Dunning, 2001). Locational advantages are usually classified into four categories: 
natural resources advantages such as raw material and energy; economic environment 
advantages, such as market size and R&D facilities; cultural and social advantages, 
such as culture and language; and political power and legal environment advantages, 
such as political stability and the legal environment.   
3) The Internalization advantages (I) variable: these are advantages that accrue to firms 
in the course of their foreign value-adding activities from their ability to exploit their 
ownership advantages by internalizing production inside the firm in order to avoid 
transactions costs associated with intermediary goods and intangible assets (i.e. 
knowledge) (Dunning, 2001; Erdener & Shapiro, 2005).  In another words, 
internalization advantages are the benefits that accrue to firms from expanding their 
production abroad rather than to provide licenses to independent firms (Dunning, 
2000; Itaki, 1991).  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
52 
 
Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm holds that all three types of advantages, O, L and I, must be 
satisfied in order for MNCs to invest abroad. Dunning (2001) argues that the three variables 
that make up the OLI paradigm should not been seen as independent of one another. Instead, 
all three variables should be considered as mutually reinforcing; for instance, locational 
advantages can strengthen firms‟ ownership advantages and their ability and willingness to 
internalize markets, while the internalization advantages can consolidate the ownership 
advantages (Dunning, 2001).  
As mentioned above, while the OLI variables offer a framework to explain the determinants 
of FDI, the precise scope and motivations of firms involved in foreign value-added activities 
will not only depend on the OLI parameters, but also on the  local context and the manner in 
which firms respond to that context (Dunning, 2000). Therefore, the OLI paradigm also 
encompasses a contextual variable (i.e. control variable). The contextual variable relates to 
the political economy of the country or region of the investing firm and that of the country or 
region in which it is seeking to invest; the industry and the nature of the value-added activity 
in which firms are engaged; and the features of competitor firms, including their objectives 
and strategies in pursuing these objectives. 
Regarding the contextual variable, Dunning (2000) identified four main categories of 
multinational corporations‟ activities. The classification of these activities into four big 
categories is designed in order to enable scholars to better understand the motives of FDI 
undertaken by MNCs. Thus, according to the above classification, activities of MNCs are 
divided into the following categories: 
1) Those designed to satisfy a particular foreign market or set of foreign markets 
(market-seeking activities); 
2) Those designed to gain access to natural resources such as minerals, agriculture 
products and unskilled labour (resource-seeking activities); 
3) Those designed to reduce production and transaction costs by getting close to 
suppliers and customers, or by promoting efficient division of labour  or 
specialization of an existing portfolio of foreign domestic assets by multinational 
corporations (i.e. efficiency seeking activities); 
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4) Those designed to protect or augment the existing O-specific advantages of the 
investing firms and/or to reduce those of their competitors (i.e. strategic asset 
activities) 
Following criticism from scholars in the field of international business who pointed to the 
inability of Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm to account for the pattern of FDI that emerged 
during the last quarter of the 20
th
 century, when multinational corporations from developed 
countries preferred to invest in other developed countries, the OLI paradigm has been 
extended. Dunning (2000, 2001) acknowledges that the last quarter of the 20
th
 century 
witnessed significant changes in the global economy marked by the maturation of the 
knowledge-based economy; the deepening of financial and economic integration at the global 
level; the liberalization of cross-border markets; and finally the emergence of several new 
players on the global economic stage. Dunning (2000) and Cantwell and Narula (2001) 
further argue that the above structural changes in the global economy have led to the 
emergence of asset augmenting and alliance capitalism (i.e. the merging between or 
acquisitions of MNCs from different nationalities) as MNCs have sought to disperse their 
activities abroad in several regions or countries in order to tap into alternative streams of 
technological innovations and knowledge. The geographical dispersion of MNCs‟ activities 
has in turn led to the creation of industrial clusters of innovative technologies in various 
regions of developed countries. Dunning (2000) argues that as a result of these changes it is 
important to conduct not only a static but also – depending on the context – a dynamic 
analysis in order to provide a comprehensive explanation of the determinants of MNCs‟ 
activities. Dunning holds that most FDI in developed countries is made by efficiency- and 
strategic asset-seeking MNCs that intend to protect and augment their ownership advantages 
by taking advantage of the non-imitable set of location-bound created assets. Understanding 
the factors underpinning their activities requires a dynamic analysis. However, Dunning 
(2000) argues that a major part of FDI in developing countries is first-time investments, 
which are often made by market- and resource-seeking MNCs. For him, a static analysis is 
still relevant for these kinds of FDIs. 
The introduction of dynamic analysis into the OLI paradigm has direct implications for the 
definition and configurations of the O, L and I advantages and the way in which these 
advantages interact with one another.  
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In a dynamic analysis the ownership advantage is not only understood as the firm-specific 
income-generating asset that allows it to engage in foreign production, but also as the  asset 
resulting from the firm‟s ability to coordinate its initial assets with other assets across 
national boundaries (Dunning, 2001; Cantwell & Narula,2001). In this kind of analysis, the 
locational advantage is perceived as the immobile or human-created benefits such as 
agglomerations of firms and sound institutions which enable foreign firms to access new 
strains of knowledge and practices in the host country (Dunning, 2000). Finally, in the 
dynamic analysis the internalization advantage is not only comprehended as the benefit 
accruing to the firm from internalizing production inside the firm, but also from the ability of 
the firm to organize the flow of knowledge within its different subsidiaries (Dunning, 2000).  
The dynamic analysis thus changes the configuration of the OLI parameters in the sense that 
the interactions between the O, L and I variables become powerful. This is because over time 
each type of advantage is likely to influence the evolution of one or both of the other 
advantages. The interaction is particularly stronger between the O and L advantages 
(Cantwell & Narula, 2001; Dunning, 2001). For instance, the interaction between ownership 
and locational advantages tends over time to lead to an increase in both sets of advantages, 
since an MNC with a specific income-generating asset that decides to invest in a foreign 
country to take advantage of interactive learning and innovative technologies – deriving from 
the agglomeration of firms – will over time increase its ownership advantage while at the 
same time contributing to the enhancement of the technological capabilities of local firms 
through the same process of interactive learning (Cantwell & Narula, 2001). However, in 
some cases the ownership advantage might lead to a reduction of locational advantage in the 
home country. This occurs when an MNC invests in a country with weak technological 
capacity and therefore drives out local competition and reduces local technological capacity 
further (Cantwell & Narula, 2001).   
I mentioned above that the revision of Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm was the consequence of 
criticisms of this paradigm. The criticisms have been related to the configuration of the OLI 
paradigm, its predictive power as well as linkages among its main determinants.   
This discussion acknowledges four majors criticisms directed towards Dunning‟s eclectic 
paradigm. The first is of the predictive power of the paradigm. Itaki (1991) and other scholars 
(Dunning, 2001) argue that the explanatory variables identified by the paradigm are so 
numerous that it becomes difficult to determine which variables play a more critical role in 
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providing the explanation for the determinants of FDI. Itaki (1991) considers the OLI 
paradigm as a shopping list of variables since “Theorists, empiricists, and historians can 
freely invent new determinants to describe a particular case of FDI as long as they fall under 
one of the three headings”.  For Itaki, a good theory needs to contain few determinants in 
order to explain an economic phenomenon adequately. Therefore, for these scholars 
Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm is not a meaningful instrument for explaining the determinants 
of FDI (Itaki, 1991; Dunning, 2011).  
The predictive power of the OLI paradigm has also been criticised by Macharzina and 
Engelhard (1991). Macharzina and Engelhard hold that not only Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm 
contains numerous variables but foremost, the selection of these variables is arbitrary. They 
claim that while most of the variables contained in the OLI paradigm are relevant from a 
normative point of view, this is not necessarily the case from an empirical one, since little 
empirical research has been conducted to confirm the relevance of those variables. In this 
perspective, Macharzina and Engelhard (1991:28) conclude that “the eclectic paradigm 
remains an abstract analytical framework “in search of a theory”, not a material theory which 
would allow for drawing empirically substantiated conclusions.   
The second main criticism has revolved around the interaction between the ownership and 
localization advantages. Itaki (1991) defines ownership advantage as “an economic asset, the 
value of which is equal to the capitalized value of expected future super-normal profit (i.e. 
revenue net cost)”. In another word, he defines ownership advantage as the super-normal 
profit obtained after paying for all production and transaction costs. For Itaki, Dunning‟s 
eclectic paradigm confuses the ownership advantage in “engineering terms” with that in 
“economic terms”. He claims that ownership advantage cannot be measured in engineering 
terms – productivity innovations or quality innovations – but only in economic terms.  As for 
the locational advantage, Itaki argues that the price structure of a location must be assessed 
when identifying an advantage linked to that location. In another word, he claims that 
locational advantage is a function of a country‟s input prices. Thus, Itaki holds that the 
ownership advantage of a firm in a foreign country is partly determined by that firm‟s 
specific assets as well as by the host country‟s costs efficiency, since whether a technology 
turns out to be advantageous or disadvantageous depends both on the firm‟s input coefficients 
and the host country‟s input prices. Itaki (1991) therefore argues that ownership and 
locational advantages cannot be measured nor identified separately.   
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Another main criticism of the OLI paradigm concerns the relationship between ownership 
and internalization advantages. Again, Itaki argues that ownership and internalization 
advantages are not independent. Itaki (1991) claims that if arms-length markets are inefficient 
and incur high transaction costs, firms would decide to internalize and/or integrate production 
inside their organizations in order to minimize those transaction costs. He identifies three 
types of transactions costs: those associated with government interventions; those associated 
with imperfect or oligopolistic competition; and those inherent in commodity transactions per 
se.  Itaki (1991) holds that by internalizing and integrating markets such as production, 
research and development (R&D), marketing and management, the firm will generate 
advantages over other firms. Thus, Itaki argues that the advantage generated by firms as a 
result of internalization and integration of markets is the ownership advantage. Moreover, he 
argues that the above process is dynamic as internalization and integration generate the 
ownership advantage, which in turn promotes further internalization and integration. In 
addition to that, Itaki (1991) also claims that ownership advantage includes the cost of its 
acquisition. This is because after paying for all production costs, the ownership advantage 
that remains in the firm simply results from the firm‟s organizational power of internalization 
and integration. Thus, Itaki (1991) claims that the ownership advantage is similar to the 
internalization advantage, contrary to what is claimed in the OLI paradigm.  
Finally, the last major criticism of the OLI paradigm focuses on the absence of integration 
among the main determinants of this paradigm.  Macharzina and Engelhard (1991) argue that 
the main determinants of Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm –the ownership, locational, 
internalisation advantages, plus the contextual variable –are not sufficiently integrated in 
order to establish causal connections that will cross-relate variables in order to provide more 
understanding about the types and problems of international production. Macharzina and 
Engelhard (1991) claim that the integration of the main determinants of the OLI paradigm is 
especially important given the pretention by Dunning to establish links between determinants 
that belong to different levels of analysis without providing any mediating mechanism. 
Indeed, they hold that ownership advantages are located within the firm‟s level of analysis, 
while the contextual variable is situated within the country‟s level.  According to them, 
linking these two levels of analysis requires the establishment of causal mechanisms and not 
merely statistical causal effects.         
Since its introduction in 1976 Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm has been applied by several 
scholars in the field of international business to explain the determinants of FDI undertaken 
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by MNCs of specific countries to determined locations. We are going to mention a few such 
studies here. 
Stoian and Filippaios (2008) focus on the determinants of Greek firms‟ investments in 
Central and Eastern and South-Eastern European Countries (CESEE). They rely on 
Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm in order to understand the determinants of Greek firms‟ 
investments in CESEE countries. They aim particularly to test the impact of ownership and 
locational advantages on the decisions by Greek‟s investors to engage in value-added 
activities in CESEE countries. Regarding methodology, Stoian and Filippaios (2008) rely on 
statistical binary logistic regressions. They include in their sample 177 manufacturing firms – 
both domestic enterprises and foreign subsidiaries of MNCs – listed on the Athens Stock 
Exchange (ASE).  They investigate these firms‟ investments abroad over a period of six years 
(1994-1999), based on the official daily reports of ASE – which contains all the information 
on the activities of all firms listed – as  well as the annual reports of the firms.   
Stoian and Filippaios (2008) find that Greek investments in CESEE countries are mainly 
determined by similarities between the Greek and the CESEE economies as well as by the 
openness of the latter economies. In addition to that, they argue that Greek companies make 
use of their ownership advantages – in particular their superior human and financial resources 
– to invest in CESEE countries in order to reduce risks associated with transaction costs.  
Dunning, Suhk Pak and Beldona (2007) focus their analysis on the determinants of different 
modes of entry of international franchisors into overseas markets. Dunning et al. (2007) 
identify two types of entry modes use by international franchisors to operate in foreign 
markets: contractual entry mode (contractual franchising) and equity entry mode. These 
scholars hold that contractual franchising is a mode of entry through which international 
franchisors transfer their rights to local franchisees by means of contracts. Moreover, the 
same scholars argue that equity entry modes take several forms such as joint ventures and 
subsidiaries.  Dunning et al. acknowledge that the majority of international franchisors chose 
contractual franchising as their preferred mode of entry into overseas markets. This is 
because contractual franchising allows them to reduce risks and rely on the resources, 
capabilities and entrepreneurial spirit of local franchisees. However, despite this reality, a 
small number of international franchisors still rely on an equity mode of entry to penetrate 
into foreign markets and Dunning et al. endeavour to understand the reason for this.   
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They hypothesize that the precise configuration of the foreign operations of international 
franchisors will depend on the interactions of the ownership, locational and internalization 
advantages. They particularly assume that the equity mode of entry might be the product of 
interactions between ownership and locational advantages in the framework of a dynamic 
analysis, since the motives of international franchisors that own foreign outlets might be to 
upgrade their ownership advantage. Nevertheless, Dunning et al. claim that international 
franchisors opting for contractual franchising to enter into foreign markets are primarily 
interested in gaining market share. Thus, a static analysis is suitable for contractual 
franchising .          
For their methodology Dunning et al. conduct four binary logistic regressions. They select a 
sample of 160 US firms from a list of 200 international franchisors published in the 
Entrepreneur International magazine. They also select a sample of 28 UK firms from a list of 
30 UK international franchisors published by the British Franchise Association (BFA).  In 
total, they examine a sample of 188 firms. After analysing their results, Dunning et al. 
conclude that US international franchisors prefer to enter foreign markets via a non-equity 
contract. This is because US firms perceive the franchising business as a means to create 
franchising networks. As a corollary to this, Dunning et al. claim that US firms tend to 
establish franchisees in foreign markets where local applicants demonstrate competency. As 
for UK firms, Dunning et al. argue that they prefer the equity strategy of ownership to enter 
foreign markets. This is because managers of UK firms strongly perceive foreign locations as 
significant sources of learning. Thus, Dunning et al. claim that the primary motive of UK 
international franchisors in overseas markets is to enhance competitiveness.    
Erdener and Shapiro (2005) focus their analysis on the determinants of Chinese diaspora 
family firms‟ investments in mainland China. They argue that approximately 60 million 
culturally identified Chinese people live in Southeast Asia where they have established 
enclaves in countries other than China. They hold that while these Chinese ethnic groups 
comprise a small minority of not more than 10 per cent in all of the Southeast Asian 
countries, they nevertheless play a significant role in the economies of the region as they own 
the major portion of its corporate wealth. Erdener and Shapiro (2005) hold that Chinese 
ethnic minorities tend to organize themselves into modern family enterprises.  
Erdener and Shapiro (2005) rely on Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm to understand the 
determinants of Chinese family enterprises‟ (CFEs) investments in mainland China. They 
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hypothesize that the precise configuration of these investments will depend on the 
interactions of their ownership, locational and internalization advantages. As for 
methodology, Erdener and Shapiro rely on secondary data such as articles, books and 
newspapers.  They conclude that CFEs possess distinctive ownership, locational and 
internalization advantages – compared to Western MNCs – which enable them to invest 
successfully in China. The ownership advantages are quite unique and relate to particular 
skills such as deal making, rational contracting, operational control, risk management and 
firm size. The locational advantages are contingent to ownership advantages and include 
opacity in government regulations and high levels of corruption – which is quiet rampant in 
China. Concerning the internalization advantages, Erdener and Shapiro argue that because of 
its smaller size and superior control ability, the CFE is able to quickly mobilize coordinated 
action and resources, thereby gaining the advantages of timing and flexibility vis-à-vis its 
competitors.   
As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, this study will rely on Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm    
to enhance our understanding on the motivations informing the activities of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises in Mozambique and the DRC. As such, this study holds that Chinese 
firms embarking or seeking to embark on agricultural enterprises in Mozambique and the 
DRC should enjoy ownership, locational and internalization advantages. The ownership 
advantages should consist of specific assets such as technology, managerial skills and capital. 
The locational advantages should be natural resources and market availability or labour costs. 
Finally, the internalisation advantage will be defined as the ability of Chinese agricultural 
enterprises to exploit their ownership advantages abroad and will therefore be ignored or 
considered as given. The exclusion of the internalisation advantage is also due to the fact that 
this study will adopt a static analysis of Chinese agricultural investments in Mozambique and 
the DRC. This is because Chinese agricultural investments occur in developing countries that 
have low stocks of knowledge and technology. 
Furthermore, this study will also take into account the contexts in China and in Mozambique 
and the DRC when assessing the motivations informing the activities of Chinese agricultural 
enterprises operating in these two countries.  Two contextual variables are relevant in this 
case. The first variable pertains to the nature of the political economy of China – especially as 
it relates to the role of the Chinese government in promoting the outward expansion of 
Chinese firms. The second variable will relate to the provision of agricultural aid through 
research and training by Chinese agricultural enterprises running the aid projects in 
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Mozambique and the DRC. In this way, the ownership, locational and internalization 
advantages will capture concepts informed by the liberal approach of IPE. Equally, the 
contextual variable related to the political economy of China will reflect concepts informed 
by mercantilism, while the provision of agricultural aid through the aid projects will mirror 
concepts informed by the structuralist approach. Ultimately, this study holds that the 
motivations informing the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in 
Mozambique and the DRC will be determined by the combination of their ownership and 
locational advantages as well as by the nature of the two contextual variables identified 
above.    
3.5 New institutional theory  
In the previous chapter I argued that scholars interested in Chinese engagements in African 
agriculture have restricted their focus to the motivations of Chinese actors and have paid 
little, if any, attention to the manner in which local institutions affect the operations of 
Chinese agricultural enterprises. Investigating the way in which institutional contexts in 
Mozambique and the DRC affect the behaviour and/or modes of entry of Chinese agricultural 
enterprises into local industries adds a new perspective to the discipline of China-Africa 
relations. In doing so, this study will rely on new institutional theory – developed by 
Douglass North and to a lesser extent by Oliver Williamson – to understand the way in which 
institutional contexts affect the behaviour and/or modes of entry of Chinese agricultural 
enterprises. New institutional theory is a theory of microeconomics and for this reason it is 
also called the new institutional economics.  
New institutional theory provides an analytical framework that seeks to understand the 
process through which institutions emerge and evolve over time (North, 1990, 1994, 
Williamson, 2000). New institutional theory starts from the premise that institutions form the 
incentive structure of a society and are the fundamental determinants of economic 
performance and levels of economic growth (North, 1990, 1994; Williamson, 2000). 
Therefore, it would be more appropriate to posit that new institutional theory is specifically 
interested in the evolution of economies through time; new institutional economics thus 
provides an analytical framework of economic dynamics.  North (1994) argues that a theory 
of economic dynamics is not only crucial for understanding the way economies evolve 
through time but also for the field of economic development. He claims that the neoclassical 
theory of microeconomics is an inappropriate tool to analyse and prescribe policies that will 
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induce development.  Nevertheless, North (1994) holds that new institutional theory does not 
yet provide a theory of economic dynamics comparable to the Walrasian general equilibrium 
theory. He argues that new institutional theory rather provides the “initial scaffolding of an 
analytical framework capable of increasing our understanding of the historical evolution of 
economies and a necessary crude guide to policy in the ongoing task of improving the 
performance of economies”. In a recent work, North (2005:126) argues that it is unlikely that 
any theory of economic dynamic could possibly be developed –as it would lack precision in 
explanation and prediction. However, he holds that specifying why such a general theory is 
unlikely should prepare us for a more limited but manageable approach to deal with 
economic dynamic.   
North (1990:3) defines institutions as “the humanly devised constraints that structure human 
interaction”. North (1990, 1994) and Williamson (2000) claim that institutions are made of 
formal rules (e.g. rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (e.g. norms of behaviour, 
conventions, self-imposed codes of conduct) and their enforcement mechanisms. Williamson 
(2000) and North (1990) argue that informal constraints, formal institutions and their 
enforcement characteristics are interconnected, and hence a change in one component leads 
to variations in the others. North (1990: 6) claims that institutional change is therefore a 
complicated process because “the changes at the margin can be a consequence of changes in 
rules, in informal constraints and in kinds and effectiveness of enforcement”. Williamson 
(2000) claims that informal institutions are the most embedded in social structures and 
therefore, change very slowly – often over centuries or millennia. He further argues that 
formal institutions can change progressively as a result of revolution or occupation. However, 
he claims that such breakdowns are exceptional in history and even when they occur, “the 
response to such opportunities is often one of failure”. Williamson (2000) and North (1990, 
2005) maintain that major changes in the rules of the game occur more slowly, over decades 
or centuries. In this way, North and Williamson hold that informal institutions – because of 
their strong embeddedness in social structures – have a pervasive effect on the long-term 
character of economies. Therefore, they conclude that institutions usually change 
incrementally rather than in a discontinuous fashion.     
The origin of new institutional theory can be traced to the late 1960s and the pioneering work 
of North (Nye, 2008). It was precisely because of the inability of the neoclassical theory of 
microeconomics to provide a sound analytical framework for development economics that 
North ventured into the development of the new institutional theory (Nye, 2008; Poskow, 
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2008). North, Williamson and other scholars of new institutional theory have criticized the 
neoclassical theory for ignoring the role of institutions in development, or at best for taking 
them for granted (North, 1990, 1994; Williamson, 2000; Poskow, 2008). As a matter of fact, 
neoclassical theorists have traditionally tended to explain the disparity between rich and poor 
countries through their unequal access to capital and technology (Nye, 2008).  
North‟s theory of institutions is based on two major modifications of the traditional 
neoclassical theory of microeconomics. First, North (1990, 2005) revisits the neoclassical 
conception of human behaviours. In neoclassical theory, human behaviour is conceived as 
rational, since individuals are assumed to make choices that maximize their welfare at any 
given time. While North (1990) does not question the wealth-maximizing behaviour 
described in the neoclassical theory, he nevertheless holds that human behaviour tends to be 
more complex than the rational behaviour advanced in neoclassical theory. He argues that in 
many cases choices made by individuals are shaped by subjective factors such as altruism, 
ideologies and self-imposed constraints. As a matter of fact, North and Denzau (1994) argue 
that individuals are able to make rational choices that maximize their utilities only when 
faced with simple, frequent and well-informed choices. However, they hold that individuals 
are likely to make sub-optimal choices when the payoffs to choices are clustered, random and 
difficult. North and Denzau (1994) as well as North (1994) claim that in the context of 
complex, random and clustered choices, the ability of individuals to make choices that 
increase or maximize their utilities depends on their cognitive knowledge – embodied in their 
mental models. They define these mental models as “the internal representations that 
individual cognitive systems create to interpret the environment”.  The mental models consist 
of the amalgamation of individuals‟ personal knowledge; local-based knowledge –acquired 
from the physical environment – as well as knowledge from past generations transmitted 
through the socio-cultural and linguistic environment (North, 2005). North (1994) and North 
and Denzau (1994) identify a strong connection between mental models and institutions, 
since the shared mental models that groups of individuals in a society possess give rise to 
ideologies. In turn, ideologies – or the shared framework of mental models – affect the 
development of institutions – the external mechanisms individuals create to structure and 
order the environment. They argue that limited cognitive knowledge can compel individuals 
to make sub-optimal choices that reduce their welfare for a sustained period of time. In this 
perspective, North (1994, 2005) introduces the concept of path dependence. He holds that 
path dependence could mean nothing more than choices in the present are constrained by 
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heritage of institutions accumulated from the past. More importantly, over time, the 
institutions that have accumulated give rise to organisations whose survival depend on the 
perpetuation of those institutions. Hence, those organisations deploy resources to prevent any 
changes that threaten their survival (North, 2005:51). North (1994, 2005) claims that path 
dependence mostly explains why, historically and contemporarily, some societies maintain 
institutions that perform badly for long periods of time. Thus, North (1994, 2005), North and 
Denzau (1994) hold that mental models, or to put it bluntly, belief systems, are the most 
significant elements in determining the performance of economies at all time.  
Second, North (1990, 1994, 2005) disputes the neoclassical assumption of zero transaction 
costs. He argues that the neoclassical theory holds that transaction costs do not exist in 
efficient markets, because even when the actors might initially have diverse and erroneous 
models, the informational feedback process and arbitrage actors correct the initial incorrect 
models, punish deviant behaviour, and lead surviving players to correct models. In addition to 
that, even when transaction costs do exist, neoclassical theory assumes that the consequent 
institutions of the market will be designed to induce the actors to acquire the essential 
information that will lead them to correct models. However, North (1990, 1994,) argues that 
in the real world transaction costs are prevalent in economic markets and especially in 
political markets. According to North (1990), the existence of transaction costs in economic 
markets is attributable to information and measurement costs of the attributes of goods and 
services as well as to the performance of agents and the costs of enforcement. However, 
North (1990, 1994) acknowledges that information and measurement costs have been reduced 
in economic markets as the result of the standardization and codification of goods and 
services. Still, he argues that transaction costs still exist in economic markets because 
transaction costs are high in political markets and it is precisely the polity that defines and 
enforces property rights and contracts. Therefore, North (1990, 1994) and Williamson (1973) 
argue that in a world of impersonal and complex exchanges the prevalence of transactions 
costs creates uncertainties on the part of the actors involved in those exchanges. According to 
them, it is precisely in order to reduce the amount of uncertainty that institutions – formal 
rules and mechanisms of enforcement – are created. However, as stated before, the 
establishment of appropriate institutions depends on the dominant ideologies prevailing in a 
society – as particular ideologies can prevent or delay the establishment of desirable 
institutions. North (1990:54) holds that it is the inability of societies to create solid 
institutions – especially to develop low-cost enforcement of contracts – that has been the 
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most important source of historical stagnation as well as of the current level of 
underdevelopment in the third world.  
As I indicated in the beginning of this section, the new institutional theory is primarily 
interested in the evolution of economies through time. As I mentioned in chapter 1 of this 
study, North differentiates institutions from organisations. Institutions are the rules of the 
game, organisations are the players. Yet, it is the interaction between the two that shape 
institutional change (North, 2005:59). North (1990, 2005) holds that organisations comprise 
of groups of individuals that are bound together by some common objectives, such as firms, 
trade unions, political parties, churches and clubs. In addition to that, North argues that the 
kinds of organisations that emerge in a society depend on the opportunities provided by the 
institutional structure –as well as those provided by the stock of specialised knowledge and 
resources. Most importantly, he claims that it is the entrepreneurs of organisations that induce 
institutional change as they face ubiquitous competition derived from an economic world of 
scarcity. Indeed, North (2005:60) stresses that as entrepreneurs of organisations perceive new 
or altered opportunities, they induce institutional change by either changing informal rules or 
by altering the rules –either directly by political bodies or indirectly by pressurising political 
bodies. However, North (2005) argues that there are no guarantees that organisations will 
successful pressurised political bodies into altering the rules in their favour. There are two 
main reasons for that. First, North (2005) claims that responses from political bodies to the 
demands and pressures from organisations will depend on political rulers‟ belief systems, 
which ultimately inform their perceptions. Second, North (2005) argues that since the 
political process aims to reconcile and channelled conflicting societal interests into coherent 
policy processes, the ability of particular organisations to influence political bodies in altering 
formal laws will also depend on their bargaining strength relative to political rulers.   
As a matter of evidence, North (2005) holds that in medieval Western Europe, it was  
foremost the belief systems combined with the bargaining strength of rulers vis-a-vis 
emerging commercial interests, that determined the extent and direction of institutional 
change in states such as England, the Netherland, Spain and France. North (2005:137) argues 
that all Western European states initially shared a similar belief structure rooted in the Greco-
Roman civilisation. However, in the centuries following the collapse of the Roman Empire, 
this common belief system evolved differently in various parts of Europe –as each state or 
geographical area encountered different experiences. North (2005) holds that in countries 
such as England and the Netherland, the belief structure evolved over time and integrated 
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new values such as freedom of religion – especially in the case of the Netherland – equality 
among all men and partial democracy. He argues that these values played a significant role in 
the emergence of a representative form of government and effective protection of property 
rights in these two countries. In Spain and France, political rulers centralised political powers 
in their hands while preserving the medieval hierarchical order that violated the basic 
principle of equality among all men. Consequently, North (2005) claims that in countries 
such as Spain and, to a lesser extent, France, political freedom and private property were 
undermined by absolutist monarchs.  
In medieval Europe, as competition among European states for territorial aggrandizement 
increased, political rulers became in dire need of more revenues in order to wage increasingly 
expensive wars against rival European states. As a result, political rulers turned to emerging 
commercial interests to raise revenues, and hence, the bargaining strength between the former 
and latter became important in influencing the direction of institutional change in Western 
Europe. North (2005:142) argues that in countries such as England and the Netherland, 
commercial interests, mainly those organised around the vibrant export industries, were able 
to successfully trade rights such as representative bodies, control over tax rates in return for 
stable and sufficient revenue to the rulers. In contrast, in Spain and France, North (2005: 144) 
holds that political rulers had the upper hands over their constituencies, and therefore were 
able to raise revenues by arbitrarily raising taxes and confiscating properties.  Therefore, 
North (2005) argues that the belief system centred on freedom, equality and democracy 
together with the superior bargaining strength of commercial interests vis-a-vis rulers enabled 
England and the Netherland to achieve sustainable economic growth and prosperity for 
several centuries. On the contrary, he argues that the belief system axed on autocracy and 
inequality combined with the superior bargaining strength of political rulers over their 
constituencies, condemned Spain and to a lesser extent, France, to stagnation and instability 
that lasted, in the case of Spain, until the demise of Franco in the twentieth century.  
 North‟s study of institutions has primarily been conducted at a macro or societal- level, since 
his main interests has been to understand the manner in which the incremental change of 
beliefs affects the formal rules, the efficient operations of markets and ultimately the level of 
economic growth and standards of living of populations – captured in the variations of per 
capita incomes, life expectancy, and literacy rates.  
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 In contrast to North, other scholars interested in new the institutional theory, in particular 
Williamson, have conducted their analyses at a micro-level, as their primary concern has 
been to understand the manner in which institutions –particularly formal rules – affect the 
efficient operations of markets and how this impact on the governance structures of firms. 
Williamson (1973, 2000), Grossman and Hart (1986) and Joskow (2008) aim to understand 
the reasons why firms adopt specific governance structures. Williamson (1973) defines 
governance structures as mechanisms taken by firms to minimise uncertainties that may 
emerge as a result of disputes in the course of contracts or at their renewals. Williamson 
(2000) identifies several governance structures available to firms ranging from autonomous 
contracting to vertical integration. Williamson (1973, 1975, cited in Lowndes, 1996 & 
Granovetter, 1985), Grossman and Hart (1986) and Joskow (2008) ask under what conditions 
economic functions are performed within the boundaries of a firm, rather than through market 
processes that cross the firm boundaries. In other words, these scholars enquire under what 
conditions a firm will rely on the market or the hierarchy to produce and exchange goods and 
services. Williamson (2000) argues that ideally, autonomous contracting is often the best 
governance structure both in law and economics, as it allows firms to improve performance 
and minimize their costs. However, Williamson (1973, 2000) and Joskow (2008) claim that 
in any institutional structure, firms will adopt governance structures that enable them to 
minimize transaction costs. In particular, these scholars argue that firms will tend to integrate 
their transactions within firms when faced with high transaction costs.  As mentioned before, 
transaction costs are the costs associated with accessing information, negotiating and 
enforcing contracts. Williamson (1973, 1975, cited in Granovetter, 1985) holds that firms 
encounter high transaction costs in two particular situations: when they are faced with 
bounded rationality and opportunism. Williamson (1973, 1975, cited in Granovetter, 1985) 
defines bounded rationality – in the continuity of the definition provided by Coase in his 
article on the nature of the firm – as the inability of economic agents to properly anticipate 
the complex chains of contingencies that are typical to long-term contracts. Equally, 
Williamson (1973, 1975, cited in Granovetter, 1985) defines opportunism as the rational 
pursuit by economic agents of their own interests, by all means possible, including guile and 
deceit. Williamson (1973, 1975, cited in Granovetter, 1985) argues that the problem 
associated with bounded rationality is reduced when transactions are internalised within 
firms, as it becomes unnecessary to plan for all contingencies when transactions are 
conducted inside firms. Equally, Williamson (1973, 1975, cited in Granovetter, 1985) holds 
that when transactions are internalised within firms, authority relations and greater 
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identification with internal transaction partners mitigate the problem associated with 
opportunism.   
Therefore, Williamson (1973, 1975, cited in Lowndes, 1996 & Granovetter, 1985) holds that 
firms will tend to integrate transactions within firms for transactions associated with the 
problems of bounded rationality and opportunism. Thus, transactions that are uncertain in 
outcome, recur frequently and require “transaction specific investments” are more likely to 
take place within firms.  On the contrary, Williamson (1973, 1975, cited in Lowndes, 1996 & 
Granovetter, 1985) argues that transactions in the open market remain the most efficient 
institutional arrangement for transactions that are straightforward, non-repetitive and require 
no transaction specific investments – such as one-off purchase of standard equipment. 
The new institutional theory has attracted very few criticisms from the scholarly community. 
This study has identified only one relevant criticism of this theory. As mentioned above, 
Williamson and other scholars hold that the choice of governance structures firms make 
depend on transaction costs. Scholars such as Granovetter (1985) and Lowndes (1996) refute 
this claim. These scholars define the new institutional theory as ahistorical and abstract. 
Granovetter (1985) criticises Williamson‟s categorisation of different forms of governance 
structures, arguing that both market and hierarchy are embedded in prevailing social 
relations. For Granovetter (1985), transaction costs do not determine the governance 
structures of firms. It is rather personal relations and network of relations linking economic 
agents both within and between firms that do determine the governance structures of firms. 
Thus, Granovetter (1985) argues that transaction costs, defined as disorder and malfeasance, 
can be widespread both between as well as within firms. For him, it is the nature of personal 
relations and network of relations that determine the level of transaction costs within and 
between firms. Granovetter (1985) holds that personal relations and network of relations are 
susceptible to generate more trust and cooperation between economic agents. For instance, he 
claims that managers that maintain close and personal relations with other managers outside 
business circles –such as country clubs –are able to establish strong links that reduce distrust 
and uncertainties. Thus, Granovetter (1985) holds that interlocking managers are in a position 
to facilitate the exchange of goods and services between their respective firms, on a repetitive 
basis, at low transaction costs.  
 Lowndes (1996) on his side, points to the role of power and politics in influencing the choice 
of governance structures that firms make.  He argues that different arrangements of hierarchy 
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and market relations become institutionalised and relatively successful in different contexts. 
For him, efficient firms might look quite different in Japan and Britain, as they are embedded 
in different patterns of social relations, which relate to the distinctive character of the state, 
financial system, education and training, family life and cultural practices.  
Despite the fact that there have been few criticisms of the new institutional theory among the 
scholarly community, this study has identified a major limitation of North‟s analytical 
framework. As discussed above, the new institutional theory was developed by North in the 
course of analysing the process of economic change of Western European states from the 
medieval to the modern era. From North‟s analysis, it is evident that the process of economic 
change in individual European states was spearheaded by the evolution of belief structures 
and political institutions –shaped by competitions between European states and the 
emergence of commercial interests. Indeed, for North (2005:100) European states such as 
England and the Netherland managed to develop their economies over time because they 
were able to shift from a status-based and coercive society that relies on mutual control, 
respect of ranks, and strictly enforced codes of generosity, to an open society where free 
entry and exit, democratic governance, competence criteria and socio-economic 
differentiation are allowed to operate.  Thus, the new institutional theory appears to be an 
analytical framework that provides explanations for the evolution of Western European 
economies through time rather than that of the world economies over time.  
Indeed, many countries in East and South East Asia managed to witness impressive levels of 
economic growth and prosperity for a sustained period of time despite the fact that they 
possessed different belief structures and political institutions from those identified by North 
above. This was the case of countries such as Japan in the 1950s and 1960s, South Korea and 
Taiwan in the 1970s, and currently, that of China, Indonesia and Vietnam.    
Sub-Saharan Africa countries also have different belief structures and political institutions to 
those of Western European states – as the result of the specific historicity of their societies. In 
this perspective, the new institutional theory might not be appropriate to study the process of 
economic change in sub-Saharan Africa. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the new 
institutional theory should be discarded altogether. This study holds the view that the new 
institutional theory should be modified, rather than discarded; by incorporating in it key 
concepts of the literature on African states. Such integration between the new institutional 
theory and African studies would pave the way for more extensive understanding of the 
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nature and operations of political institutions in sub-Saharan Africa. Understanding the nature 
and operations of political institutions, as well as the belief structures that underpin them, will 
enable researchers to assess the possible avenues for improving the efficiency of political 
institutions – based on the historicity of African societies. North acknowledges the 
importance of enhancing our understanding of the nature and operations of political 
institutions in sub-Saharan Africa. He argues that:  
The previous paragraphs have schematically outlines the political framework of 
representative government, a subject that has been explored at length by political 
scientists. It is more difficult to model the political process in third world polities 
where corruption, bribery, and Mafia like extortion tend to be the order of the day. 
Modeling the actual structure as it in fact works in such polities has increasingly 
occupied the attention of political economists in recent years, but we are some 
distance from having good working models. The enormous diversity of performance 
of polities makes the subject a crucial one for improving our understanding of 
economic change (North, 2005:55).  
Unsurprisingly, the new institutional theory has been used by scholars to study the process of 
economic development of nations as well as particular governance structures adopted by 
firms to deal with the problem associated with transaction costs.  
Fafchamps (2004) assesses the contractual practices of African manufacturing firms in 
Ghana, Kenya and in Zimbabwe by relying on new institutional theory. He aims to examine 
whether economic agents use long-term relationships to make contractual performance 
contingent upon external shocks. He relies on firm surveys and in-depth interviews. He 
conducted a survey on 58 firms in each country. Fafchamps (2004) found that clients and 
suppliers in the manufacturing sector in Ghana, Kenya and in Zimbabwe often fail to comply 
with their contractual arrangements. He argues that this low level of compliance takes the 
form of non-payment and late payments of goods and services provided by suppliers or 
enterprises as well as late deliveries of orders from customers. However, he argues that most 
enterprises and suppliers demonstrate considerable flexibility with respect to the inabilities of 
their customers and suppliers to comply fully with their contractual arrangements. Fafchamps 
(2004) holds that such flexibility is a consequence of the realization by all players of the 
vulnerability and underdevelopment of their respective economies and populations. For 
instance, he argues that in much of Africa final consumers are mostly poor and therefore 
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vulnerable to economic shocks, while markets for raw materials, intermediate goods, 
specialized services and capital equipment are thin or non-existent. He contends that the 
flexibility displayed by players is aimed at sharing risks between partners or business 
associates. However, Fafchamps argues that in some instances, some customers and suppliers 
are tempted to take advantage of the prevailing culture of non-compliance to contractual 
arrangements to default temporarily or completely on payments.  
In instances of such opportunistic behaviour, Fafchamps (2004) notes that in Ghana and 
Kenya – where the legal system is costly and inefficient – enterprises seldom go to court and 
instead prefer to resolve their difference through harassment. However, he claims that such 
recourse to violence sometimes does not work. Hence, Fafchamps claims that enterprises and 
suppliers in Ghana and Kenya prefer to establish long-term and personalized relationships 
with their customers and suppliers in order to curb opportunistic behaviour. However, he 
holds that by doing business with a restricted numbers of associates, firms reduce their 
potential for specialization and growth. On the contrary, In the case of Zimbabwe, where the 
legal system is more affordable and efficient, enterprises go to court as an instrument of last 
resort. In this case, enterprises, especially microenterprises, are more eager to comply with 
their contractual arrangements within the acceptable period of late payment.      
Peng et al. (2008) and Peng and Luo (2000) rely on new institutional theory in order to 
account for the recent economic performance of China. Peng and Luo (2000) argue that 
China managed to sustain economic growth for three decades despite an unfavourable 
institutional context characterized by a lack of effective courts and strong government 
regulations. They suspect that interpersonal relationships linking Chinese managers amongst 
themselves as well as with government officials – in an attempt to lower the uncertainties 
associated with the poor institutional context– might explain the good performance of 
Chinese firms. Therefore, Peng and Luo (2000) assess the impact of the personal ties of top 
managers of Chinese firms on the performance of those firms. They use a micro-macro link 
that differentiates between ties among managers interpersonal relationships linking managers 
to government officials. Concerning their method, Peng and Luo (2000) selected 400 firms 
with varying characteristics – state-owned and private firms; small and large firms; 
manufacturing and service firms; and firms from various industries – and sent questionnaires 
to their managements. They received 127 questionnaires from the 400 firms and conducted 
several multiple regressions analysis. Peng and Luo (2000) find that managerial ties – both 
among managers and between managers and government officials – have a significant impact 
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on firms‟ performance. More importantly, they find that managerial ties between managers 
and government officials are more important than those among managers. In conclusion, 
Peng and Luo (2000) and Peng et al. (2008) argue that interpersonal managerial relationships 
partially account for the sound performance of Chinese firms despite the poor institutional 
context prevailing in China. Therefore, Peng and Luo (2000) and Peng et al. (2008) claim that 
while informal and formal institutions shape strategic choices, where formal institutions are 
weak, informal institutions – such as the norms governing interpersonal relationships – play a 
greater role in determining firms‟ strategic choices and performances.    
     
New institutional theory can be applied at various level of analysis as suggested by 
Williamson (2000). It can be applied at level one, which is the social embeddedness level. It 
is at this level where culture, norms and traditions are located. According to Williamson 
(2000), institutions at this level change very slowly – over centuries or even millennia. The 
second level is the institutional environment. This level relates to the formal rules of the 
game, with the emphasis on political institutions, definition of property rights and 
enforcement of contracts (Williamson, 2000; North 1990). Moreover, Williamson (2000) 
argues that institutions on the second level of analysis change faster than on the first – often 
over decades or centuries. The third level is the governance structure. This level deals with 
the incentives provided to players as well as the forms of organizations they devise from 
specific contracts (North, 1990). The fourth level is the neoclassical market. This level relates 
to the efficient allocation of resources and constant adjustments of prices and quantities 
(Williamson, 2000).  
The primary interest of this study lies in the third level of analysis.  This is because this study 
aims to understand the effects of institutional contexts on the behaviour and forms of 
organizations of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique and the DRC. In 
another words, the main concern lies in comprehending how these enterprises respond to the 
set of opportunities and/or challenges prevailing on the ground in Mozambique and the DRC. 
However, as it will be shown in Chapters 6 and 7, investigating the behaviour and/or modes 
of entry of Chinese agricultural enterprises also necessitate a careful assessment of the nature 
of the customary land tenure system, the land laws as well as the strength of political 
institutions. Moreover, as it will be seen in Chapters 6 and 7, customary land tenure systems 
have a strong bearing on the content of land laws and together they affect the institutional 
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contexts. Equally, political institutions also affect institutional contexts. Therefore, in 
addition to the focus on the third level of analysis, this study will also devote limited attention 
to the second and first levels of analysis. The second level of analysis will look at the land 
laws and political institutions in Mozambique and the DRC. The first level will focus on the 
existing customary land tenure systems in Mozambique and the DRC.   
3.6 Conclusion 
This study aims to understand the motivations underlying the activities of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique and the DRC as well as the manner in 
which the institutional contexts, in both countries, shape their behaviour and/or modes of 
entry into local industries. In order to achieve these two objectives, this study will rely on 
Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm and the new institutional theory. Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm is 
an appropriate analytical framework to study a complex phenomenon such as the motivations 
of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique and the DRC. It enables the 
integration into a single analytical framework of the several dimensions that are relevant to 
understand the motivations of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique and 
the DRC. The new institutional theory is suitable for investigating the behaviour and/or 
modes of entry of Chinese agricultural enterprises into local industries in Mozambique and 
the DRC. This theory leads to a more extensive analysis of institutional contexts by taking 
into account the nature and role of informal constraints and formal rules in determining the 
behaviour and/or modes of entry of Chinese agricultural enterprises on the ground.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the research design and the methodology applied in 
this study. A discussion of the research design and methodology is fundamental not only in 
understanding the way in which the research problem has been investigated, but also in 
ensuring the overall validity and credibility of the study.  This chapter starts by outlining the 
aim of the study as well as the research sub-questions. Next, the chapter outlines and 
discusses the research design applied in this study; this is followed by a discussion of the 
data-collection and data-analysis methods. This chapter ends with a short conclusion on the 
strengths and limitations of the methodology.  
4.2Aim of the study and research questions 
As noted in the introductory chapter, the aim of this study is to enhance understanding of the 
motivations informing the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in 
Mozambique and the DRC, as well as to shed more light on the way in which the institutional 
contexts in both countries affect the behaviour and/or modes of entry of these enterprises into 
local industries.   
In order to achieve the above objectives, this study posits the following research sub-
questions. 
 What are the nature and objectives of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in 
Mozambique and the DRC? In particular, the study seeks to establish whether 
Chinese agricultural enterprises active in each country are state-owned or private 
entities; whether they are new enterprises or multinational enterprises with operations 
in other parts of the world; and finally, what these enterprises‟ areas of specialization 
or primary missions are. 
  What kind of commodities are produced by each Chinese agricultural enterprise and 
what is the market(s) for which these commodities are destined? 
 What is the size of farmlands secured by each Chinese agricultural enterprise and are 
they fully operational? 
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 What is the scope and importance of Chinese agricultural aid delivered by Chinese 
agricultural enterprises in Mozambique and the DRC? 
 What is the sustainability and effectiveness of Chinese agricultural aid provided in 
Mozambique and the DRC by Chinese agricultural enterprises?  
 What is the nature of the institutional contexts – relative to the agricultural sector – 
prevailing in Mozambique and the DRC? 
 How do these institutional contexts shape the behaviour and/or the modes of entry of 
Chinese agricultural enterprises?   
4.3. Research design and case study  
4.3.1 Research design 
Yin (2009: 26) defines a research design as “the logical sequence that connects the empirical 
data to a study‟s initial research questions, and ultimately, to its conclusions”. For him, the 
main purpose of a research design is to avoid a situation in which the evidence does not 
address the initial research questions. Thus, in line with the views expressed by Yin 
(2009:27) and Babbie (1979:83), the research design can be defined as a logical plan that 
enables the researcher to achieve the objectives set at the onset of his/her study.   
Yin (2009:6) enumerates five types of research designs: experiments, surveys, archival 
analysis, historical analysis and case studies.  He argues that three important factors 
distinguish the above research designs or methods: the type of research question posed; the 
extent of control an investigator has over actual behavioural events; and the degree of focus 
on contemporary as opposed to past events.  
Yin (2009:9) argues that survey and archival analysis methods are more suitable for 
exploratory studies – those that mainly focus on the “what” questions and that aim to describe 
the incidence or prevalence of a particular phenomenon or predict future events.  Yin argues 
that a survey and archival analysis do not require control of behavioural events. The 
difference between a survey and archival analysis lies in the fact while the first always 
focuses on contemporary events, the second focuses on either contemporary or past events.   
In addition to that, Yin (2009) argues that explanatory studies – which mainly focus on 
“how” and “why” questions – are likely to require the use of case studies, histories and 
experiments as the preferred research methods. These methods are more suitable for studies 
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that aim to understand complex issues. Yin (2009:11) argues that a further distinction 
between case study, historical and experimental research designs is the extent of the 
investigator‟s control over and access to actual behavioural events. According to Yin, 
historical and case study methods do not require control over and access to actual behavioural 
events, while the experimental method requires that the investigator does have precise and 
systematic control over these aspects. Thus, the distinction between historical and case study 
methods, on the one hand, and the experimental method, on the other, lies in the ability of the 
researcher to control actual behavioural events.   
A further distinction between case study and historical methods lies in their orientation 
towards contemporary events. Yin (2009:11) claims that historical analysis is the preferred 
method to deal with the “dead” past, that is “when no relevant persons are alive to report ... 
and the investigator must rely on primary documents, secondary documents, and cultural and 
physical artefacts as the main sources of evidence”.  In contrast, according to Yin (2009:11), 
case study analysis is preferred to examine contemporary events, when the relevant 
behaviours cannot be manipulated. While case study analysis relies on many of the same 
techniques as historical analysis, it adds two sources of evidence not usually included in the 
historian‟s repertoire: direct observation of the events under consideration and interviews 
with the people involved in the events (Yin, 2009:11).  
4.3.2 Case study   
Several authors have sought to define case study design.  Yin (2009: 18) defines a case study 
as “empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its 
real-life context, especially when the boundary between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident”.  Remenyi (2012:2) suggests that the above definition of case study design 
by Yin is still probably the most useful. Gerring (2007:65) defines case study design as the 
intensive study of a single case or a small set of cases with the aim of generalising across a 
larger set of similar cases. Henning (2004:41) argues that a case study design is employed to 
gain an in-depth understanding of the situation and the meaning for those involved.  Henning 
(2004:41) further argues that with such design the focus is on process rather than outcomes, 
on context rather than a specific variable , and in discovery rather than confirmation. In 
another words, case study design allows for a greater number of variables at play in order to 
explain a complex phenomenon; it seeks to establish causal mechanisms – provide 
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explanations of pathways through which variables affects other variables; and it is more 
suitable for theory formulation than for theory testing.  
The case study is primarily defined by its case or unit of analysis. Gerring (2007: 19) argues 
that “a case connotes a spatially delimited phenomenon (a unit) observed at a single point in 
time or over some period in time. It comprises the type of phenomenon that an inference 
attempts to explain”. For his part, Yin (2009:29) defines the case or the unit of analysis as the 
primary phenomenon of analysis in an investigation. Yin argues that the case can be an 
individual, a person, a programme, legislation or a community. Echoing Gerring, Yin (2009; 
32) argues that a case must have clear spatial and temporal boundaries to be analytically 
relevant.  
Gerring (2007) and Yin (2009) distinguish between single and multiple case studies. 
According to them, a single case study contains only one case, while multiple case studies 
include at least two cases. However, Gerring (2007:20 &22) argues that at a certain point – 
that is when more than a dozen cases are included in a study – it will no longer be possible to 
investigate those cases intensively. Gerring (2007) argues that in this context, the study 
becomes more of a time series of case studies. Gerring (2007) and Yin (2009) further argue 
that the single case study is more suitable for certain types of studies.  These include studies 
that aim to test a well-formulated theory (critical case); be more representative of a broader 
set of cases (typical case); represent an extreme case or unique situation(extreme case); to 
reveal a new or unusual phenomenon (exploratory or deviant case) ; or to study a 
phenomenon at two or more different points in time (longitudinal case). Concerning the 
strength of multiple case studies, Gerring (2007) and Yin (2009) argue that the evidence of 
multiple case studies is often considered more compelling and the overall study is usually 
regarded as more robust in term of its representativeness of the broader population. 
Furthermore, Gerring (2007) and Yin (2009) argue that multiple case studies function 
according to the logic of replication, which entails replicating the research conducted in a 
previous case to the other cases. According toYin (2009:54), in multiple case studies cases 
are carefully selected in order to either predict similar results (literal replication) or to predict 
contrasting results for anticipated reasons (theoretical replication). Yin further states that few 
cases are usually needed to conduct a literal replication (two or three), while more cases are 
needed to conduct a theoretical replication. Gerring (2007: 131) argues that in multiple case 
studies cases are usually selected because they have similar features but yet demonstrate 
surprisingly different outcomes (most-similar case). Thus, in this case, the researcher wants 
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to identify the factors that differ across the cases.  Gerring (2007:139) also argues that in 
multiple case studies cases might also be selected because they exhibit different features but 
yet demonstrate similar outcomes (most-different case).  Gerring claims that in this situation 
the researcher seeks to identify similar factors across the cases.    
Yin (2009:50) distinguishes between holistic versus embedded case studies. He argues that 
sometimes more than one unit of analysis might be included in a single case study. This 
occurs when attention is also given to a sub-unit or sub-units within a single case study. He 
states that when a case contains more than one unit of analysis, it is an embedded case study. 
Conversely, when a case study contains only one unit of analysis, it is a holistic case study. 
Yin therefore identifies four major types of case studies: holistic-single case studies, 
embedded-single case studies, holistic-multiple case studies and embedded-multiple case 
studies.   
This study relies on case study design in order to ensure that its conclusion will provide 
appropriate answers to the research questions.  In the light of the above discussion, case study 
design is defined in this study as an intensive investigation of a small set of cases with the 
aim of providing in-depth understanding of a particular contemporary phenomenon – 
occurring in a delimitated geographical area at a particular point in time or over some period 
in time.  
The phenomena under investigation in this study are the motivations and behaviours  of 
Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique and the DRC. Mozambique and 
the DRC are therefore the two case studies.  The case studies possess geographical 
boundaries – since they are sovereign states with recognised borders – and temporal 
boundaries – given that the period of investigation runs from the year 2000 to 2011. The unit 
of analysis is the Chinese agricultural enterprise. Moreover, given that each case study 
contains more than one unit of analysis – as there are more than one Chinese agricultural 
enterprises operating in Mozambique and the DRC – it is more appropriate and correct to 
state that this study relies on embedded- multiples case studies. Lastly, the embeddedness of 
Chinese agricultural enterprises within the context in Mozambique and the DRC – in 
particular the characteristics of the agricultural sectors, the land ownership patterns and the 
institutional contexts – and within that of China – the political economy of the country – 
allows for an extensive study of the motivations and behaviours  of these agricultural 
enterprises.   
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The two case studies, Mozambique and the DRC, have been chosen on the basis of their 
similarities, as will be discussed in the following chapter. In my view, Mozambique and the 
DRC embody three characteristics that are pertinent to this study. First, Chinese agricultural 
enterprises – as well as the Chinese government – have showed an obvious interest in 
investing in agricultural projects in Mozambique and the DRC. Second, the two countries 
possess vast expanses of fertile farmlands and a great deal of water. Last, the institutions and 
institutional contexts, with respect to the agricultural sector in Mozambique and the DRC, are 
to some extent analogous. In the light of the similarities between my two case studies, I 
anticipate that the results of this study will be similar for both of them. My selection of the 
case studies is thus in line with Yin‟s notion of literal replication explained above.  
However, one could possibly object and ask why not include more than two case studies in 
the study, or even why not insert into the study similar and dissimilar case studies. Regarding 
the first remark, it should be noted that this study included only two case studies because of 
limited time and financial resources. Although the inclusion of a third case study was 
desirable, it would have involved more time and money, given that the case study design 
requires extensive fieldwork. Concerning the second objection, mixing similar and dissimilar 
case studies would have required the insertion of more case studies – at least six of them 
(Yin,2009:54) – into this study. Again, given the time and financial constraints, this option 
was not feasible. Also, the incorporation of similar and dissimilar case studies was not 
warranted, given that the aim of this study is not to test and revise a theory.  
4.4. Data collections and analysis  
This section of the chapter deals with the process related to the collection and analysis of 
empirical and secondary data. As far as the collection of data is concerned, this study relied 
on qualitative methods. The instrument for data collection was the semi-structured interview. 
As for sampling, the study relied on purposive and snowball sampling. Purposive sampling 
served to establish the profile of people to interview, while snowball sampling allowed for 
the identification of such people on the ground. For the analysis of data, this study depended 
on the atlas-ti software package.    
4.4.1 Data collection 
Gerring (2007:21) defines a sample as the number of cases that are subject to formal analysis. 
He argues that a case study is usually characterised by a small sample size as it aims to study 
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a specific phenomenon intensively. On the other hand, a non-case study seeks to capture 
cross-case variations and as a result tends to incorporate more cases.  Gerring further argues 
that the quantitative approach (statistical analysis) requires a significant number of cases in 
order to make the kind of inference that is representative of the broader population. Gerring 
(2007:33) claims that a quantitative approach is more suitable for the non-case study, while a 
qualitative method is more appropriate for case study design. Nevertheless, Gerring 
(2007:35) holds that quantitative methods might still be employed together with qualitative 
methods in a situation where a case study has several within-case observations. Yin (2009: 
19) and Henning (2004: 42) also claim that the case study may employ both qualitative and 
quantitative techniques, although it is more suitable for the first. Remenyi (2012:5), however, 
argues that there is no prohibition on the use of quantitative methods in a case study. 
However, he admits that in practice case study is usually associated with qualitative methods.  
This study refrained from using quantitative methods to collect data on the activities of 
Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique and the DRC. As I mentioned 
above, case study designs tend by definition to be qualitative in nature, although they can 
accommodate quantitative methods as well under precisely specified conditions. As a general 
rule, for a single-holistic case study, quantitative methods can only be used when qualitative 
variables can be transformed into standardised variables – through coding – that can be 
handled within a dataset format (Gerring, 2009:35). Conversely, for single-embedded, 
multiple-holistic or multiple-embedded case studies, the use of quantitative methods only 
makes sense when cross-case variability is small – meaning that cases are highly 
homogenous. In another words, cases must be similar in those aspects that are closely related 
to the focus of the researcher (Gerring: 2009:50). In situations of homogeneity of cases, it is 
possible for the researcher to establish standardised variables that can allow for cross-case 
comparisons in order to understand underlying factors of interest (Gerring, 2009:50). 
However, when cases are heterogeneous, the addition of each heterogeneous case into the 
model – a quantitative model – requires the adjustment of the model in the form of 
assumptions. The more assumptions a model has, the more tenuous the quality of causal 
inference generated. In such circumstances, cross-case comparisons become at best 
hazardous, at worst meaningless (Gerring, 2009:53).     
As noted, this study relies on a multiple-embedded case study design. Thus, a quantitative 
approach can only be considered if cases are homogenous. During the early stages of this 
study the preliminary literature review as well as newspaper articles retrieved from the 
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internet provided little information on the numbers, the nature and activities of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique and the DRC. Therefore, in view of such 
limited information, doubts and uncertainties remained on the homogeneity of cases – 
Chinese agricultural enterprises. This study thus also serves as an exploratory endeavour, as it 
aims to better understand the number, nature and activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises 
operating in Mozambique and the DRC.   
Therefore, this study relied on qualitative methods to collect data on the activities of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises in Mozambique and the DRC as well as on the contexts in both 
countries. By context I refer to the characteristics of the agricultural sectors, the land 
ownership patterns and the institutional contexts regarding Mozambique and the DRC, and 
the political economy in the case of China.  As Yin (2009:18) argues, it is its ability to 
investigate simultaneously a phenomenon and its context that enables case study design to 
develop an in-depth understanding of a given phenomenon.    
The qualitative methods used in this study consisted of accessing secondary and primary 
sources. The secondary sources of data consisted of academic materials such as scholarly 
articles and books; official documents such as reports of international institutions such as the 
World Bank as well as official legislation; and articles from private sources such as 
newspaper. 
The primary sources of data consisted of documents obtained in the field work such as 
contracts between Chinese agricultural enterprises and governments and official documents 
from Chinese agricultural enterprises, on the one hand, and semi-structured interviews on the 
other.  In addition to these sources, field visits were also conducted in Mozambique and the 
DRC.   
Semi-structured interviews 
Ackroyd and Hugues (1981:66) point out that interviews in social research are encounters 
between a researcher and a respondent in which the latter is asked a series of questions 
relevant to the topic of investigation. According to Ackroyd and Hugues (1981:67), the 
pertinence of interviewing lies on the widespread belief that people can amass a considerable 
amount of information about various aspects of respondents‟ lives as well as their immediate 
environments in this way. Henning (2004:50) argues that interviewing has become a way of 
life in our society, where it is assumed that  an “individual‟s perspective is an important part 
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of the fabric of society and of our joint knowledge of social processes and of the human 
condition”.  
Interviews are usually classified according to their degree of standardisation (Ackroyd & 
Hugues, 1981; Henning, 2004). Like most scholars, Ackroyd and Hugues (1981) and 
Henning (2004) identify two main types of interviews: the standardised (structured) interview 
and the non-standardised interview. Ackroyd and Hugues (1981) state that the standardised 
interview is a form of interview in which the interviewer adheres to a rigid questionnaire for 
all the respondents. In addition to that, the questions and the order in which they appear on 
the questionnaire must be administered consistently to all the respondents. Henning (2004) 
argues that the standardised interview is still the dominant form of interview. Moreover, she 
argues that the justification for standardised interviews is that they will yield information that 
closely corresponds to realities as depicted by respondents. Standardised interviews are thus 
in conformity with the principles of objectivity and neutrality (Henning, 2004:53).  Ackroyd 
and Hugues (1981) further note that standardised interviews are more suitable for cross-case 
studies relying on quantitative analysis of data. This is because the quantitative format of data 
obtained from standardised interviews facilitates the rigorous testing of a hypothesis.   
Henning (2004:57) defines the non-standardised interview as a kind of speech or 
communication between the interviewer and the respondent, as both parties involved are 
allowed a great deal of flexibility in asking and answering questions. Ackroyd and Hugues 
(1981:72) hold that in non-standardised interviews the interviewer is free to ask questions in 
whatever way he or she thinks appropriate and following the order he or she feels to be the 
most effective in the circumstances. They claim that non-standardised interviews are most 
suitable for pilot studies preliminary to more systematic and extensive studies. There are 
several sorts of non-standardised interviews, such as key informant and in-depth interviews.  
For instance, non-standardised interviews take the form of key informant interviews when a 
researcher interviews key personnel in an organisation in order to obtain rich and specific 
information (Ackroyd & Hugues,1981:72) . Conversely, non-standardised interviews take the 
form of in-depth interviews when the researcher aims to build a close relationship with the 
respondent in order to acquire as much knowledge as possible from the informant on a 
particular topic. In this particular case, non-standardised interviews are long in duration and 
are often spread over several occasions (Henning, 2004:74).  
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Ackroyd and Hugues (1981:72) argue that between the two extremes of standardised and 
non-standardised interviews lies the broad category of semi-structured interviews. They claim 
that with semi-structured interviews the interviewer normally asks specific questions but he 
or she is free to investigate issues beyond them as necessary. They hold that semi-structured 
interviews combine the strengths of both standardised and non-standardised interviews. 
Ackroyd and Hugues (1981:72) contend that the most usual manner of crafting semi-
structured interviews is to use the standardised format for “face sheet” information, such as 
age, sex, marital status and demographic variables, while the less standardised section is used 
to obtain additional information based on the each particular circumstance.     
As I mentioned above, this study relied on semi-structured interviews to collect data during 
the fieldwork in Mozambique and the DRC. The semi-structured format of the interview was 
chosen in order to provide the flexibility that would allow the researcher to focus on specific 
questions, while at the same time enabling the probing of aspects beyond those questions as 
necessary. This flexibility was particularly important as the researcher intended to acquire as 
much knowledge as possible on the local context.  
In addition to that, the researcher intended to target several specific groups for interviewing. 
The groups targeted were either directly or indirectly involved with the activities of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises or had or – were supposed to have – sufficient information on the 
activities of these enterprises. These groups consisted of managers of Chinese agricultural 
enterprises, officials from the ministries of agriculture and agricultural research centres, 
leaders of civil society, researchers, and farmers and/or employees of Chinese agricultural 
enterprises. They were approached by the researcher in order to enhance the construct 
validity of the study.
3
 Yin (2009:42) argues that one of the ways to increase construct validity 
when conducting case studies is to use multiple sources of evidence (i.e. triangulation) in a 
manner that encourages convergent lines of inquiry. Triangulation is aimed at ensuring the 
credibility of information gathered in the conducting of case studies by relying on several 
sources of information. The researcher developed interviews schedules for six target groups: 
one for managers of Chinese agricultural enterprises; one for managers of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises managing aid projects: one for researchers and civil society leaders; 
one for government officials working within the ministry of agriculture or its related 
                                                          
3
 Concept validity basically aims to enhance the quality of a study by defining key concepts in 
accordance with the objectives of the study and ensuring their proper measurement and 
operationalisation (Yin, 2009:42). 
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institutions; one for managers of local agricultural enterprises; and lastly one for local 
farmers or smallholders. The interview schedules can be found in Annexure 2 of this study. 
The questions posed were open-ended as the researcher aimed to allow respondents the 
freedom to provide an answer in whatever form they choose. The researcher hoped this type 
of question would enable him to gather sufficient data in order to understand the main 
research questions posed by this study. Therefore, in elaborating on responses to the 
questionnaires, the researcher specifically aimed to acquire an understanding of the 
motivations informing the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in the DRC 
and Mozambique, and of the way in which their operations are shaped by institutional 
contexts. In addition to the above objectives the researcher also probed the effects of the 
activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique and the DRC on the 
welfare of smallholders and the growth of the agricultural sector – although this did not form 
part of the objectives of this study.  
Babbie (1979) argues that each individual has his or her own exact definition of abstract 
events – the concepts. He claims that researchers – in order to preserve construct validity – 
often attempt to specify exactly what they mean when using particular terms. Babbie 
(1979:120) describes this process as conceptualisation. He holds that the aim of 
conceptualisation is to facilitate communication with others by agreeing on the specifications 
of particular concepts. Babbie (1979:124) further argues that once conceptualisation has been 
achieved, researchers seek to specify exactly what they are going to observe, how they will 
do it and what interpretations they are going to place on various possible observations. He 
holds that researchers achieve these tasks by creating indicators that measure and 
operationalise the concepts. Indicators are real and observable things that provide evidence of 
the presence or absence of the concepts under investigation (Babbie, 1979:120).   
As argued in Chapter 1 and 2, the concept of motivation is defined in this study as striving for 
the internal and external strategic goals that prompt Chinese agricultural enterprises to invest 
in Mozambique and the DRC.  This definition is in accordance with the definition of the firm, 
as formulated by Coase (1937), which perceives the firm as an organisation that coordinates 
sets of resources in order to achieve collective goals and objectives. Thus, motivation is 
closely intertwined with the goals or objectives of the firm. This study endeavours to 
understand the goals and objectives of Chinese agricultural enterprises in Mozambique and 
the DRC. In the questionnaires, especially those prepared for Chinese managers, the 
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researcher developed some indicators that aimed to measure and operationalise the concept of 
motivation. These operational measures are: the nature of the enterprise (size or area of 
specialisation, capital or market value, stock of knowledge and technology);  advantages 
offered by local location (fertile land, water, size of local markets)  crops produced , 
destination markets and size of concessions; support from the Chinese government (loans, 
subsidies, diplomatic backing);  and nature of agricultural aid, as well as scope and 
effectiveness of agricultural aid (value of aid projects, number of Chinese staff or technicians, 
number and profile of beneficiaries, institutional mechanisms to ensure scientific cooperation 
between Chinese technicians and local researchers).  
As mentioned in the preceding chapters, the researcher defined the concept of institutional 
context in line with new institutional theory, which perceives the institutional matrix as a 
mixture of informal rules, formal constraints and enforcement mechanisms. This has been 
done in order to determine how the institutional context affects the behaviour of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises and/or their modes of entry into local industries. The indicators that 
measure and operationalise the above concept included: the land tenure system; the status, 
monitoring and enforcement of land laws; the quality of the infrastructure and enforcement of 
land titles.  
As indicated above, the researcher also endeavoured to obtain preliminary information on the 
effects of Chinese agricultural investments on the livelihood of local communities and the 
growth of the agricultural sector.  On the basis of the conditions of the agricultural sectors in 
Mozambique and the DRC – as outlined in the next chapter – the researcher developed 
indicators to measure and operationalise the effects of Chinese agricultural investments on 
the livelihood of local communities and the growth of the agricultural sector.  These 
indicators include: provision of assets such as training and inputs to smallholders as well as 
building of infrastructure (roads and irrigation schemes).  
 Concerning the selection of respondents for interviews, Henning (2004:71) distinguishes 
three forms of sampling to ensure that the researcher selects the most suitable participants: 
purposive, snowball and convenience sampling. Purposive sampling allows for the 
establishment of profiles of desirable participants on the basis of their knowledge of concepts 
or their ability to substantiate theory further (Henning, 2004:71). Snowball sampling, on the 
other hand, enables researchers to identify additional participants on the basis of the 
preliminary interviews conducted in the field. Convenience sampling enables researchers to 
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select the first available participants. She points out that all these forms of sampling represent 
a theoretical “population” in the sense that they are spokespersons for the topic of inquiry and 
can all be defined as “theoretical” sampling.        
The participants in the interviews conducted in Mozambique and the DRC were selected 
according to purposive and snowball sampling techniques. To start with, purposive sampling 
was used in order to select desirable participants who had the potential to enhance the 
researcher‟s knowledge on the topic under investigation. Knowledge derived from the 
literature as well as common sense guided the researcher in establishing the profiles of the 
desirable participants. However, the actual selection of participants on the ground was the 
result of snowball sampling. Upon commencing the fieldwork, the first priority of the 
researcher was to target and access specific individuals, such as managers of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises and key officials of the respective ministries of agriculture, who were 
in a position to provide sufficient information on the topic under investigation. Subsequent to 
that, the researcher had to rely on guidance from the participants already interviewed as well 
as other contacts in the field to identify and engage with additional participants who could 
provide further information.    
The interviews in Mozambique and the DRC were conducted between April and June 2011. 
In total 32 interviews were conducted: 18 in Mozambique and 14 in the DRC.  In 
Mozambique the interviews were conducted in the provinces of Maputo, Gaza and Sofala. In 
the DRC interviews were conducted in and around Kinshasa. Interviews were conducted in 
Portuguese, French and English in the case of Mozambique, and in French, English and 
Lingala in the DRC. Furthermore, three interviews – one in Mozambique and two in the DRC 
– were group interviews as they were conducted with more than one respondent. However, in 
none of the three interviews did the number of participants exceed three people.  
The following tables display some basic descriptive statistics concerning the characteristics 
of the participants in the interviews. 
Table 4.1 Demographic distribution of interviewees 
Racial Group Chinese Africans Total 
Number of participants in Mozambique 4 14 18 
Number of participants in the DRC 2 14 16 
Total  6 28 34 
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Table 4.2 Professional distribution of interviewees 
Profession Number of participants for 
Mozambique 
Number of participants  for 
DRC 
Total 
Managers 4 3 7 
Private entrepreneur 0 1 1 
Government officials 4 4 8 
NGO leaders or researchers 8 2 10 
Farmers or employees 2 5 7 
Chinese diplomats 0 1 1 
Total 18 16 34 
 
The researcher conducted the interviews alone, with neither a field assistant nor translator. He 
used a voice recorder in most of the interviews, which enabled him to convert the interview 
data into MP3 format on his laptop.  
Problems encountered 
During the researcher‟s fieldwork in Mozambique and in the DRC he encountered some 
problems. The main problem related to winning the trust of managers of Chinese agricultural 
enterprises. Chinese managers appeared suspicious of the researcher‟s real motives. This 
suspicious was further compounded by the language barrier between him and the Chinese 
respondents. Indeed, most Chinese managers in Mozambique and the DRC spoke hardly 
Portuguese, English or French.  
As a result of such mistrust, most Chinese managers requested that the researcher switch off 
his voice recorder. In addition to that, Chinese managers also proved reluctant to disclose 
some information – such as those pertaining to the profits realised by the firm or to the 
relationship between the firm and the Chinese government. Moreover, in the DRC a group of 
Chinese managers – those of Hubei Dadi International Corporation for Technical and 
Economic Cooperation – refused to talk to the researcher and instead referred him to their 
Congolese deputy. In an attempt to overcome such suspicions, in Mozambique the researcher 
got in touch with the president of the Chinese Business Association of Mozambique, Wang 
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Jie, who introduced him via the telephone to managers of some Chinese agricultural 
enterprises. In addition to that, both in Mozambique and the DRC the researcher produced his 
business card in an attempt to allay the suspicions of Chinese managers. On a general note, 
such difficulties in winning the trust of Chinese managers is comparable to the experiences of 
other researchers (Human Right Watch, 2011; CCS, 2010) who have conducted studies on 
Chinese investments in several African countries.  
Besides the difficulty of accessing Chinese managers, the researcher found the DRC to be a 
challenging country in which to conduct research. First, the researcher struggled to establish 
contact with senior officials from the Congolese ministries of agriculture and international 
cooperation. When such contacts were made, government officials usually claimed to be 
unaware of any Chinese agricultural activities within the agricultural sector. While it is quite 
possible that some officials did in fact have little knowledge about the activities of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises in the country, this nevertheless reflects some lack of organisation 
within government departments. In addition to that, it is also possible that some senior 
officials refrained from engaging on an issue perceived as politically sensitive. Second, the 
researcher also experienced a small incident with members of the security services at the Pool 
Malebo, Kinshasa. These officials alleged that the researcher had entered the border area with 
the Republic of Congo (Congo-Brazzaville) without the prior authorisation or identification 
from the security services. Such accusations were not accurate, as the researcher had not only 
obtained authorisation to enter the area but had also paid fees to other members of the 
security services. After some discussion, the researcher had to pay money to the group of 
officials detaining him before leaving the area.  
4.4.2 Data analysis 
After collecting the data in the field in Mozambique and the DRC, the researcher proceeded 
to transcribe those data before starting the analysis process. All data were transcribed in 
English. In total, he produced a transcript of 228 pages.  
Henning (2004:127) states that qualitative analysis is a process that begins with data 
collection, as researchers constantly reflect on impressions, relationships and connections 
while connecting data. She claims that in qualitative analysis the search for similarities, 
differences, categories, themes, concepts and ideas forms part of a continuous process. 
Henning (2004:127) holds that qualitative analysis starts with reading all the data and then 
dividing them into smaller and more meaningful units – the codes. She adds that researchers 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
88 
 
use comparison to build and refine categories, define conceptual similarities and discover 
patterns. Remenyi (2012:105) points out that the researcher looks for patterns not only in the 
data itself, but also between what the data suggests and what are already known patterns from 
prior research. For Remenyi (20012:105) much of the qualitative analysis relies on 
comparing similarities and differences between what is already known and what we are 
trying to understand. Remenyi (20112:105) and Henning (2004: 128) claim that the most 
important objective of qualitative analysis is to establish relationships between concepts in 
order to explain or predict events. However, Henning (2004:127&129) argues that 
researchers sometimes encounter data management problems when dealing with large 
amounts of data. She claims that it is precisely to minimize problems associated with data 
management that researchers use data analyses software.  
Henning (2004: 126) identifies atlas.ti as one such qualitative data-analysis software. 
Henning (2004:126) holds that Atlas.ti is “a powerful workbench for qualitative data analysis, 
particularly for large sections of text, visual and audio data”.  She claims that this software 
provides support to researchers when analysing and interpreting texts by way of coding and 
graphs. According to Henning (2004: 130), coding of texts plays a central role in the analysis 
of data with atlas.ti. She defines coding as a classification of categories from lower to higher 
levels of abstraction. Henning (2004:131) states that coding fractures data into concepts that 
can be compared. Similar incidents are grouped into higher categories and given the same 
conceptual labels. Wildschut (2011: 11) argues that from a methodological perspective codes 
serve a number of purposes. First, they capture the meaning of data. Second, codes serve as 
handles for specific occurrences in the data that cannot be found by ordinary search 
techniques. Third, codes are also used as classification mechanisms at different levels of 
analysis in order to “create sets of related information units for the purpose of comparison 
(e.g., a concept like „coping strategy‟)”.   
Wildschut (2011) further holds that the construction of codes has to be informed by some 
good practice principles. First of all, code names have to be brief and succinct. The longer 
denomination of codes has to be kept in the pane. Second, codes have to be constructed in 
order to capture the most specific, detailed occurrences. This would ensure that codes are 
subsequently regrouped into broader categories or themes. Last, codes can be assigned a 
negative sign (-) or a positive sign (+) to express a particular effect of an occurrence.   
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In this study, the researcher defined codes as categorization devices of different levels of 
abstraction for the purpose of establishing comparisons between concepts.  The researcher 
started by creating a code book containing 66 codes. It can be viewed in Annexure 3. The 
codes were constructed in order to capture the most detailed occurrences. The selection of 
codes followed both a deductive and inductive approach. In other words, the choice of the 
codes was informed by a combination of the theoretical frameworks and claims made by 
scholars in the literature on China-Africa relations.  The choice of the codes was also 
informed by a general assessment of the transcripts of the interviews.  
During the process of coding the researcher created additional codes as a result of a closer 
inspection of the texts inserted into atlas.ti software. By the end of the exercise the number of 
codes was reduced to 48 through the process of merging identical codes. In total, all codes 
produced 447 occurrences.  
After coding, the researcher produced a correspondence analysis table from the quotation 
count report automatically generated by atlas.ti. The correspondence analysis table provides a 
list of codes and the number of times they have been mentioned by respondents (Remenyi, 
2012:107). The researcher selected the codes that showed the highest number of occurrences 
as well as codes considered as central for their contribution to the substantiation of the 
theoretical frameworks . The researcher then compiled two contingency tables: one for 
Mozambique and one for the DRC. A contingency table provides a list of key concepts as 
well as the sources of these concepts (Remenyi, 2012:119). In this study the sources of the 
concepts were the respondents in the interviews. The contingency tables can also be found in 
Annexure 4. From the contingency tables the researcher wrote summaries of his own 
understanding of the concepts included in those tables. There were two summaries: one on 
Mozambique and the other on the DRC. The summaries were easy to make given that all 
quotations related to a particular code or concept were regrouped into one network in atlas.ti.  
After producing the summaries of the concepts, the researcher compared them  and created 
broad categories within which several concepts were inserted. For Mozambique, the 
categories created were the following: local advantages; specific assets of enterprises; size of 
concessions, crops produced and destination markets; provision of agricultural technology; 
land acquisition and monitoring; and infrastructure problems. For the DRC, the categories 
included: local advantages; specific assets of enterprises; size of concessions, crops produced 
and destination markets; provision of agricultural technology; land acquisition system and 
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monitoring; enforcement of land titles; and infrastructure problems. The researcher then 
divided the categories into two groups: the first group included categories related to the 
motivations informing the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises (i.e. local advantages; 
specific assets of enterprises; size of concessions, crops produced and destination markets; 
and provision of agricultural technology), while the second group contained categories linked 
to institutional contexts shaping the behaviours and/or modes of entry into local industries  
(i.e. land acquisition system and monitoring, enforcement of land titles, and infrastructure 
problems). For each country the researcher integrated the categories included in each group in 
order to generate conceptual frameworks or narratives that provide explanations on the 
motivations informing the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in 
Mozambique and the DRC as well as on the effects of institutional contexts on the behaviours 
and/or modes of entry of these enterprises into the two countries. These conceptual 
frameworks are discussed extensively in Chapters 6 and 7.   
4.5 Conclusion  
The methodology employed in this study was rigorous and consistent. First, the choice of a 
case study design has been well planned given the contemporary and the context-specific 
dimensions of the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises in Mozambique and the DRC. 
Second, the two case studies have been carefully selected in order to ensure that the results of 
the two case studies are similar and applicable to other case studies in which the theoretical 
frameworks applied in this study are relevant. Furthermore, the instrument for data collection, 
the semi-structured interview, was the best tool for collection of data in a qualitatively 
oriented research project with a clear interest in local contexts. On top of that, the data have 
been analysed through a rigorous and objective process. 
Nevertheless, the methodology employed in this study has two weaknesses. First, given that 
the fieldwork research was conducted once in Mozambique and the DRC, the researcher did 
not have sufficient time to establish more trust and better working relations with managers of 
Chinese agricultural enterprises. If the researcher had had more opportunity to visit the two 
countries, he would have established greater trust with the Chinese managers, which would 
have allowed him to access more information on the activities of Chinese agricultural 
enterprises in Mozambique and the DRC.  However, given the limited time and money, the 
researcher did not have the opportunity to revisit Mozambique and the DRC after the 
fieldwork. Despite the above limitation, the researcher attempted to gain the trust of Chinese 
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managers by seeking the intervention of a senior Chinese businesswoman and by presenting 
his business card as well as the letter from the University to Chinese managers.  
Second, as it should be clear by now, the researcher derived his understanding of the 
motivations of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique and the DRC from 
experiences and perceptions of various stakeholders on the ground, including Chinese 
implementing agents. However, this approach constitutes an important limitation. This is 
because the motivations of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Africa cannot be 
fully understood without integrating the experiences and perceptions of senior managers 
operating from the headquarters in China.  This is especially true given that some of these 
enterprises operate under a vertical integration model and hence, managers of subsidiaries 
might ignore the overall strategic objectives of the mother companies. Therefore, this study 
can only provide partial, although significant, explanations of the motivations of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique and the DRC.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: BACKGROUND AND CONTEXTUALIZATION: THE 
AGRICULTURAL SECTOR IN MOZAMBIQUE AND THE DRC 
5.1. Introduction 
 In Chapter 3 I argued that the motivations informing the activities of Chinese agricultural 
enterprises operating in Mozambique and the DRC may be ascertained by the features of the 
ownership and locational advantages of these enterprises as well as by the political economy 
of China and the provision of agricultural aid in the form of research and training by Chinese 
agricultural enterprises running aid projects funded by the Chinese government. I also held 
that the behaviour and/or modes of entry of Chinese agricultural enterprises into local 
industries will be determined by the customary land tenure systems, the lands laws as well as 
political institutions.  
This chapter aims to provide background and contextual information on the characteristics of 
the agricultural sectors in Mozambique and the DRC; the institutional contexts in relation to 
these agricultural sectors; the customary land tenure systems in the two countries; and the 
political economy of China. The chapter is divided into four parts. In the first I introduce the 
reader to the general characteristics of Mozambique‟s agricultural sector with an emphasis on 
its potential and its relevance for the economy of the country. I also discuss the institutional 
context related to the agricultural sector and the way in which it affects the smallholders and 
foreign firms.  In the second part I discuss the same issues with respect to the DRC. Next, I 
introduce the reader to the customary land tenure systems prevailing in Mozambique and the 
DRC. In the last part I provide an overview of the political economy prevailing in China with 
an emphasis on the role of the Chinese government in promoting the outward expansion of its 
corporations – mainly the states-owned enterprises.   
 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
93 
 
 
5.2. Mozambique  
5.2.1 Outline of the agricultural sector in Mozambique 
Characteristics of the agricultural sector 
Mozambique is a country blessed with sufficient water, sun and fertile land. It possesses 36 
million hectares of arable land, of which only 4.5 million is cultivated (World Bank, 2006). 
The country can be divided into three main agro-climatic regions ranging from arid and semi-
arid in the south and south-west to sub-humid zones – in the north of the country – and to 
humid islands – mostly in the central provinces. This means that the central and northern 
parts of Mozambique are the most fertile regions of the country and therefore suitable for 
growing crops, while the south of the country is most suitable for raising livestock because of 
the low prevalence of animal diseases in that part of the country (FAO, 2005; World Bank, 
2006). Maize and cassava are the main crops produced in the country followed by rice, 
sorghum, beans, cashew nut, sugar, cotton and tobacco.  The prevalence of maize and cassava 
is due to their high resistance to drought and diseases. As far as livestock is concerned, 
Mozambique produces chickens, pigs, goats and cattle. 
Prior to its independence, Mozambique had a striving agricultural sector that consisted of a 
mixture of several leading commercial and small-scale farm enterprises. The country was a 
leading exporter of cotton, cashew nuts and sugar, and at the same time was able to ensure 
food security at home. After independence, the civil war that ensued forced millions of 
people – including the skilful Portuguese farmers – to migrate to urban areas and 
neighbouring countries, therefore depriving agriculture of a much needed labour force. In 
addition to that, the Marxist-Leninist policies of the FRELIMO government prompted 
Maputo to concentrate its agricultural intervention policies on the inefficient state-owned 
commercial farms at the expense of small-scale farms (Mosca, 2011:39) Above all, 
commercial and small-scale farms were the target of acts of sabotage during the conflict 
(World Bank, 2006). As a result of all these obstacles, the agricultural sector was in a state of 
decay at the end of the civil war in the early 1990s (World Bank, 2006).   
The agricultural sector of Mozambique is dominated by smallholders, who produce more 
than 95% of the country‟s total agricultural output, while the balance is provided by a small 
number of medium-size and commercial farms (World Bank, 2006).  As Table 5.1 below 
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shows, in 2002, out of a total of 3.064700 million farmers, 3.051100 million of them – an  
equivalent of 99.5% – were smallholders cultivating an average land area of 1.22 hectare per 
household. These numbers demonstrate the predominance of smallholders within the 
agricultural sector. 
Table 5.1: Basic characteristics of the agricultural sector, 2002 and 2003 
Parameter Size of farm enterprise
4
 
2000          2000          2000 
Total   
2000          2003     
Size Small       Medium   Large All farms  All farms5    
Number of farm households („000) 3,051.1     10.2             0.4 3,064.7        3,172.6 
Total cultivated land („000) 3.736.6      67.7           121.0 3,925.3        4,534.6 
Average cultivated land (ha/household) 1.22           6.65            282 1.26               1.41 
Area cultivated in food crops (%) 84.4          74.2              7.6 84.7               ..... 
Source: Leoning and Perumalpillai-Essex (2005)  
Furthermore, the majority of smallholders are involved in subsistence farming, using 
rudimentary tools. The World Bank estimates that only 16% of smallholders are involved in 
the production of cash crops (World Bank, 2006).  
The end of the civil war was followed by a slight recovery of the agricultural sector. From 
1996 to 2006 the Mozambican agricultural sector grew at an annual rate of 5.7% and even 
accelerating to 7.7% in the five last years of that period (USAID, 2008). However, from 2006 
to this day growth in the agricultural sector has stagnated. This is because the boost in 
agricultural production observed since the mid-1990s was triggered by the return of refugees 
and internally displaced persons to the rural areas, on the one hand, and the expansion of 
cultivated land area, on the other. In another words, the growth in agricultural production was 
due to the expansion of labour and cultivated land area rather than to any structural 
transformation of the sector as a result of, for example, technological innovation or 
infrastructural development (World Bank, 2006). Table 5.2 indicates that the  size of 
cultivated land and labour in Mozambique increased on average by 3.9% and 1.2%, 
respectively, from 1991 to 2003.  However, as showed in Table 5.3, agricultural production 
                                                          
4
 Small-scale farms are those with less than 10 hectares of cultivated area, medium-sized farms are 
10-50 hectares, and large farms have over 50 hectares (Leoning and Perumalpillai-Essex, 2005). 
5
 The 2002-2003 agricultural survey included only small and medium farm enterprises. 
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in Mozambique continues to be insufficient as there are huge gaps between actual and 
potential production for the major agricultural commodities.  
The stagnation in agricultural production in Mozambique provides a clear indication of the 
low productivity of smallholder farmers. Such low productivity is confirmed by the 
contradiction between the portion of the workforce employed in the agricultural sector, which 
stands at 78.5%, on the one hand, and the share of agriculture in the GDP, which stands at 
25%, on the other (USAID, 2008). 
Table 5.2: Average annual growth rates for land, labour and rainfall, 1993-03 (per cent) 
Region Time Area 
Total      Smallholder    Commercial
6
           
Labour Rainfall 
North 1993-2001 2.5                 2.9               -8.2 1.5 6.2 
Central 1993-2001 6.8                 7.2               -5.0 4.2 13.5 
South 1993-2001 2.7                 2.7                7.0 0.5 11.6 
Total 1993-2001 3.3                 3.6               -4.2 1.7 10.7 
Total 2000-2003 3.9                 ....                 ..... 1.2 ..... 
Source: Leoning and Perumalpillai-Essex (2005) 
Table 5.3: Estimated actual and potential crop yields 
Crop Average actual yield (t/ha) Average potential yield (t/ha) 
Maize 0.9 5.0-6.5 
Sorghum 0.4 0.8-2.0 
Rice 1.0 2.5-6.0 
Beans 0.5 0.5-2.5 
Cassava 6.0 5.0-10.0 
Cotton 0.5 1.0-2.0 
Source: Leoning and Perumalpillai-Essex (2005)  
 
 
                                                          
6
 Commercial farms are those with over 50 hectares of cultivated land (Leoning and Perumalpillai-
Essex, 2005). 
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Relevance of the agricultural sector 
The agricultural sector is of special significance for the wellbeing of the Mozambican 
population and for the economy of the country. In the first place, the evolution of the 
agricultural sector has a considerable impact on the incidence of poverty in Mozambique. 
This is because 68% of Mozambique‟s 19 million inhabitants – around 12 million people – 
live in rural areas. Of these 12 million people, more than 90% rely on agriculture for their 
livelihood (USAID, 2008). Therefore, the underdevelopment of the agricultural sector means 
that the majority of the rural population is condemned to earning pitiable incomes, and hence 
to poverty. As a matter of fact, 80% of poor households in Mozambique are found in rural 
areas (International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), 2010).  Although the 
incidence of poverty has been reduced in rural areas since the end of the civil war, poverty 
remains widespread in those areas. Rural poverty in Mozambique decreased from 71% 
between 1996-97 to 55% between 2002-03. Despite such significant reduction in the 
incidence of poverty, more than half of rural population still live on less than one US$1 a day 
and lack basic services such as electricity, clean water, health facilities and schools. In 
addition, poverty is more acute in the south of the country, where smallholder farmers have to 
deal with hostile climatic conditions characterised by drought and floods (International Fund 
for Agricultural Development (IFAD), 2010). 
Secondly, the state of the agricultural sector in a country affects the economy of that country 
through various channels. Mozambique is not an exception to the rule. To begin with, Sur and 
Senauer (1999) point to a positive and significant relationship between nutrition – measured 
by the number of calories or through the weight-height ratio – and productivity. They argue 
that improvement in the nutrition level within a population usually leads to the emergence of 
a healthy and vibrant labour force capable of effectively engaging in productive activities. 
Moreover, other studies have also showed that adequate and sufficient nutrition is critical for 
children – especially at the foetal stage to year 2 – for their health and productivity in 
adulthood (USAID, 2007). Thus, providing proper food to children will ensure that their 
physical and intellectual growth process is preserved. However, in the case of Mozambique 
the underperformance of the agricultural sector is having a harmful effect on the country‟s 
food security. Mozambique‟s agriculture is unable to produce enough foodstuffs to meet the 
needs of its population. The Mozambican government aims to mitigate the effects of food 
shortages by importing staple foods from abroad. However, Maputo can import only a limited 
quantity of staple foods because of a shortage of foreign currency. This means that the 
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amount of food remains inadequate despite imports and this situation causes a surge in the 
prices of staple foods. As a result, many poor Mozambicans are unable to access sufficient 
food. USAID estimates that despite considerable progress achieved by Mozambique in 
reducing the proportion of the population that is undernourished – 66% in 1990 – 40% of the 
population is still underfed (USAID, 2007). In addition to that, 41% of children under the age 
of 5 years suffer from chronic malnutrition. Likewise, the extent of malnutrition is higher in 
rural areas than in in urban centres (USAID, 2007).  The sudden surge in international prices 
of basic foodstuff in 2008 further curtailed the capacity of the Mozambican government to 
alleviate the effects of food shortages. The rise in food prices has been felt acutely in Maputo 
because its high dependence on imported foods. Prices of staple foods such as wheat and rice 
continued to increase in 2010 to the point where many poor Mozambican became unable to 
obtain sufficient food. As a result, a violent uprising broke out in late 2010 in Maputo when 
thousands of unemployed youths took to the streets to protest against the high cost of living ( 
Radio France Internationale, Le Mozambique a Fain, 2010).   
Third, the agricultural sector is also relevant for the industrial development of Mozambique. 
The World Bank claims that generally there are strong forward and backward linkages 
between the agricultural sector and the light industrial sector – such as agro-processing 
industries (World Bank: World Development Report, 2008).  In addition to that, the World 
Bank also claims that such linkages suggest the existence of an agricultural multiplier, since 
an initial increase in the incomes/outputs of smallholders leads to an increase of higher 
proportion in the incomes/outputs of agro-processing and food marking enterprises. The 
agricultural multiplier seems to be significant in large economies with a high share of non-
tradable agriculture and services (World Bank: World Development Report, 2008). The 
above information suggests that the expansion of the agricultural sector will promote the 
industrial development of Mozambique.      
5.2.2 Institutional context  
The institutional context related to the agricultural sector in Mozambique is unfavourable 
overall. The stagnation of agricultural output since 2006 is the consequence of structural 
problems facing the agricultural sector. As a matter of fact, Mozambique‟s agricultural sector 
remains plagued with several challenges.   
To begin with, the majority of smallholders have limited access to new varieties of seeds, 
fertilizers and pesticides, and animal tractions. The proportion of smallholders that use new 
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varieties of seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and animal tractions is 12%, 4%, 5% and 10% 
respectively.  Yet, it is estimated that on average households that use fertilizers, pesticides 
and animal tractions will earn higher incomes of 50%, 30% and 14% respectively than those 
who do not use these technologies (World Bank, 2006). One of the main reasons for the 
limited access of smallholders to these technologies is simply their lack of availability. Input 
supplies for agriculture from governmental bodies are very weak and often left to the private 
sector and NGOs (Interview with the General Director of the Mozambican Institute for 
Agricultural Research (IIAM), Maputo 21 April 2011). Smallholders who cannot afford to 
purchase these inputs at market price are obliged to farm without them.  
Secondly, in spite of the country‟s huge potential for irrigated farmland, estimated at 3 
million hectares, only 97 000 hectare of farmlands are equipped for irrigation. Of that, only 
37 000 hectares of farmlands are currently irrigated. Still, most of the farms benefiting from 
irrigation are commercial farms (World Bank, 2006). Yet irrigated agriculture has a high 
potential for smallholder farmers. This is because irrigation enables smallholders to use 
double-cropping food crops. The World Bank estimates that the average value added for 
using irrigation is US$500-600 on the smallest farms and US$800-100 for farms between 5 
and 10 hectares. Thus, the World Bank states that an annual investment of US$20 million for 
irrigation could generate US$250 million of added value in the agricultural sector (World 
Bank, 2006).   
In addition to that, the rural extension system in Mozambique is relatively weak. This is 
mainly the outcome of limited financial capabilities. In order to be efficient, the national 
extension service of Mozambique needs a minimum of 3 000 agents. But for the moment, 
because of financial constraints on the part of the government, the national extension service 
has only 800 extension agents and this number is clearly insufficient. Nonetheless, the 
national extension service of Mozambique hopes to hire a minimum of 1 150 agents in the 
medium term   (Interview with the National Director of the Agricultural Extension service of 
Mozambique, Maputo 20 April 2011). The weakness of the national extension service means 
that smallholders are denied access to new production techniques as well as new varieties of 
seeds (Interview with the National Director of the Agricultural Extension service of 
Mozambique, Maputo 20 April 2011).    
Furthermore, the financial sector in Mozambique is not well suited to meet the needs of 
smallholder farmers. To start with, there are very few bank branches in rural areas. On top of 
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that, most of the products offered by the banks do not correspond to the conditions and needs 
of smallholders, for instance, in term of short-term deposits and mobile banking. Moreover, 
the interest rates charged by commercial banks are too high, even for commercial farms 
(USAID, 2008). Finally, farmers cannot mortgage their land in order to access credit from 
commercial banks.  Mozambique‟s land law clearly states that the land is the property of the 
state. As such, it cannot be sold, alienated in any ways or seized (Mozambique‟s land law, 
article 3, 1997).  
Finally, poor infrastructure also presents a major obstacle to the expansion of the 
Mozambican agriculture. The inadequate infrastructures – in particular roads – reduce 
linkages between smallholders and markets and, hence, serve as disincentives for additional 
production (Interviews with local researchers, Maputo 8 April 2011 & 22 April 2011). In 
addition, poor electricity coverage can also increase production costs and prevent farmers 
from producing at their full potential.  In Mozambique, recent government‟s efforts to 
upgrade the quality of roads have led to better integration of smallholders with markets 
(World Bank, 2006). However, during the rainy season many secondary roads become 
inaccessible. Table 5.4 indicates the relative gains achieved by Mozambique in the 
improvement of its road network.  
Table 5.4 : Condition of classified road network, 1995 to 2000 
Year Paved roads (%) 
Good    Fair    Poor 
Unpaved roads (%) 
Good   Fair     Poor 
1995 11          20       69 1           19         80 
2000 41          39       20 21         20         48 
Source: Benito – Spinetto and Moll (2005) 
The supply of power in the rural areas of Mozambique is also inadequate as the majority of 
the rural population lacks access to electricity. 
As a result of this unfavourable institutional context, many foreign agricultural enterprises 
avoid investing in Mozambique (Interview with local researcher, Maputo 22 April 2011). 
While foreign agricultural enterprises turn away from investing in the production of food 
crops or livestock, in recent years foreign investors have demonstrated a strong interest in the 
production of cash crops associated to biofuels and ethanol. Following the rise of the price of 
crude oil, which crossed the benchmark of US$100 per barrel in 2008, the production of 
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biofuels became a potentially profitable business for international agricultural enterprises 
(Arndt et al., 2008). Several foreign agricultural corporations have attempted to secure 
farmlands in Mozambique to grow sugarcane and jatrofa for biofuels and ethanol (Interview 
with Postdoctoral Fellow at the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Maputo 
4 May 2011). Armdt et al. (2008) point out that recently the Mozambican state requested 12 
million hectares of land for growing jatrofa, sugarcane and sweet sorghum – in addition to the 
5 million hectares of farmlands that are already used for growing crops associated with 
biofuels and ethanol.       
Amongst foreign agricultural enterprises currently operating in Mozambique, there is the case 
of Procana, a British agricultural enterprise with South African interests, which signed a 
contract  in 2007 with the Mozambican government to invest US$500 million in the farming 
of 30 000 hectares of land in Mashiching. However, Procana‟s contract has been revoked by 
the government since the British enterprise failed to begin operating on its farmland within a 
two-year period (Interview with Postdoctoral Fellow at the International Food Research 
Institute (IFPRI), Maputo 4 May 2011). Sun Biofuel, another British enterprise, has secured 
1 000 hectares of land in Manica province for the production of biofuel.  Furthermore, the 
British multinational Longro has secured 30 000 hectares for the production of cotton in 
Mozambique (Radio France Internationale, 2011). In addition to that, Energem Resource, a 
Canadian agricultural enterprise is currently developing 60 000 hectares of land for biofuels 
at Chilenge, Gaza province (Radio France Internationale, 2010). Besides these enterprises, 
there are also the cases of some South African and Zimbabwean farmers who are running 
small-scale farms – producing mostly sugarcane – in Sofala and Manica provinces, Central 
Mozambique (Interview with the Program Officer of the Rural Organization for Mutual Help 
(ORAM), Maputo 5 April 2011).   
The above emerging impetus of foreign agricultural companies in the production of crops for 
the purpose of generating biofuels might ,in the medium term, lead to tensions between the 
energy security of their countries of origin and the food security of Mozambique.  It is 
probably for this reason that the Mozambican government has been reluctant to allow these 
foreign agricultural enterprises to operate in the country – fearing possible land grabbing 
(Interview with Postdoctoral Fellow at the International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI), Maputo 4 May 2011). In an apparent effort to prevent land grabbing , the 
Mozambican government has initiated a countrywide agro-ecological zoning study to 
determine the amount of land that is available and the portions that should be employed for 
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cash crops and those that should be used for food crops (Interviews with the Coordinator of 
the National Agricultural Development Program (PROAGRI) and the National Director of 
the Agricultural Extension service of Mozambique and Postdoctoral Fellow at the 
International Food Research Institute (IFPRI), Maputo, 18, 20 April 2011 and 4 May 2011).   
5.3 Democratic Republic of Congo 
5.3.1 Outline of the agricultural sector in the DRC 
Characteristics of the agricultural sector  
The DRC has huge agricultural potential. The country is blessed with the world‟s second 
largest rainforest and the highest volume of rainfall in Africa, with average renewable water 
resources of 900 km³ per year, which accounts for almost a quarter of the continent‟s fresh-
water resources ( FAO, 2005) . Farmland suitable for cultivation represents over one third of 
the land area of 228 million hectares, or some 80 million hectares. However, only 10% of the 
80 million hectares of farmlands suitable for agriculture are cultivated (FAO, 2005). 
Nevertheless, the extensive amount of fertile land also constitutes a major handicap, as the 
country needs to invest heavily in infrastructure in order to integrate farmers with markets 
(World Bank, 2010). The DRC has three main agro-climatic regions: 
 The central basin, located in the central-western part of the country with a hot and 
humid climate, and high rainfall ranging between 1 500 and 2 000 mm during the 
entire year;  
 The storied shelf of savannah situated in the south and north of the country, which is 
characterised by two seasons – the rainy and the dry season. During the rainy season 
the average annual rainfall varies between 800 and 1 500 mm. There is no rainfall 
during the dry season, which lasts between 1 to 6 months. Climatic variability in the 
savannah zones, coupled with abundant water, allows for the cultivation of several 
types of crops during the year; 
 The massif of mountain located in the east and north-east of the country, characterised 
by a temperate climate (Ministry of Agriculture of the DRC, 2008 & FAO, 2005). 
As one might expect, the DRC produces several food and cash crops. The most important of 
these are: cassava, maize, rice, beans, plantains, potatoes, coffee, cocoa, sugar, tea, rubber 
and palm oil. Overall, just as in the case of Mozambique, cassava and maize are the main 
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cultivated crops. Most of the cash crops are produced in the central basin region, while the 
bulk of food crops is farmed in the savannah and mountain zones.  The DRC has also 
important potential in livestock production. The World Bank estimated that the country‟s 87 
million hectares of pasture lands can sustain production of 40 million cattle (World Bank, 
2010).  Animals raised include chickens, pigs, goats and cattle. Most  livestock  activities 
take place in the mountain regions of the east as well as in the Savannah zones in the south-
east of the country (Ministry of Agriculture of the DRC, 2008). 
At independence in 1960 the DRC had a modern and vibrant agricultural sector consisting of 
several family farms alongside numerous and prosperous commercial farms. As an indication 
of the efficiency of the sector, agricultural exports accounted for 40% of GDP in 1960 (World 
Bank, 2010). However, a series of events after independence contributed to the downfall of 
the Congolese agricultural sector. First, the wars in which the country was engulfed in the 
1960s disrupted the operations of commercial farms as well as those of householders who had 
to flee from their farms in order to escape violence and anarchy. The condition of the 
agricultural sector further deteriorated in 1973, when the government decided to nationalise 
small and medium plantations. The transfer of these assets into the hands of inexperienced 
managers brought them to a state of near collapse. Furthermore, the government‟s 
underinvestment in the agricultural sector – especially in infrastructure – coupled with bad 
economic policies that favoured urban populations at the expense of farmers further worsened 
the conditions of the latter, including smallholders. Finally, the disintegration of the state in 
the early 1990s and the subsequent civil war that lasted from 1996 to 2002 devastated the 
sector as millions of people died, while others sought refuge in urban areas or outside the 
country. At the same time the government lost control of several parts of the country (World 
Bank, 2010). Consequently the Congolese agricultural sector was in total disarray by the end 
of civil war in 2002. From 1998 to 2008 the average annual growth of the agricultural sector 
was 0% (World Bank: Democratic Republic of Congo at glance, 2009).  
With the return to a fragile peace in the DRC, especially after the 2006 general elections, 
economic conditions have improved slightly.  The DRC has managed to stabilize its macro-
economic parameters and since 2002 it has enjoyed significant economic growth (World 
Bank, 2009).  The agricultural sector has also shown small signs of recovering after many 
years of decline. It registered a positive growth rate of 3% in both 2007 and 2008 ((World 
Bank, 2009).  However, the current modest growth of the agricultural sector is neither 
sufficient nor sustainable in the sense that it is not attributable to any structural 
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transformations of the sector. It simply stems from minor improvement in the political 
environment, the enhancement of the macro-economic framework as well as the 
rehabilitation of some basic infrastructure (World Bank, 2010). Hence, the Congolese 
agricultural sector remains plagued with significant structural problems, which considerably 
undermine the productivity of smallholders. Consequently, the country‟s agricultural 
production remains insufficient. Table 5.5 below provides an indication of the deficit in the 
production of major agricultural commodities in the DRC. Besides shortages of the above 
staples, the DRC also faces a significant deficit in meat production, be it goat, chicken, pig or 
cattle. According to the Congolese Ministry of Agriculture, the DRC produces around 70 000 
tonnes of meat per year, which represents an average of 1.3 kg of meat per person per year. 
This figure is far below the minimum requirement estimated at 18.25 kg per year or even to 
the FAO requirement of 13 kg per year (Ministry of Agriculture of the DRC, 2008).  
Overall, the Congolese agriculture remains underdeveloped. Perhaps, a clear reflection of that 
reality is that the agricultural sector accounts for less than 40% of the country‟s GDP, while it 
employs more than 70% of the active population.   
 Table 5.5: Crops production in 2008 ( in tonnes)  
Crop Actual Production Production Required Balance 
Cassava 15.019.430 30.873.128 -15.853.698 
Rice 316.530 340.380 -23.850 
Maize 1.155.950 1.769.976 -614.026 
Bean 113.240 204.228 -90.988 
Peanut 370.000 816.912 -446.912 
Sweet potatoes 239.960 408.456 -168.496 
Wheat 8.740 340.380 -331.640 
Source: SNSA CEPLANUT (2008) 
Relevance of the agricultural sector  
The agricultural sector is crucial for the overall welfare of the Congolese population. The 
Congolese population is estimated at 60 million people, 68% of whom live in rural areas. In 
addition to that, agriculture is the main source of livelihood for more than 70% of the 
population (World Bank: Consultative Group on the DRC, 2007). 
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Hence, as in Mozambique, the underdevelopment of the agricultural sector is having 
widespread effects on the welfare of most of the DRC population. This is particularly true for 
the rural population, who depend heavily on agriculture for their livelihood. As a matter of 
fact, on average 62% of the urban and 76% of the rural population live below the poverty line 
in the DRC (World Bank, 2010). In addition to that, the incidence of poverty reaches up to 
90% in some rural communities (HELIO International: RDC, 2009). Furthermore, in most 
rural areas the bulk of the population lacks access to basic services such as clean water, 
education and health services.  
Another sad outcome of the underperformance of the Congolese agriculture is its adverse 
effect on food security – not only in rural areas but in urban centres as well. As discussed 
above, the DRC is unable to meet the food requirements of its population.  
In order to mitigate the effects of food shortage, the DRC imports staple foods from abroad. 
However, the DRC can import only small quantities of staple foods, given its limited reserve 
of foreign currency.  As a consequence, foodstuff remains expensive and unaffordable for the 
poor in the DRC. The World Bank estimates that more than two thirds of the population – 
more than 35 million people – do not have enough food to meet their minimum daily caloric 
requirements (World Bank, 2010). The FAO estimates that in rural areas 73% of the 
population are malnourished and that 30% of children under 5 suffer from chronic 
malnutrition compared to 22.4% in urban centres (FAO, 2005).  Moreover, in recent years the 
country has been forced to increase its imports of stable foods to meet rising demand fuelled 
by a 3% annual population growth (World Bank, 2010).  
From 2008 the significant surge in international prices of key staples such as wheat, meat and 
rice further reduced the scope of the DRC to mitigate the effects of food shortages. As a 
result, the rate of malnutrition increased sharply, especially in the capital Kinshasa, because 
of its high dependence on food imports. The World Bank argues that the increase of food 
prices not only affects the health of the poor, but also pushes more people into poverty. For 
instance, it claims that a 50% increase in food prices in the DRC will increase the national 
incidence of poverty by 5% (World Bank, 2010). 
Finally, as in the case of Mozambique, the development of the agricultural sector in the DRC 
will also have positive effects for the expansion of light industries. The agricultural sector 
could become both a source of raw materials by providing cheap and sufficient inputs to light 
industries, and also a source of markets by purchasing light machinery and equipment from 
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the same industries. In addition to these linkages, the multiplier effects would also benefit the 
broader Congolese economy (World Bank: World Agriculture Report, 2008).  
5.3.2 Institutional context 
The institutional context related to the agricultural sector is even more unfavourable in the 
DRC than it is in Mozambique.  The DRC agricultural sector is still facing numerous 
structural constraints that are preventing it from realizing even part of its full potential. To 
start with, there is a problem accessing agricultural inputs. Smallholders struggle to access 
certified seeds and fertilisers. Only 5% of seeds utilised in the DRC are certified by the 
relevant body. The biggest proportion of seeds is multiplied by peasant‟s organizations and 
transmitted informally from one peasant to another (Van Hoof, 2011:109). This raises 
questions regarding the quality of these seeds as well as the economic viability of the peasant 
organizations (Van Hoof, 2011).   Fertilisers are also not easily accessed by smallholders. 
Until recently, smallholders were unaware of the significant positive effects of fertilizers on 
farm outputs (Van Hoof, 2011:113).  The lack of use of seeds and fertilisers considerably 
reduces the output of smallholders.         
The dysfunctional extension services and agricultural research institutions also constitute a 
major obstacle to the growth of the agricultural sector in the DRC (Van Hoof, 2011:112). 
Over the years agricultural extension services and research stations in the DRC have become 
dysfunctional to the point that they are unable to conduct research and provide training, 
seeds, fertilizers and pesticide to farmers. For instance, of the 32 agricultural research stations 
that the country had in 1960, only nine are still operational (FAO: Research on Congo‟s Basic 
Crops, 2011). In addition to that, extension services and research stations are unable to 
introduce new – and well-performing – varieties or species to smallholders (Van Hoof, 
2011:p113).  The inefficiency of extension services and agricultural research stations has led 
to the proliferation of diseases such as Mosaic, Anthracnose, Black Sigatoka and others, 
which are hampering the growth in production of major staple crops such as cassava, 
plantains, maize and peanuts as well as livestock (FAO, 2011).  
The other major impediment to the expansion of the agricultural sector in the DRC is the 
problem associated with the absence or destruction of vital infrastructure such as roads and 
electricity. As for the state of the roads in the DRC, suffice it to say that they are in a bad 
condition. The World Bank argues that because of the bad state of the roads, surface transport 
is estimated to cost US$0.16 per ton-kilometre in the DRC compared to US$0.05 in Southern 
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Africa. In addition, the World Bank also suggests that only 5% of the country‟s classified 
roads are paved, while most roads need rehabilitation and maintenance (World Bank, 2010).  
Besides the road network, the DRC‟s agricultural sector also relies extensively on waterways 
provided by the Congo River and its tributaries to move agricultural commodities from 
production to markets areas. The World Bank argues that the Congo River represents a very 
competitive mode of transport since a ton per kilometre is estimated at around US$0.05. 
However, the World Bank claims that important stretches of the river are not navigable 
during the dry season because of lack of signals and dredging (World Bank, 2010).  
In addition, smallholder farmers in the DRC also have limited access to irrigated lands. 
Despite the country‟s 4 million hectares of irrigable land, only 13 500 hectares are irrigated, 
which accounts for only 3.2% of available irrigable lands (Ministry of Agriculture of the 
DRC, 2008). The limited access to irrigated farmlands constrains agricultural output.  Finally, 
despite the country‟s impressive potential in hydroelectricity – estimated at 774 Gwh – less 
than 10% of the population have access to electricity and most of the power is supplied to 
urban areas. In rural areas the main source of electricity remains firewood (HELIO 
International: RDC, 2009). The lack of electricity in rural areas is a major impediment toward 
the enhancement of value-adding activities such agro-processing.     
The weak institutional capacity of the Congolese Ministry of Agriculture to elaborate, 
implement and monitor projects is also a matter of concern that negatively affects the 
agricultural sector. The inefficiency within the Congolese Ministry of Agriculture is due to 
many factors, among which the centralisation of technical services and management of all 
projects and programmes in the capital; limited financial and material resources ; and ageing 
and low-paid civil servants (World Bank, 2010). In this regard, it is interesting to note that 
the proportion of the national budget allocated to the agricultural sector represents a 
negligible amount estimated to be between 0.69% (Cros, 2010) and 1.2% (Van Hoof, 2011).  
Finally, the absence of a financial system suitable to meet the needs and realities of 
smallholders is problematic for Congolese agriculture. In the DRC traditional commercial 
banks and micro-credit institutions are not interested in smallholder farmers. This is because 
the activities of the latter are perceived as risky – because of climatic variations – and low 
paying (Van Hoof, 2011:117). Furthermore, smallholders often lack assets to use as collateral 
for credit.  Difficult access to finance prevents smallholders from enhancing their farming 
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activities, since they require financial assistance to purchase machines and agricultural tools 
(World Bank: Consultative Group on the DRC, 2007; Van Hoof, 2011:117).  
Given this, despite the DRC‟s significant agricultural potential, few foreign agricultural 
enterprises are operating in the country because of the unfavourable institutional context.  
The National Agency for the Promotion of Investments (ANAPI) identifies only a handful of 
foreign agricultural enterprises currently operating in the DRC (Interview with manager of 
agricultural projects at ANAPI, Kinshasa 31 May 2011).  
Foreign agricultural enterprises avoid the DRC as an investment location because of the harsh 
business climate prevailing in the country. Three factors in particular inhibit foreign 
agricultural investments in the DRC: the underdeveloped state of infrastructure, the 
dysfunctional legal system and the continuing political instability (Hogg, 2012).  
Furthermore, despite the official end of the civil war in 2002, political stability in the DRC 
remains elusive. This is because of the persistent activities of militias and rebel groups in the 
east and north-east of the country as well as continuous factional strife among political elites, 
which hinders the consolidation of state institutions. The DRC is constantly threatening to fall 
back into a new cycle of widespread violence. The political instability in the DRC is believed 
to be one of the most important challenges for Chinese agricultural enterprises that wish to 
invest in the country (Interview with the First Councillor to the Office of the Economic 
Councillor of the Chinese Embassy, Kinshasa 8 June 2013).   
Nevertheless, in the last couple of years more foreign agricultural enterprises have shown an 
interest in investing in the country. These agricultural corporations come from a variety of 
countries, including Britain, Canada, India, Russia, South Korea and China (Interview with 
manager of agricultural projects at ANAPI, Kinshasa 31 May 2011). The bulk of these 
foreign players contemplating investment in the DRC agricultural sector are interested in 
growing jatrofa and palm for the production of biofuels and biodiesels (Interview with 
manager of agricultural projects at ANAPI, Kinshasa 31 May 2011).  
This is the case with the Korean-dominated joint venture, Congo Agriculture Biotechnology. 
This joint venture was created in 2007 by a Korean enterprise called IF Incorporation 
together with a Congolese businessman (Interview with General Director of Congo 
Agriculture Biotechnology, Kinshasa 13 June 2011). IF Incorporation held 75% of the 
enterprise‟s shares. Congo Agriculture Biotechnology obtained more than 120 000 hectares 
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of land for the cultivation of jatrofa to be processed into biofuels and to be sold locally as 
well as exported to South Korea. For the first phase of the project Congo Agriculture 
Biotechnology intended to invest US$3 million (Interviews with General Director of Congo 
Agriculture Biotechnology, Kinshasa 13 June 2011 and with manager of agriculture projects 
at ANAPI, Kinshasa 31 May 2011). However, in 2008 IF Incorporation lost a lot of money in 
stock market shares as a result of the financial crisis. In addition to that, the Korean currency 
lost 50% of its value at around the same time.  As a result, Congo Agriculture Biotechnology 
was unable to proceed with its planned investments in the DRC (Interview with General 
Director of Congo Agriculture Biotechnology, Kinshasa13 June 2011).  
But not all foreign agricultural enterprises seeking to invest in the DRC are interested in the 
production of biofuels and biodiesels. A good example is the Canadian agricultural 
enterprise, Feronia PHC. In 2009 Feronia acquired three former palm plantations – totalling 
107 892 hectares – that had fallen into disrepair in the Equateur and Orientale provinces of 
the DRC (Feronia, 2012). Feronia produces crude palm oil and palm kernel oil, which are 
transported to Kinshasa on the Congo River and sold to local markets and refineries (Feronia, 
2012).  In 2011 Feronia produced more than 65 000 tonnes of palm oil (Hogg, 2012). As 
mentioned above, palm oil is one of the staple foods in the DRC. As Table 5.6 shows, since 
2006 the DRC has been unable to meet its internal consumption of palm oil and the country 
has had to rely on imports.  
Table 5.6 Production and import of palm oil in the DRC (in tonnes) 
Year Production1  Importation2  
2000 246221  
2001 238715  
2002 231440  
2003 234366  
2004 237329  
2005 240339  
2006 243386 30042 
2007 246477 46379 
2008 249608 15919 
2009 252582 53654 
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2010 255988 48482 
2011 258240  
2012 262532  
1 National Agricultural Statistics Service (SNSA), Ministry of Agriculture and Development 
2 Quarantine Plant and Animal (SQSA), Ministry of Agriculture and Development 
 
In addition to palm oil production, Feronia has also acquired a 10 000 hectares farmland in 
the Bas Congo province, south-west of the capital Kinshasa. In 2011 Feronia completed the 
planting of 1 200 hectares of rice on this farm. The rice was destined for domestic markets 
(Feronia, 2012).     
5.4 Customary land tenure systems   
This section of the chapter introduces the reader to the land tenure patterns currently 
prevailing in Mozambique and the DRC. In order to achieve that, it provides a brief history 
that enables the reader to understand the underlying structural factors shaping the nature of 
land tenure systems in Mozambique and the DRC, as well as in much of sub-Saharan Africa.    
 Feder and Noromha (1987) and Adholla et al. (1991) hold that during the pre-colonial era, 
with the notable exception of Islamic societies, land access in Africa depended either on the 
basis of residence or on acquiring membership of a group or lineage. They hold that often 
land tenure was obtained by the person who first cleared the land and that such right could be 
passed on as a legacy. Feder and Noromha (1987) and Adholla et al. (1991), however, claim 
that access to land by all residential groups or relatives did not preclude the existence of land 
rights. On the contrary, they claim that the abundance of land, mostly as a result of low 
demographic pressures, the use of primitive technology – mainly hoes –  to cultivate land and 
the need to shift the locations of farm plots to allow nutrients to regroup, implied less concern 
at the collective level with guaranteeing land titles over specific portions of land and instead 
emphasized control over large tracts of unutilized areas. As Feder and Noromha (1987:147) 
put it: “it thus made no sense to develop a system of rights to a particular parcel of land that 
could not be protected and had no utility until its fertility was restored”.  
Feder and Noromha (1987), Adholla et al. (1991) and Peters (2004) argue that the colonial 
authorities misunderstood the African system of land tenure by mistaking it for communal 
land tenure. Feder and Noromha (1987), Adholla et al. (1991), Peters (2004) and Boone 
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(2004) hold that European colonialists officialised communal land tenure in Africa by 
empowered local chiefs – while creating chiefs in places where they did not exist – in order 
to manage the new system. Still, Peters (2004) and Boone (2004) hold that the establishment 
of communal land tenure served primarily to promote both state and European private 
interests in African colonies. Feder and Noromha (1987) also claim that the creation or 
empowerment of chiefs, as well as the restriction of the movements and trade of local people 
and goods to the newly established circles or districts, strengthened ethnic differences and 
gave a new salience to the notion of ethnicity in Africa. Feder and Noromha (1987), Adholla 
et al. (1991), Peters (2004) and Boone (2004) all argue that at independence only a few 
African countries decided to introduce individual land titles as a mean to promote agricultural 
development and economic growth. This was the case in Kenya and in the Ivory Coast. 
However, according to these scholars, the majority of African countries decided to maintain 
the communal land tenure system inherited from the colonial period. According to Feder and 
Noromha (1987), these countries can be divided into two groups. The first consists of 
countries that recognise different types of land tenure systems. For instance, Senegal and 
Sudan recognise both individual titles and nationalisation of non-titled lands. Botswana, 
Ghana, Lesotho, Liberia, Mali, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Uganda and Zimbabwe recognise 
individual titles, communal systems and public lands. Cameroun acknowledges individual 
and group titles, as well as communal systems and public lands. The second group consists of 
countries that place land ownership under the sole control of the state. In these settings 
individuals have only use and occupancy rights over land. Countries such as Ethiopia, the 
DRC, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia are part of this group.    
It is evident from the above paragraph that in several African countries two or more forms of 
land tenure systems co-exist. Even in countries where the land is the sole property of the state 
– such as in Mozambique and the DRC – the state recognises, at least tacitly, the rights of 
local communities and in particular local chiefs in the management of lands and in the 
process of allocating lands temporarily to national and foreign investors. In the case of 
Mozambique, the land law clearly states that national or foreign investors seeking to access 
land must first consult with local communities to ensure that the land desired is available and 
unoccupied ( Lei de Terras, ,1997:article 3). In the DRC the land law stipulates that investors 
seeking to access land must lodge a formal request with the relevant authority, which then 
conducts an investigation to find out the nature and the extent of rights that third parties 
might have over that tract of land (Code Foncier Immobiliers et Regime de Suretes, , 
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2006:article 190). On a general note, in both Mozambique and the DRC individuals and 
groups seeking to access land for business projects are expected to first negotiate with local 
communities and to secure their approval before lodging formal applications for land titles 
with the relevant state structures. Without approval from local communities, national and 
foreign investors can barely hope to obtain land titles from the state (Interviews with the 
Programme Officer of the Rural Organisation for Mutual Help (ORAM) and with the 
Postdoctoral Fellow at the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Maputo 5 
April and 4 May 2011, and Interviews with the manager of agricultural projects at ANAPI 
and General Director of Congo Agriculture Biotechnology, Kinshasa 30 May and 13 June 
2011). The above duality in land ownership in Mozambique and the DRC has important 
implications for access to land by Chinese investors and will be further discussed in the next 
two chapters.   
Before closing this section, it is worth to mention that while the customary land tenure 
systems in Mozambique and the DRC are globally similar, they nevertheless exhibit some 
differences.  These differences are the outcome of the varied policies implemented by the two 
countries in their post-independence era. In Mozambique, the Frelimo government 
dismantled the institutions of the native authority as the colonial-appointed chiefs and their 
administrations were replaced with party‟s cadres (Mamdani, 1996:25). In addition to that, 
the customary laws inherited from the colonial era were abandoned and replaced with a 
uniform judicial structure (Mamdani 1996).  Furthermore, the Frelimo government 
established state farms by recuperating abandoned Portuguese farms and expropriating 
peasants from their lands. The expropriation of peasants from their lands created a class of 
labourers tied to state farms (Mosca, 2005). In addition, the government created communal 
villages in an effort to spur collective modes of production. However, in the face of resistance 
by peasants to join the communal villages, the state resorted to the forced removal of peasants 
from their traditional villages and their subsequent insertion into communal villages 
(Mamdani, 1996:177).  Ultimately, the new form of social organisations that emerged around 
the state farms and the communal villages diluted the potency of customary laws, including 
the customary land tenure systems. 
However, in the case of the DRC, the institutions of the Native authority and their 
administrations were maintained after independence (Mamdani, 1996). Moreover, the 
customary laws were also preserved in the rural areas, as the state simply favoured a dual 
structure of customary and modern courts, while providing for a single integrated review 
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process (Mamdani, 1996:130).  Given that access to land in the DRC had continue to be 
firmly governed by customary laws, customary land tenure systems retained their full 
potency within rural areas.   
5.5 Political economy of China  
This section of the chapter introduces the reader to the political economy of China, with 
particular emphasis on the role of the Chinese government in promoting outward investments 
of Chinese corporations, especially the state-owned corporations. Given that the outward 
investment policy or the “go-global” policy – which aims to promote Chinese overseas 
investments in areas perceived as strategic or important for the Chinese economy – took 
shape in the late 1990s ( Freeman, 2008) , this section focuses on the political economy of 
China since the late 1990s.  However, one cannot explain the features of China‟s political 
economy since the late 1990s without also considering Chinese domestic politics and its 
effects on China‟s foreign policy since the late 1970s. In other words, China‟s political 
economy is the product of interactions between domestic politics and China‟s foreign policy 
since the late 1970s. Nevertheless, this section of the chapter does not aim to provide an 
analysis of China‟s foreign policy – neither at a particular point nor over a specified period of 
time – as such an exercise would also require an assessment of the external environment 
which China faces as well as an evaluation of the perceptions, preferences and allocation of 
power of individuals who determine the background against which Chinese foreign policy 
issues are framed. Instead, this section seeks to highlight the joint effects of domestic politics 
and China‟s foreign policy since the late 1970s on the features of the political economy 
prevailing in China since the late 1990s. 
The Chinese government has two parallel government structures: one set of structures and 
institutions run by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the other run by the Chinese 
state (Roy, 1998:63). The three top party organisations are the Politburo Standing Committee, 
which is comprised of nine members, the Politburo, 25 members, and the Central Committee, 
371 members. The Central Committee includes different sections of the Chinese elite, such as 
ministers and senior government officials, provincial leaders, leaders of the military, heads of 
big state-owned corporations and representatives of minority communities (McGregor, 
2010:12). The Central Committee elects members of the Politburo. In turn, the Politburo 
elects members of the Standing Committee, the inner sanctum of the leadership of the CPP 
(McGregor, 2012:13). The most powerful state organisations are the National People‟s 
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Congress (NPC) and the State Council. The NPC is China‟s highest legislative body, while 
the State Council serves as the chief executive body, overseeing various government 
ministries (Roy, 1998:63).  
However, despite the fact that the two government structures depicted above are parallel, they 
are not equal. The Chinese constitution clearly states that the CPP is “the source of all 
political power and authority in China, including the legitimacy of state organisations” (Roy, 
1998:63). The Politburo sets the general policy direction of the country and enjoys 
undisputed hegemony over the state, the economy, the civil service, the military, the police 
and the media (McGregor, 2010:13). To enable the control of the state by the CPP, party 
organisations and their state counterparts are intertwined through an elaborate and opaque 
appointments system (Roy, 1998: 63; McGregor, 2010:15). Appointments and promotions 
within the government, civil service, state-owned corporations and judiciary are contingent 
upon the will of officials of the CPP (McGregor, 2010:15).  
Throughout history territorial fragmentation by way of regional rebellions has been a constant 
fear among successive Chinese rulers (Roy, 1998: 54). The fear of territorial fragmentation 
has been motivated by cultural and ethnic divisions prevailing in Chinese society – illustrated 
by the presence of minority groups such as the Tibetans, Uighurs and Mongolians, some of 
whom are fighting for self-determination – as well as the tendency of the provinces to resist 
control from the capital, Beijing (Roy, 1998:54). The Chinese communist party too has been 
aware of the risks of territorial fragmentation of China since it took power in 1949. For that 
reason, upon its accession to power the CPP expended much effort – including militarily – to 
assert its effective control over the entire Chinese territory, especially in the troubled regions 
of Tibet and Xinjiang, where Tibetans and Xinjiang Muslims fight for self-determination 
(Roy, 1998). Equally, the CPP refused to recognise the independence of the Island of Taiwan, 
fearing that such an action might spur other secessionist movements within the Chinese 
empire. In recent years the CPP has perceived Western countries‟ actions and rhetoric in 
favour of democracy, on the right of minorities in China and on the independence of Taiwan 
as attempts to topple the CPP from power and to divide and weaken the country. Leaders of 
the CPP are suspicious of the West and believe that Western countries view a united and 
powerful China as a strategic competitor to the West, especially the United States (Roy, 
1998:42). The CPP sees its continuation of leadership as vital to the maintenance of China‟s 
unity, stability and prosperity (Roy, 1998:43). However, the CPP leadership is aware that the 
legitimacy of the CPP and its ability to continue ruling China will depend on the ability of the 
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party to ensure economic development in order to gradually raise the standard of living of the 
Chinese people. In this perspective, the attainment of economic progress became a priority 
for the CPP leadership since the late 1970s.  It therefore comes as no surprise that the CPP 
leadership makes little distinction between internal and external threats, and defines its 
national security policy in broader terms, which include not only the classical military 
component but also such internal factors as political stability and economic development 
(Roy, 1998:43).  
The domestic politics of China, in particular the commitment of the CPP leadership to 
promote economic development in order to maintain internal political stability, has also 
influenced the trajectory of China‟s foreign policy since the late 1970s.  
Chairman Mao, the president of the People‟s Republic of China, passed away in 1976. The 
country was in a state of severe economic crisis following years of autarky during the 
infamous Cultural Revolution. In the aftermath of Mao‟s death, a faction of the CPP 
leadership began to question China‟s isolationist policy. These leaders, led by Deng Xiaoping 
and Zhou Enlai, argued that the isolationist policy delayed the country‟s progress by 
preventing it from accessing foreign knowledge and technology. During the third plenum of 
the Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978 the CPP leadership opted for the 
abandonment of the policy of isolation in favour of an open policy (Roy, 1998:85; Shelton et 
al., 1999). The open policy embodied two dimensions. On the internal front, it aimed to 
gradually move away from central planning toward the free market economy by giving a 
greater role to market forces in determining prices, wages and production. It is in this context 
that the CPP leadership proceeded to the privatisation of small state-owned enterprises as 
well as the reform of the medium and large ones in order to give them greater autonomy and 
incentives for profits (Shelton et al., 1999). On the external front, the open policy sought to 
expand foreign trade and promote foreign investment. The CPP leadership hoped that foreign 
investments and trade would enable the country to gather sufficient funds and speed up the 
transfer of technology and knowledge from foreign to Chinese companies (Roy, 1998).  
During the 1980s the Chinese government sought to restrict outward investments through a 
set of tight regulatory controls. As mentioned above, this was a period during which the 
Chinese government primarily aimed to attract foreign investments in order to acquire funds, 
technology and knowledge (Freeman, 2008). However, from the 1990s the Chinese 
government started encouraging outward investments by introducing regulations intended to 
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control the flow of outward investments. The first formal call for the formulation of a go-
global policy occurred in December 2000, when the CPP Central Committee adopted its tenth 
national economic and social development five-year plan (Freeman, 2008).  The Chinese 
government claims that the aim of the go-global policy is to make use of domestic and 
foreign resources and markets in order to enhance the technological capabilities of Chinese 
firms and/or industries, and to acquire access to strategic natural resources (Freeman, 2008).  
In 2006 the National Development and Reform Committee of China (NDRC), the Chinese 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and other government authorities issued the Outward 
Investment Sector Direction Policy. This document defines the basic policy on outward 
investments. It identifies those sectors in which outward investment is encouraged, permitted 
or prohibited. In addition to that, it also provides for policy support in the encouraged sectors 
and defines the basic aims of the government in encouraging outward investment (Freeman, 
2008).  
According to Freeman (2008), the sectors for which outward investment is encouraged are 
those which can: 
 obtain resources or raw materials that are lacking within China and which are urgently 
required for the development of the national economy; 
 stimulate the export of products, equipment and technology in which China has a 
comparative advantage and labour service exports; and  
 advance China‟s technological capacities and make use of international advanced 
technology, management experience and human resources. 
In addition, the Outward Investment Policy contains a catalogue in which encouraged, 
permitted and prohibited sectors are listed. Encouraged sectors cover a wide range of areas 
including natural resource exploitation, manufacturing and services, agriculture, forestry, 
animal husbandry and fisheries. For the agricultural sector, activities that are encouraged 
include the cultivation of natural rubber, oil-bearing crops, cotton and vegetables, and the 
transportation and planting of timber (Freedman, 2008). 
The Outward Investment Policy also sets out the types of projects in which investment is 
prohibited. These include investments: 
 that threaten China‟s national security or damage the public interest of society;  
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 that use proprietary techniques or technology, the export of which has been 
prohibited; 
  in sectors in which Chinese law prohibits business operations;  
  in industries in which the law of the recipient country prohibits investment, and in 
industries in which investment is prohibited by the provisions of international treaties 
which China has signed (Freeman, 2008).   
Beside the encouraged and the prohibited sectors, all others sectors fail under “permitted”. 
Only outward investments in the encouraged sectors receive support from the Chinese 
government. Financial support is the main form of support provided by the government in the 
form of subsidies for outward investment. There are two main forms of financial support for 
outward investments: direct support for costs and interest subsidies (Freeman, 2008). Support 
for costs is in turn divided between pre-investment expenses and operating costs. Subsidies 
for pre-investment expenses are usually available for enterprises that engage in cooperative 
projects in agriculture, forestry or fisheries, contracting, labour services, high or new 
technology, R&D platforms, and design consultancy. Pre-investment expenses for which 
subsidies are available include: the cost for obtaining third party legal, technical or business 
consulting services, surveys or investigations, and project feasibility (Freeman, 2008). 
Subsidies for operating costs are mainly provided for enterprises that engage in labour 
services, development of foreign high and new technology, R&D platforms, and design 
consultancy.   
Interest rate subsidies are loans provided by Chinese banks to enterprises that engage in 
outward investments or cooperative projects abroad in agriculture, forestry and fisheries. The 
loans provided must be medium- to long-term loans for a term of no less than one year. In 
principle, the interest rate subsidy for RMB loans may not exceed the People‟s Bank of 
China‟s base rate in effect, and for foreign currency loans it cannot exceed 3% (Freeman, 
2008).  
However, the policy support available for outward investments changes regularly. In 2006 
additional forms of support were introduced by the Chinese government. These included a 
20% subsidy for the transport of raw materials to China for enterprises engaged in the 
exploitation of raw materials. This measure applies only to transport companies with Chinese 
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equity shareholders and includes raw materials such as oil, natural gas, iron, copper and 
others minerals (Freeman, 2008).   
Concerning the institutional architecture, various bodies are involved in the formulation and 
implementation of the outward investment policy. The two important bodies are the NDRC 
and the MOFCOM.  In addition to them, several Chinese banks also contribute to the 
implementation of the outward investment policy by providing financial support to 
enterprises engaging in foreign investments. The most important banks are the Import-Export 
Bank of China (China Exim Bank) and the China Development Bank. Exim Bank specialises 
in providing concessionary loans to fund joint ventures, Chinese infrastructure projects and 
other mutually beneficial projects abroad (Brautigam & Xiaoyang, 2009).  In addition, Exim 
Bank also provides export sellers and buyers credits to Chinese enterprises in order to 
promote the export of Chinese goods at competitive rates (Brautigam & Xiaoyang, 2009). As 
such, Exim Bank plays an important role in Chinese enterprises‟ foreign investments. China 
Development Bank‟s primary mission is to support China‟s domestic economic development. 
However, the Bank is also active internationally. The China Development Bank is 
responsible for managing the Africa Development Fund. The fund was established in 2006 by 
the Chinese government to encourage and support Chinese enterprises‟ investments in Africa. 
The fund was launched in March 2007, with a starting capital of US$1 billion made available 
by the China Development Bank. Ultimately, the Africa Development Fund will operate with 
a capital of US$5 billion (Freeman, 2008).   
5.6 Conclusion  
The agricultural sectors of Mozambique and the DRC possess significant potential in the 
form of fertile land and water. This sector is relevant for the wellbeing of the population of 
the two countries as well as for their economic development. Moreover, the institutional 
contexts related to the agricultural sector in Mozambique and the DRC are unfavourable 
overall in the sense that they are having adverse effects on the entrepreneurial initiatives of 
smallholders and foreign agricultural enterprises.  
Furthermore, as a result of historical, demographic and technological factors, two main 
patterns of land tenure coexist in Mozambique and the DRC: an official land tenure system 
that is governed by the state, and tacit communal land tenure systems governed by local 
communities through local chiefs. This duplication in the patterns of land tenure in 
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Mozambique and the DRC has important implications that will be discussed in the next two 
chapters.   
Finally, since the late 1990s China has developed an outward investment policy that aims to 
promote foreign investments by Chinese enterprises in order to enhance the technological 
capacities of these enterprises; ensure access to lucrative foreign markets; and secure access 
to strategic raw materials needed by the Chinese economy. It is in this context that the 
Chinese government provides subsidies to its firms – including agricultural enterprises – in 
order to encourage their overseas operations. 
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CHAPTER 6: CHINESE AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES IN MOZAMBIQUE: 
ROLE AND BEHAVIOUR 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 provided background information on the characteristics and relevance of the 
agricultural sectors in Mozambique and the DRC; the nature of the respective institutional 
contexts related to the agricultural sector in both countries and the way in which they affect 
the activities of smallholders and foreign investors; the characteristics of the land tenure 
systems prevailing in Mozambique and the DRC; and the nature of the political economy of 
China, in particular the efforts of the Chinese government to promote foreign investments by 
Chinese enterprises.  In this chapter I aim to discuss the motivations informing the activities 
of Chinese agricultural enterprises in Mozambique and the way in which the institutional 
context in that country shapes their behaviour and/modes of entry into local industries. This 
chapter consist of two sections. The first focuses on the motivations of Chinese agricultural 
enterprises operating in Mozambique. The second deals with the way in which the 
institutional context shapes the behaviours and/or the modes of entry of Chinese agricultural 
enterprises into local industries.  
The analysis has shown that Chinese agricultural investments in the country are motivated by 
several objectives: 1) to acquire farmland in order to generate profits by way of farming 
activities; 2) to transfer agricultural commodities to China in order to supply Chinese markets 
with consumer goods and natural resources such as textiles, clothes and animal foods; and 3) 
to deliver agricultural aid by testing new varieties of crops brought from China and offering 
training to  local farmers, students and technicians. However, the provision of agricultural aid 
is more of a secondary motive for Chinese agricultural enterprises managing the aid projects. 
This is because these enterprises primarily use the aid projects funded by the Chinese 
government to gain a foothold in Mozambique. Therefore, the motivations of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique can be seen as consistent with China‟s 
foreign policy, since these enterprises aim to better position themselves in local markets and 
access agricultural commodities for Chinese markets. For the moment Chinese agricultural 
enterprises operating in Mozambique do not aim to transfer primary staple food crops such as 
rice and maize to China. However, Chinese agricultural enterprises have demonstrated an 
interest in growing soybeans in Mozambique for Chinese markets.  
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The institutional context in Mozambique shapes the behaviours and/or modes of entry of 
Chinese agricultural enterprises through three institutional features: poor delivery of 
infrastructure, particularly in rural areas; complexity of access to land because of the duality 
in land ownership patterns; and the weak regulatory capacity of the state to monitor and 
enforce the land law at both the national and provincial levels. The inefficient infrastructure 
development appears to undermine the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises by 
preventing further investments in agricultural production. Equally, difficulty in accessing 
land hinders large-scale Chinese agricultural investments in Mozambique. The difficulty of 
access to land is aggravated by lack of information on the availability of land and its main 
characteristics as a result of flaws in the monitoring and enforcement of the land law. This 
last obstacle seems to further compromise the operations of Chinese agricultural enterprises, 
especially the large ones, by preventing the identification of suitable lands for their activities.  
6.2 Chinese agricultural engagement in Mozambique  
The presence of Chinese agricultural enterprises in Mozambique stretches back more than 
thirty years. Following Mozambique‟s independence in 1975, China began providing 
agricultural aid to the African country. Agricultural experts from the Chinese province of 
Sichuan arrived in Mozambique to develop 230 hectares of the 7 000-hectare Moamba state 
farm located at about 90 km north-west of Maputo ( Brautigam & Ekman, 2012).  Chinese 
experts also helped develop the 3 000-hectare Matama farm, in Niassa Province. In the mid-
1980s the Chinese government donated farm machinery and sent agricultural experts from 
Sichuan to assist with communal agricultural projects in Maputo‟s urban Green Zone 
(Brautigam & Ekman, 2012). However, the civil war prevented the implementation of these 
projects as Chinese experts left the country (Brautigam & Ekman, 2012).  The current 
Chinese engagement in agriculture in Mozambique dates back to 2007. when Hubei Lianfeng 
began operating in Xai-Xai, Gaza province. Since contemporary Chinese engagement in 
Mozambique‟ agriculture is new, it is not surprising that few Chinese agricultural enterprises 
are currently operating in the country. This study has been able to identify four such 
enterprises operating in Mozambique, with one of them having two separate branches in the 
country. During my fieldwork I visited these enterprises, which figured on the list provided 
by the Mozambican Investment Promotion Centre (CPI) – the state agency in charge of 
guiding national and foreign investors seeking to invest in the country and registering 
investment projects.  
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Table 6.1 provides a summary of the nature and activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises 
operating in Mozambique. Nevertheless, it is important to note that several of the enterprises 
registered with the CPI are in reality not operational. This is particularly the case with the 
China Grain and Oil (Group) Corporation (CGOG), which apparently failed to start operating 
in Sofala province because of institutional hazards, which will be discussed in the second part 
of this chapter. In addition, it is important to note that it transpired from the fieldwork that the 
owner of ACE Agriculture and Aquaculture, mentioned in the table below, is actually from 
Taiwan and not from mainland China.  
Table 6.1: Nature and activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises in Mozambique 
Enterprises Type of 
enterprise 
Year of initial 
operation 
Location/ 
province 
Capital 
invested (US$) 
Activities Size of 
concession 
(hectares) 
Hubei Lianfeng 
Mozambique 
State-owned 2007 Gaza 1 000 000 Grow and sell rice 
and seed. Provide 
technical aid to 
farmers. 
300 
Hubei Lianfeng 
Mozambique 
State-owned 2011 Boane 6 000 000 Sell seeds, animals 
and vegetables. 
Provide training and 
conduct research. 
52 
China Africa Cotton 
Mozambique 
State-owned 2007 Sofala 6 000 000 Sell cooking oil and 
hospital grade 
cotton. Transfer 
processed cotton to 
China. 
NA 
Sol e Mar Private 2009 Sofala 12000 000 Export prawns to 
Europe. 
 
ACE Agriculture and 
Aquaculture 
Private 2009 Sofala 1 000 000 Grow and sell rice, 
maize, sesame  
seeds and 
mushrooms. 
600 
Source: CPI and Information obtained from fieldwork in Mozambique 
Furthermore, only a part of the Mozambican territory was covered during the fieldwork, 
mostly because of limited resources and time. Hence, this study does not claim to provide a 
complete list of all Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in the country. Figure 6.1 below 
provides an indication of the areas of Mozambique covered by the fieldwork.  
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Figure 6.1 Map of Mozambique  
 
Figure 6.1: The regions in colour were visited by the researcher during the fieldwork 
6.3 Chinese agricultural enterprises’ motivations  
Figure 6.2 details the conceptual framework, based on fieldwork data, which informs the 
discussion in this chapter on the motivations of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in 
Mozambique as well as their activities. Three main factors determine these motivations.  As 
shown in Figure 6.2, the first factor is access to local resources – mainly water and arable 
land – as well as local markets. The second is the availability of the modern agricultural 
technologies of Chinese agricultural enterprises, especially in the area of hybrid rice. The 
third element is the financial support that Chinese agricultural enterprises receive from the 
Chinese government in the form of subsidies – direct support for costs – provided through the 
aid projects or in the form of direct funding through the China-Africa Development Fund. 
Hence it is the complementarity between local resources (water, arable lands and local 
markets), agricultural technologies (hybrid rice, machinery and modern techniques) and 
subsidies from the Chinese government that determines the motivations of Chinese 
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agricultural enterprises. Therefore, the motivations of Chinese agricultural enterprises 
operating in Mozambique are to access farmlands in order to embark on commercial farming 
with several objectives in mind: to generate profits by exploiting local, South African and 
European markets; to supply Chinese markets with agricultural commodities; and to provide 
agricultural aid to local farmers, students and technicians. In order to achieve these aims 
Chinese agricultural enterprises intend to grow, trade, process, export agricultural 
commodities, to test new varieties of crops brought from China, and to provide training. 
Figure 6.2 Conceptual framework on the motivations of Chinese agricultural 
enterprises operating in Mozambique  
Determinants of Investments                Motivations                                  Activities                 
Activities     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.3.1 Determinants of the motivations of Chinese agricultural investments  
Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique rely on their specific ownership 
advantages in order to be able to compete with local firms.  These specific advantages or 
assets are technology and knowledge. To start with, Chinese state-owned enterprises 
operating in Mozambique are in a position to access modern technologies – such as 
machinery, hybrid rice seedlings, chemicals and knowledge – from their respective mother 
companies in China and transfer them to Mozambique. This is especially true given the fact 
that the mother companies of the Chinese state-owned enterprises have had many years of 
experience in their specific areas of expertise in China and/or elsewhere. For instance, Hubei 
Lianfeng was founded by Hubei State Farming Agribusiness Corporation, which has 
Relying on 
modern 
technology and 
capital 
Access to land, 
water and local 
markets 
Support from the 
Chinese 
government 
through the aid 
projects and China-
Africa 
Development Fund 
Generate profits; 
supply Chinese 
markets with 
agricultural 
commodities; and 
provide 
agricultural aid 
Grow, trade, process 
and export agricultural 
commodities; conduct 
research; and provide 
training  
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extensive experience and knowledge regarding the production of rice in China (Freeman et 
al., 2008). While China-Africa Cotton Development, Ltd – the mother company of China-
Africa Cotton Mozambique – was founded by a consortium of Chinese enterprises such as 
China Coloured Cotton Group, Qingdao Huifu Textile Corporation and Qingdao Ruichang 
Cotton Industrial Corporation, all with extensive experience and knowledge in the cotton 
industry (Investor.com, 2011; Ecplaza Global, 2009). The goal of China-Africa Cotton 
Development is to facilitate China‟s access to Africa‟s cotton by using modern technologies 
(Interview with manager of China-Africa Cotton Mozambique, Beira 26 April 2011).    The 
private Chinese agricultural enterprises are also able to access modern technology through 
various networks in China or via some Chinese state-owned agricultural enterprises operating 
in Mozambique (Interview with manager of ACE Agriculture and Aquaculture, Beira 26 
April 2011).  
In addition to specific advantages, Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique 
also enjoy locational advantages. Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique 
appear to be attracted by the presence of natural resources – land and water. This is because, 
as argued in chapter 5, Mozambique possesses sufficient land and water to support significant 
agricultural projects. In addition to that, Mozambique also possesses significant markets for 
agricultural commodities, since the country is in dire need of foodstuff such as rice. As a 
matter of fact, Mozambique appears to be a major consumer of rice. From 2002 to 2007 rice 
consumption in Mozambique more than doubled, surpassing 20 kg per person per year 
(International Rice Research Institute, 2001).  In addition, between 2002 and 2008 rice 
imports exploded, rising from 75 000 to 350 000 tonnes per year. More importantly, rice 
demand in Mozambique is expected to continue to rise in the near future (International Rice 
Research Institute, 2011). 
 Furthermore, given that most Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique are 
state-owned, they benefit from various forms of financial support from the Chinese 
government. For instance, Hubei Lianfeng Mozambique benefited – within the framework of 
the aid projects – from subsidies from the Chinese government in the form of pre-investment 
expenses. Today, Hubei Lianfeng Mozambique continues to receive support from the 
Chinese government in the form of subsidies for operating costs. The other Chinese state-
owned enterprise, China-Africa Cotton Mozambique, also benefits from funding from the 
Chinese government, but this time through the China-Africa Development Fund. The China-
Africa Development Fund provided capital for the construction of China-Africa Cotton 
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Development planting and processing facilities in Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique (China 
Development Bank, 2012; Ecplaza Global, 2009). The provision of capital by the Chinese 
government to its state-owned agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique is related to 
the political economy of China, in particular the efforts of the Chinese government to 
promote foreign investment by Chinese enterprises to access foreign markets and resources, 
as discussed in Chapter 5.  The private Chinese agricultural enterprises rely on personal 
savings and family networks in order to raise capital for investment in agricultural projects 
(Interview with manager of ACE Agriculture and Aquaculture, Beira 26 April 2011).  
Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique possess complementary ownership 
and locational advantages, which allow them to exploit their specific assets and successfully 
establish themselves in the local industry (Interviews with managers of Hubei Lianfeng 
Mozambique, Boane 7 April 2011 and Xai-Xai 12 April 2011; Interview with manager of 
China-Africa Cotton, Beira 26 April 2011). Moreover, Chinese agricultural enterprises also 
have internalization advantages as a result of the internalization of intangible assets – 
knowledge and technology – within the firms. In the case of China-Africa Cotton 
Mozambique, the internalization of processed cotton inside the firm, as it is sent to its mother 
company in China, features a vertical integration strategy (Interview with manager of China-
Africa Cotton, Beira 26 April 2011).  Therefore, the possession of ownership, locational and 
internalization advantages by Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique, as 
well as the financial support that such enterprises receive from the Chinese government, 
enables them to pursue their objectives of accessing farmlands in order to generate profits 
through their farming activities to supply Chinese markets with agricultural commodities. In 
this way, the ownership, locational and internalization advantages outlined above – as well as 
the contextual variable in the form of the financial support by the Chinese government – are 
in line with Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm as discussed in Chapter 3.  
6.3.2 Motivations and activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises 
6.3.2.1 Generate profits through farming activities  
As explained in the introduction of this chapter, one of the motivations of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique is to grow food crops to sell them in local 
markets and to a lesser extent in South African and European markets in order to generate 
profits.  In the process Chinese agricultural enterprises adopt various business strategies 
aimed at maximizing their profits. 
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 Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique are all involved – or planning to 
get involved – in the trade of agricultural commodities such as rice, maize, mushrooms, 
sesame seeds, rice seedlings, processed cotton and cooking oil (Interviews with managers of 
Hubei Lianfeng Mozambique, Boane 7 April 2011 and Xai-Xai 12 April 2011; Interview 
with manager of ACE Agriculture and Aquaculture Beira 26 April 2011; Interview with 
manager of China-Africa Cotton Mozambique, Beira, 26 April 2011). Rice, maize, 
mushrooms, cooking oil and rice seedlings are destined for local markets – as well as for 
South African markets in the case of brown rice (Interview with manager of ACE Agriculture 
and Aquaculture, Beira 26 April 2011; Interviews with manager of Hubei Lianfeng 
Mozambique, Boane 7 April 2011 & Xai-Xai 12 April 2011; Interview with manager of 
China-Africa Cotton Mozambique, Beira 26 April 2011). In addition to that, Chinese 
agricultural enterprises seem to charge higher prices for their agricultural commodities – 
especially rice – than those prevailing in local markets (Interview with manager of Hubei 
Lianfeng Mozambique, Xai-Xai 12 April 2011; Interview with manager of ACE Agriculture 
and Aquaculture, Beira 26 April 2011). Moreover, Chinese agricultural enterprises appear to 
focus on crops or seeds that experience significant local demand, while disregarding crops or 
seeds produced by local producers or lacking significant demand. This is especially the case 
for rice and rice hybrid seedlings (Interviews with managers of Hubei Lianfeng Mozambique, 
Boane 7 April 2011 & Xai-Xai 12 April 2011; Interview with manager of ACE Agriculture 
and Aquaculture Beira 26 April 2011). Likewise, Chinese agricultural enterprises – especially 
the private ones – also target lucrative markets in Europe with exports of sesame seeds and 
prawns (Interview with manager of ACE Agriculture and Aquaculture, Beira 26 April 2011). 
All these actions on the part of Chinese agricultural enterprises indicate profit maximisation 
strategies.   
Furthermore, Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique also seem to 
implement a strategy of product diversification by producing more than one commodity 
(Interview with manager of ACE Agriculture and Aquaculture, Beira 26 April 2011; 
Interview with manager of China-Africa Cotton Mozambique, Beira 26 April 2011). This 
mode of operation could be perceived here as a strategy aimed at reducing production costs – 
economies of scope – or at minimizing risks. Regardless of whether Chinese agricultural 
enterprises seek to reduce production costs or minimize risks, the production of more than 
one crop clearly indicates a profit-maximizing mode of production. Finally, Chinese 
agricultural enterprises also appear to employ permanent and casual workers (Interview with 
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manager of Hubei Lianfeng Mozambique, Xai-Xai 12 April 2011; Interview with manager of 
ACE Agriculture and Aquaculture, Beira 26 April 2011). The employment of local workers 
might signal an attempt on the part of Chinese managers to lower labour costs through 
efficient use of workers. This pattern of operation is also likely to enhance profit.  
6.3.2.2 Supply Chinese markets  
Besides the generation of profits, the other motivation of Chinese agricultural enterprises is to 
transfer agricultural commodities to China.  In this respect, China-Africa Cotton 
Mozambique is planning to transfer processed cotton within its firm to its mother company in 
China (Interview with manager of China-Africa Cotton Mozambique, Beira 26 April 2011). 
Moreover, it appears that the Chinese government is also keen to acquire tracts of land in 
Mozambique‟s Zambezi valley on behalf of Chinese agricultural enterprises and farmers in 
order to cultivate agricultural commodities and transfer them to China (Interviews with local 
researchers, Maputo 8 April 2011 and 14 April 2011). The Zambezi valley seems to be the 
most important region of Mozambique. The valley has a significant area of 250 000 km² and 
has huge reserves of natural resources – including water, timber, coal and gold, which makes 
it the richest region of the country (Macauhub, 2006). Given the availability of natural 
resources in this region, it is not surprising that it has attracted the interest of Chinese farmers 
and agricultural enterprises.  
The Chinese government seems to be pushing for the creation of a large zone in the valley in 
which Chinese farmers and agricultural enterprises would produce agricultural commodities 
on a large scale destined for local markets and Chinese markets.  This interest on the part of 
the Chinese government in the valley appears to explain the purpose of the US$32 million 
loan provided by the Chinese EXIM Bank to China CAMC Engineering CO, Ltd (CAMCE) 
in 2011 for the construction of three processing factories – for husking rice, maize and cotton 
– in the Zambezi valley (Macauhub, 2011). It can also explain why the Chinese government 
has signalled its interests in funding investments projects – mostly through China EXIM 
Bank – such as the construction of dams and roads in the valley (Jansson & Kiala, 2009). In 
fact, these initiatives of the Chinese government aim to create a particular environment that 
would enable Chinese agricultural enterprises and farmers to operate under a vertical strategy 
– in order to serve local but primarily the larger Chinese markets. Beijing aims to establish 
clusters of Chinese agricultural enterprises and farmers in the valley, which will be linked to 
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Mozambican markets for rice and maize, and Chinese markets for cotton and soybean 
(Interviews with local researchers, Maputo 8, 14 April 2011).  
Soybeans, cotton and sugar are projected to be amongst the agricultural commodities for 
which China will experience shortages in the long term (BOABC Company, 2010).   Figure 
6.3 below shows that in 2008 soybeans, palm oil and cotton featured amongst the top 
agricultural commodities imported by China. The high demand for palm oil in China is 
fuelled by the rising demand for cooking oil and biofuels, while the high demand in cotton is 
fed by the strong requirements of the textile industry. As for soybeans, the rise in imports of 
this commodity is due to the mounting consumption of meat in China, which compels 
Chinese farmers to import more soybeans abroad – especially from the United States – to 
feed animals (Normand, 2010; Freeman et al., 2008).   
It appears from the above discussion that Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in 
Mozambique grow rice, maize and vegetables mainly for local markets and to a lesser extent 
for South African and European markets, where there is a demand for brown rice and prawns. 
On the other hand, it appears from this section that Chinese agricultural enterprises transfer or 
aim to transfer cotton and soybeans to China. However, it is worth mentioning here that 
soybean does not feature as one of the staple food crops in Mozambique, where it is often 
used for the processing of animal (poultry) foods and soybean oil (Opperman & Varia, 2011). 
Therefore, soybean constitutes more of a secondary food crop. It therefore seems that for the 
moment Chinese agricultural enterprises operating (or aiming to operate) in Mozambique do 
not transfer (or aim to transfer) staple food crops to China. 
The above analysis is consistent with the claims made by Brautigam and Xiaoyang (2009) 
and Brautigam and Ekman (2012), according to which the Chinese interest in rice production 
in Mozambique is aimed at supplying only local markets because of the increasing demand in 
that country of this particular commodity. However, the interest shown by Chinese 
agricultural enterprises, especially CGOG, in the farming and export of soybeans from 
Mozambique to China suggests that in the long run – as the demand for agricultural 
commodities, including foodstuffs, is expected to rise in China (Freeman et al., 2008) – these 
enterprises might be willing to grow and export huge amounts of primary food crops from 
Mozambique not only to realise profits but also to serve the needs of Chinese markets and 
consumers. 
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Figure 6.3: Proportions of agricultural commodities imported by China in 2008.  Source: Collin Carter (China‟s Role in International 
Agricultural Markets) 
6.3.2.3 Provide agricultural aid 
Apart from conducting commercial activities, one Chinese agricultural enterprise operating in 
Mozambique – Hubei Lianfeng Mozambique – also aims to provide agricultural aid to 
farmers, students and technicians.  
In contrast to other Chinese agricultural enterprises that are solely involved in profit-seeking 
activities, Hubei Lianfeng Mozambique is also involved in the provision of agricultural aid in 
Boane and Xai- Xai, Gaza province. In Boane, Hubei Lianfeng runs the Umbeluze research 
centre built by the Chinese government (Interview with manager of Hubei Lianfeng 
Mozambique, Boane 7 April 2011). The centre aims to conduct scientific research through 
the introduction and adaptation of new varieties of crops brought from China, and to provide 
training to local farmers, students and technicians (Interview with manager of Hubei 
Lianfeng Mozambique, Boane 7 April 2011). In Xai-Xai, Hubei Lianfeng provides technical 
support to surrounding farmers – introducing hybrid rice seedlings and new machines to them 
and teaching them new farming techniques (Interview with manager of Hubei Lianfeng 
Mozambique, Xai-Xai 12 April 2011).  
However, the non-lucrative activities of Hubei Lianfeng Mozambique, both in Boane and 
Xai-Xai, appear to be limited in scope and to lack coordination with local institutions.  In 
Boane, Hubei Lianfeng Mozambique has only seven staff members and yet plans to train 
1 500 farmers, students and agricultural extension agents in three years (Interview with 
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manager of Hubei Lianfeng Mozambique, Boane 7 April 2011). It is unlikely that the 
Umbeluze Centre will be able to meet that target with this limited number of staff members.  
On the research front, the Umbeluze research centre lacks a well-structured framework of 
cooperation with the IIAM – Mozambique‟s leading agricultural research institute – that will 
ensure the adaptation of Chinese agricultural technologies to the needs of smallholders and 
their effective dissemination throughout Mozambique. At the Umbeluze research centre 
Chinese researchers are conducting research on their own without coordination with local 
research institutions. There is no guarantee that the activities of Chinese researchers at the 
Umbeluze research centre will be suitable to meet the needs of local farmers (Interview with 
the Director General of IIAM, Maputo 20 April 2011).  The issue of the adaptability of 
Chinese technologies is an important one and comparable to the concerns raised by Hairong 
and Sautman (2010) with reference to Zambia. Hairong and Sautman argue that modern  
agricultural technology already exists in Zambia and that what is needed are mechanisms to 
adapt them to the needs of local farmers and ensure their dissemination rather than the mere 
establishment of a Chinese agricultural demonstration centre in the country.  
I mentioned in Chapter 2 that since the mid-1990s China has adopted a new architecture for 
its agricultural aid projects in Africa that combines aid provision with business imperatives. 
Chinese agricultural enterprises are allowed to manage aid projects and provide agricultural 
aid, while at the same time pursuing profit-seeking activities. Chinese officials claim that 
such a model aims at ensuring the sustainability of aid projects – and therefore their effective 
contribution to the development of African agriculture (Brautigam, 2009:247-249). If the aim 
is, amongst other things, to ensure the sustainability of aid projects, then one would expect 
strong and well-structured collaboration between Chinese teams running the centres and local 
managers and researchers in order to build local capacity. However, at the Umbeluze research 
centre the Chinese team is currently conducting research in isolation. In addition to that, the 
manager of the Umbeluze research centre claims that his team will be working alone – 
without the participation of local staff and researchers – during its three-years period of 
management of the centre. The absence of scientific cooperation between Chinese and local 
managers and researchers at Umbeluze is therefore likely to hinder the enhancement of local 
capacities – and consequently the transfer of Chinese agricultural technologies to local 
research institutions. In addition, the absence of scientific cooperation between the two sides 
is also likely to undermine the sustainability of the activities of the Umbeluze research centre 
after the departure of the Chinese enterprise. 
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In Xai-Xai the activities of Hubei Lianfeng are also limited in scope. The Chinese 
agricultural enterprise is providing support to only six farmers per year. Not only is this 
number small and hence of limited effect, but more importantly all 46 farmers operating at 
the irrigation scheme – where Hubei Lianfeng is also operating – appear to be medium-level 
commercial farmers
7
 (Interview with manager of Hubei Lianfeng Mozambique, Xai-Xai, 12 
April 2011; Interviews with provincial inspector at the ministry of agriculture and with 
commercial farmer, Xai-Xai 13 April 2011). These commercial farmers obtained their 
farmland in the scheme after winning a bid.  Given that these commercial farmers appear to 
be more socially stable than the average smallholder, this situation appears to illustrate a class 
bias in which fairly influential individuals are able to use their networks to secure access to 
limited resources – irrigated land – as well as foreign technologies at the expense of 
smallholder farmers.
8
 This point is to some extent borne out by the work of scholars such as 
Ake (1996), Boone (1994) and Mamdani (1996), who have pointed to a bias in agricultural 
policies against smallholders in post-colonial Africa.  
The analysis in this section regarding the limitation in scope, the inadequate planning of 
agricultural aid projects and lack of cooperation with local researchers and managers casts 
doubt on the sustainability, scope and effectiveness of the aid projects implemented by Hubei 
Lianfeng Mozambique. More importantly, it should be recalled that the implementation of the 
aid projects in Boane and Xai-Xai was made possible by the financial support of the Chinese 
government – central government and Hubei province – through the construction of the 
buildings and the acquisition of equipment and machinery. Also, the Chinese government 
continues to cover the salaries of Chinese staff (Interviews with managers of Hubei Lianfeng 
Mozambique, Boane 7 April 2011 and Xai-Xai 12 April 2011). Given the limited reach and 
the inadequate planning of the aid projects, it seems as if the primary objective of the 
establishment of the aid projects is to support the business activities of Hubei Lianfeng 
Mozambique. The financial contribution of the Chinese government to the realisation of the 
aid projects can be primarily perceived as a business strategy to enable Hubei Lianfeng to 
penetrate the Mozambican market. This analysis is comparable with that of Brautigam 
(2009). As discussed in Chapter 2, Brautigam (2009:249) argues that the Chinese ministry of 
                                                          
7
 This information was provided to me by four respondents during my visit to Xai-Xai. They included 
an official of the provincial agricultural department, the local manager of Hubei Lianfeng, the driver 
and interpret of Hubei Lianfeng as well as a commercial farmer cultivating land in the same perimeter 
as Hubei Lianfeng.  
8
 The commercial farmer as well as the interpret and driver of Hubei Lianfeng told me that some 
owners of the farms at the irrigation scheme were connected to local politicians.  
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commerce decided to provide three years of grant support to Chinese agricultural enterprises 
running the new agricultural demonstration centres established in Africa, during which time 
they will “explore how to operate in a commercial, sustainable, and mutually beneficial way”.   
This is exactly what seems to be happening with Hubei Lianfeng in Xai-Xai. The Chinese 
state-owned enterprise operated for three years at the irrigation scheme in Xai-Xai, 
cultivating not more than 60 hectares of rice (Interview with manager of Hubei Lianfeng 
Mozambique, Xai-Xai 12 April 2011). During that period Hubei Lianfeng benefited from the 
support of the provincial government of Hubei. However, in late 2011 Hubei Lianfeng 
entered into a partnership with a Chinese businessman in order to create Wambao Agriculture 
Development, Ltd. The new agricultural enterprise started operating in 2012 and plans to 
farm over 6 000 hectares of rice in a new farmland located at the vicinity of the city of Xai-
Xai (Phone Interview with manager of Hubei Lianfeng in Xai-Xai, Stellenbosch 24 October 
2011). Conversely, the conduct of agricultural research at the Umbeluze research centre by 
Chinese researchers appears to be directed at developing varieties of crops adapted to local 
conditions. Such varieties might well be intended to enable Chinese agricultural companies to 
launch large commercial ventures successfully at later stages. As a matter of fact, access to 
appropriate seeds is of paramount importance for the success of any agricultural commercial 
enterprises – as I discuss in the next section.  Hence, the aid projects run by Hubei Lianfeng 
Mozambique primarily operate within a commercial strategy. The provision of agriculture aid 
is more of a secondary motive.  
This section of the chapter provides ample explanations of the linkages between the interests 
of the Chinese government with those of Hubei Lianfeng Mozambique.  In chapter 3, this 
study held that one of the criticisms against Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm expressed by 
Macharzina and Engelhard (1991) focuses on the alleged inability of the OLI paradigm to 
establish links between its main determinants, especially those that belong to different levels 
of analysis, by way of mediating mechanisms. However, the analyses conducted in this 
section tend to discard the above criticism, insofar as they have showed that Dunning‟s 
eclectic paradigm is able to establish linkages between its main determinants when combined 
with an appropriate methodological approach, such as the case study design, that facilitates 
the enunciation of causal mechanisms through which the variables are linked.     
The analyses enunciated in the preceding sections enable to conclude that the motivations of 
Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique are to acquire farmland in order to 
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generate profits, to transfer agricultural commodities to their mother companies in China – 
which further process these commodities for Chinese markets – and the provision of 
agricultural aid to local farmers, students and technicians. However, the provision of 
agricultural aid by Hubei Lianfeng Mozambique is a secondary motive of the firm – the 
primary objective remains the generation of profits.  The activities of Chinese agricultural 
enterprises operating in Mozambique are consistent with China‟s global foreign policy, as 
Chinese agricultural enterprises aim to better position themselves in local markets and secure 
natural resources for Chinese markets.  
These findings are consistent with the claims made in the literature by Hairong and Sautman 
(2010) and Sun (2011). Hairong and Sautman argue that Chinese agricultural enterprises 
operating in Zambia – specifically state-owned agricultural enterprises – function under a 
capitalist framework and that their motivation is to generate profits and acquire long-term 
assets such as land. Sun (2011) argues that one of the aims of the presence of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises in Africa is to secure key agricultural commodities for the benefit of 
the Chinese economy.  Moreover, the above findings are also comparable to the analysis of 
Brautigam (2009), Brautigam and Xiaoyang (2009), Brautigam and Ekman (2012), who have 
pointed to the new mode of Chinese involvement in Africa‟s agriculture that combines 
business activities with agricultural aid. However, in contrast with Brautigam (2009), 
Brautigam and Xiaoyang (2009), Brautigam and Ekman (2012) and Sun (2011), this study 
holds that Chinese aid projects in Mozambique primarily feature as part of the profit-seeking 
motivations of Chinese agricultural enterprises. Given that the provision of aid is a strategy of 
Hubei Lianfeng Mozambique mainly intended to get a foothold in Mozambique, 
distinguishing between foreign assistance and commercial activities becomes difficult. As 
such, the prioritization of the commercial interests of Chinese agricultural firms does not 
necessarily lead to a mutually beneficial situation. As argued by Grimm (2011), the mutually 
beneficial aspect of Chinese aid projects leaves unsettled the issue about the distribution of 
gains. In this case, it seems as if the distribution of gains is in the favour of Hubei Lianfeng 
Mozambique.  
6.4 Behaviour of Chinese agricultural enterprises   
As noted in the introduction, this chapter also endeavours to understand the effects of the 
institutional context in Mozambique on the behaviour and/or modes of entry of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises. In Mozambique the institutional context affects the behaviour and/or 
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modes of entry of Chinese agricultural enterprises in three different ways:  1) the poor 
condition of infrastructure; 2) the absence of basic information on soil and its main 
characteristics; and 3) the complexities of the land acquisition system.   
Figure 6.4 below provides a conceptual framework that explains the way in which the 
institutional context in Mozambique affects the behaviour and/or modes of entry of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises. Figure 6.4 distinguishes two sorts of institutions: slow-moving and 
faster-moving. Slow-moving institutions refers to the set of informal constraints and formal 
rules that are strongly embedded in the society‟s culture and tradition. These kinds of 
institutions change slowly over time, often over centuries (Williamson, 2000; North, 1991).  
Figure 6.4 distinguishes two types of slow-moving institutions: the customary land tenure 
system – an informal constraint – and the land law – a formal rule. Both the customary land 
tenure system and the land law tend to change gradually over time, although the latter is 
expected to change faster than the former.  Fast-moving institutions are basically constituted 
of political institutions. Levy (2004) and De Laiglesia (2006) define political institutions as 
the set of formal political rules, their governance structures and leadership. In other words, 
political institutions are described as the written constitution and laws that inform the 
constitutional form of the state as well as the process through which power is attributed and 
applied. Political institutions tend to change faster – over decades – than institutions deeply 
rooted in culture and tradition, such as customary land tenure systems and the land law.  
The first central postulate embodied in Figure 6.4 is the relationship that exists between 
political institutions, on one hand, and the customary land tenure systems on the other. In this 
way, customary land tenure systems affect the perceptions of political leaders on land issues. 
The second central assumption expressed in Figure 6.4 is the relationship between political 
institutions and the land law. The perceptions of political leaders influence the content of the 
land law. The content of the land law is therefore a product of interactions between 
customary land tenure systems and political institutions. In this way, the land law reflects 
both the traditional and official land tenure systems. As a result, access to land by Chinese 
agricultural enterprises is difficult.  
The third central assumption exemplified in Figure 6.4 is the role of political institutions on 
the effectiveness of the bureaucracy. Levy (2004) and De Laiglesia (2006) claim that political 
institutions serve as a link between the broader society and the bureaucracy. According to 
them, the role of political institutions is, on the one hand, to contain pressures from the 
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various political and economic groups in the society by channelling their various and often 
contradictory interests into the policy process; and on the other hand, to set the policy, 
regulatory and service delivery goals of the bureaucracy and to ensure their implementation.  
Political institutions therefore determine the incentive structures that affect the performance 
of the economy. In Mozambique, political institutions provide an unfavourable incentive 
structure that impact negatively on the provision of services, and the monitoring and 
enforcement of the land law.  
As a corollary, Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique face challenges 
related to poor infrastructure in rural areas and lack of information in relation to agricultural 
investments.   
Figure 6.4 Conceptual framework on the behaviour of Chinese agricultural enterprises 
operating in Mozambique  
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6.4.1 Dysfunctional political institutions 
According to the conceptual framework developed in Figure 6.4, the unfavourable 
institutional context prevailing in Mozambique is mostly the outcome of dysfunctional 
political institutions.  Recalling chapter 3, this study held that the new institutional theory is 
more suitable to explain the process of economic change in Western countries and therefore 
needs to be modified in order to provide understanding of the nature and operations of 
political institutions in sub-Saharan Africa states. As emphasized in chapter 3, the mastering 
of the operations of political institutions is fundamental in the quest of understanding 
economic change. Thus, this study attempts to incorporate the concepts relevant to the 
literature on African states in the new institutional theory in order to provide more grounded 
explanations of the ways in which institutions, including political institutions, shape the 
behaviours and/or modes of entry of Chinese agricultural enterprises into local industries in 
Mozambique.      
In Sub-Saharan Africa, political institutions are usually weak. To understand the cause of this 
weakness, one should examine the nature of African states. Most African states are artificial 
entities in the sense that European colonial powers established their borders without paying 
attention to the homogeneity of the political systems and cultures that were included in 
territories that were being formed. As a result, most African states today embody several pre-
colonial political systems and cultures, such as kingdoms and various stateless societies 
(Englebert, 2000a). Therefore, in much of Africa there is a situation of incongruity between 
pre-colonial institutions and post-colonial states (Englebert, 2000b). In addition to that, at the 
time of the independence of African states the bulk of their political elites were the product of 
European colonialism – essentially through access to European education, formal 
employment, or even integration into the trading networks of the formal economy (Englebert, 
2000b; Bayard, 2006). In that context the power and authority of those political elites were 
often not rooted in the local relations of power and domination (Englebert, 2000b). Therefore, 
Englebert (2000a:2000b) argues that most sub-Saharan African states lack legitimacy. They 
lack horizontal legitimacy because of disagreements over the definition of the community 
that forms the state. They also lack vertical legitimacy because the powers of political elites 
are contested even within their own political or ethnic societies. As a result, the state in 
Africa is often in conflict with the society, since the right to govern of political elites is 
contested by various political, ethnic and social segments of the society. This situation of 
conflict between the state and the society leads to political instability (Englebert, 2000b). In 
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order to curb political instability, political elites resort to a neo-patrimonial system of rule. 
Neo-patrimonialism is a personalised system of rule that links the ruler at the helm of the 
state with intermediaries and their ramifying networks of clientele. Basically, the ruler 
provides his clients with money and the latter, in return, provide him with political support 
and even security (Young, 2004, Bayard, 2006, Clapham, 1996). By its very nature, neo-
patrimonialism favours distributive policies over productive policies. In this way neo-
patrimonialism breeds corruption, inefficiency, laziness and neglect of the rule of law 
(Englebert, 2000b, Clapham, 1996).  
The destructive policies applied in the context of neo-patrimonial systems of rule undermine 
the strength of institutions – including political institutions, as the moral integrity of the 
political leadership and the process of acquisition and delegation of power are affected as 
well. The weakness of political institutions prevents the state from providing proper guidance 
and sufficient resources to the bureaucracy. The flaws in political institutions also allow 
interest groups in society to capture and dominate the bureaucracy. Thus, the bureaucracy 
becomes unable to perform its task of formulating and implementing sound policies and 
providing services to the community. The poor performance of bureaucracies in Africa 
should not only be perceived as an outcome of limited technical and managerial capacity. 
This is because bureaucracies are “embedded in a complex, interdependent system” that 
includes political institutions as well as social, economic and political interests (De Laiglesia, 
2006:40 & Levy, 2004:11).  
The Mozambican state and its institutions were severely weakened at the end of the civil war 
in 1992. However, since the return of peace the country has made significant progress in the 
area of state building. In particular, Mozambique initiated a process of decentralisation as 
part of a concerted effort between the country‟s political elites and international donors to 
consolidate democracy by ensuring legitimate, accountable and inclusive institutions at all 
levels of the state. It was also hoped that decentralisation would ensure more efficiency in the 
provision of basic services at the level of districts and municipalities (Cuereneia, 2001; Ames 
et al., 2010). In 1996 Mozambique‟s parliament approved the Local Government Act, which 
provided for the establishment of local authorities – rural districts and urban municipalities – 
endowed with administrative, financial and patrimonial autonomy (Cuereneia, 2001). At the 
same time, the provisions of the bulk of basic services remained the prerogative of provincial 
governments (Waterhouse, n.d).  However, despite of the decentralisation reform, provincial 
and local governments have difficulties in providing basic services to local population. The 
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reason for this failure appears to be rooted in the continuing dysfunctional nature of political 
institutions. Several studies (Ames et al., 2010; Waterhouse, n.d; Do Rasario, 2011) have 
pointed to several political factors and institutional arrangements as explanations of the poor 
performance of the state bureaucracy. These include: political rivalry between Frelimo and 
Renamo that breeds neo-patrimonial rule and sabotage; lack of effective coordination and the 
definition of service responsibility between the central and local governments; ambiguous 
distribution of responsibilities between different provincial ministries; limited fiscal 
autonomy on the part of local governments; and shortages of technical capacity for the 
purpose of policy making, planning and advocacy.  
6.4.2 Poor infrastructure  
The above discussion suggests that governance structures and political leadership in 
Mozambique appear to have failed to provide the right guidance, incentive and resources to 
the bureaucracy in order to provide adequate infrastructure. The inadequacy of infrastructure 
– and in particular irrigation systems – has undermined the activities of one Chinese 
agricultural enterprise operating in Mozambique, ACE Agriculture and Aquaculture 
(Interview with manager of ACE Agriculture and Aquaculture, Beira 26 April 2011). For the 
moment ACE Agriculture and Aquaculture is the only Chinese agricultural enterprise 
affected by the problem of poor infrastructure. However, this does not mean that this is not a 
significant issue for Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in the country. The number of 
Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique is still small. Thus, given the poor 
provision of infrastructure in the rural parts of Mozambique – such as roads and irrigation 
systems – one could anticipate that as the number of Chinese agricultural enterprises 
operating in Mozambique would increases over the next years, the issue of inadequate 
infrastructure will become a significant impediment for many of them. This will be especially 
true for Chinese agricultural enterprises that will evolve outside the aid projects funded by the 
Chinese government, as these enterprises will require large tracts of land that are likely to be 
located further in the countryside. Hence the absence of adequate infrastructure could inhibit 
the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique. This finding is 
comparable to the analysis made by Sun (2011:21) on the negative effects of institutional 
arrangements in Africa on “indigenous entrepreneurship and wealth creation” abilities of 
smallholders and investors in Africa. Furthermore, the role of political institutions in shaping 
the ability of the state to provide infrastructure in the rural areas and, in turn, the apparent 
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effects of poor infrastructure on the operations of Chinese agricultural enterprises exemplify 
the way in which formal institutions can impact on economic performance.  
6.4.3 Complex land acquisition system  
The land acquisition process in Mozambique is complex. The difficulty in accessing land is 
the outcome of the constraint that customary land tenure systems place on the formal land 
law. In other words, the complex process of accessing land in Mozambique stems from the 
duplication in the patterns of land tenure, as discussed in Chapter 5.  The coexistence of 
traditional and formal land tenure systems makes difficult any access to land by investors, 
especially foreign investors, and gives rise to problems of land identification, community 
representation and negotiations. Investors are obliged to obtain agreements from local 
communities before launching official requests for land title with local officials. They are 
expected to find suitable farmland and then identify the community to which the land belongs 
and engage in negotiations with its representatives (Interview with Postdoctoral Fellow at 
IFPRI, Maputo 4 May 2011). During negotiations the local communities usually request 
compensation from the investor in the form of social services in exchange for access to their 
land. Such requirements obviously necessitate a great deal of financial resources, time and, of 
paramount importance, a good knowledge of local conditions and languages (Interview with 
manager of ACE Agriculture and Aquaculture, Beira, 26 April 2011).  
The superposition of informal and formal patterns of land tenure has affected the mode of 
entry of one particular Chinese agricultural enterprise operating in Mozambique, China-
Africa Cotton Mozambique. This Chinese enterprise opted to adopt an outsourcing mode of 
operation in order to dodge the institutional challenges associated with accessing farmland in 
Mozambique (Interview with manager of China-Africa cotton Mozambique, Beira 26 April 
2011). China-Africa cotton Mozambique provides inputs and training to local farmers and in 
return purchases raw cotton from them. China-Africa Cotton has adopted a similar mode of 
operation in Zambia, Tanzania and Malawi (Interview with manager of China-Africa Cotton 
Mozambique, Beira 26 April 2011). Provided that it provides the right incentives to farmers 
in terms of purchasing price, this approach will surely enable China-Africa Cotton to 
minimise costs – both labour costs and those associated with accessing farmlands. This 
particular governance structure adopted by China-Africa Cotton Mozambique brings us back 
to the discussion held in chapter 3. Indeed, the analysis above has shown that the contractual 
model of governance structure chosen by this Chinese agricultural enterprise was in response 
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to the nature of the customary land tenure prevailing in Mozambique. This reality 
corroborates the claims made by Lowndes (1996) according to which firms are embedded in 
different patterns of social relations and hence, the type of governance structure they choose 
are related to particular characteristics of the state and society in which they operate. In this 
perspective, the argument put forward by Williamson (1973, 2000)  according to which the 
choice of governance structures firms make depend on transaction costs is discarded by the 
particular case of China-Africa Cotton Mozambique.  Indeed, while China-Africa Cotton is 
surely interested in transactions that are uncertain in outcome, repetitive and specific in terms 
of attributes, the Chinese agricultural enterprise has decided to go the route of a contractual 
model of governance structure, to the dismay of Williamson.  
Furthermore, the superposition of the informal and formal land tenure systems in 
Mozambique also appears to limit room for manoeuvre for the Mozambican government to 
elaborate and implement policies in the areas of agriculture. In the case of the Zambezi 
valley, it appears that the Mozambican government has been reluctant to grant Chinese 
agricultural enterprises and farmers large tracts of farmlands in the valley, fearing social 
unrest (Interviews with local researchers, Maputo 8 April 2011 and 14 April 2011). The 
perception of the Mozambican political elites appears to be shaped to some extent by the 
superimposition of traditional and formal patterns of land tenure. Members of the ruling elites 
tend to believe that local communities have the primary right over land ownership. Hence, 
giving away large tracts of farmland to Chinese farmers and agricultural enterprises in an 
environment of high demographic pressures and persistent ethnic tensions might result in 
landlessness and fuel political conflict (Interview with local researcher, Maputo 14 April 
2011).  Hanlon and Mosse (2009) argue that it is precisely because of fears of landlessness 
that Mozambican ruling elites resisted pressure from the World Bank and the United States in 
the 1990s to privatise land in Mozambique. The superimposition of the traditional and formal 
land tenure systems coupled with the above perception on the part of Mozambican ruling 
elites seem to explain why there have not been any major Chinese investments in the 
agricultural sector in Mozambique so far.  
This suggests that the Chinese government has supported the acquisition of large tracts of 
farmland in Mozambique‟s Zambezi valley by Chinese agricultural enterprises and farmers. 
This attitude of the Chinese government appears to have been motivated by a mercantilist 
strategy, as Beijing endeavours to encourage its enterprises and farmers to export cotton and 
soybeans from Mozambique in order to fuel the burgeoning Chinese economy and meet the 
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growing demand of Chinese consumers for more meat. Nevertheless, the attempt by the 
Chinese government, its enterprises and farmers to acquire large tracts of farmland in the 
Zambezi valley appears to have been undermined by the institutional context, especially in 
relation to informal constraints and formal laws pertaining to the land tenure system. The 
above findings show how informal constraints can have a bearing on formal laws, and the 
way in which formal laws can subsequently influence the direction of a segment of the 
economy.    
6.4.4 Poor monitoring and enforcement of the land law  
The difficulty of gaining access to land in Mozambique is made worse by the inability of the 
state to provide information to investors on the availability and characteristics of land in order 
to ensure the success of their investments. In Mozambique the National Land Cadastre was 
established by the land law of 1997 and mandated, amongst other things, to understand the 
different types of occupation and land uses, and to conduct assessments of soil fertility, forest 
trains, hydraulic reserves, mining exploration zones and tourist destinations, and to organise 
efficiently the use of land as well as its protection and conservation (Lei de Terras, 1997: 
article 5).  In short, the National Land Cadastre is tasked with the responsibilities of 
monitoring and enforcing the land law. However, in practice the National Land Cadastre 
lacks the capacity to do this (Interview with programme officer at ORAM, Maputo 5 April 
2011; Interview with postdoctoral fellow at IFPRI, Maputo 4 May 2011). The poor 
performance of the National Land Cadastre appears to be the result of shortages in technical 
and managerial capacity on the part of the personnel of the organisation. As a matter of fact, 
most staff members are basic-level technicians, while the number of surveyors with high 
educational qualifications is very low, about 20 (Chemonics, 2006). However, this does not 
seem to be the only reason. Political institutions also appear to play a part in the poor 
performance of the National Land Cadastre. This occurs through the absence of a 
comprehensive strategy for the organisation as well as staff shortages – especially at the 
district level – and inadequate material resources, such as transport and communication 
equipment (Chemonics, 2006). The inability of officials working for the National Land 
Cadastre to collect information prevents the organisation from providing foreign and local 
investors with essential information that would have enabled them to make effective choices. 
The shortage of critical information might also point to a larger institutional problem that 
includes local research institutions. This is because, under normal conditions, the National 
Land Cadastre can only successfully carry out its mission with the effective collaboration of 
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local research institutions. The failure of the National Land Cadastre in this respect points 
either to loopholes in its cooperation with local research institutions or even perhaps to the 
inability of the latter to generate scientific information. It might even be possible that local 
research institutions are facing the same technical, managerial and financial constraints and 
lack of orientation as the National Land Cadastre, although it is beyond the scope of this 
study to ascertain this.          
Shirley and Menard (1999) argue that information hazards and asymmetries increase the costs 
at which actors access information and therefore undermine their operations. Shirley and 
Menard (1999) also argue that information asymmetries can in turn be reduced through 
monitoring or competition. It is therefore not surprising that foreign and local investors in 
Mozambique‟s agricultural sector have been affected by information hazards and 
asymmetries. The case of CGOG – a large state-owned Chinese agricultural enterprise 
specialising in the purchase, processing, trade and transportation of a variety of grains and oil 
foods around the world and owning 21 subsidiaries (CGOG, Company Profile, 2012) – is 
quite illustrative. In 2005 CGOG decided to invest US$12 million in the growing and 
processing of soybean for its foreign markets in the Nhamatanda district, Sofala province, 
Mozambique. However, CGOG‟s operations in Mozambique failed probably due to 
information asymmetries. It appears that it was the absence of appropriate information on the 
type of soil (fertility) for growing soybean as well as on suitable seeds and machines that led 
to the failure of CGOG operations in Mozambique (Interview with manager of ACE 
Agriculture and Aquaculture, Beira 26 April 2011).  
This finding is important in the sense that it contradicts the arguments in the literature 
proffered by scholars such as Sun, who have assumed that Chinese state-owned agricultural 
enterprises operating in Africa, in light of their financial might and political connections, are 
more likely to resist the high costs of production induced by harsh institutional contexts than 
the smaller family-owned Chinese enterprises. But looking at the case of ACE Agriculture 
and Aquaculture, it appears that Chinese family-owned enterprises have greater flexibility, 
which enables them to take time to understand the local context and then take appropriate 
steps that enable them to dodge the challenges imposed by unfavourable institutional 
contexts. 
Overall, political institutions tend to influence the ability of agents at the National Land 
Cadastre to monitor and implement the land law. The poor performance of agents of the 
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National Land Cadastre in turn appears to undermine the activities of Chinese agricultural 
enterprises. This finding demonstrates how formal institutions can constrain enforcement 
mechanisms and that this, in turn, determines the economic performance of agents.  
The findings outlined in this chapter demonstrate that the institutional context in 
Mozambique affects the behaviour and/or modes of entry of Chinese agricultural enterprises. 
Specifically, the findings show this is the result of a combination of three institutional factors: 
the complexity of gaining access to land; poor infrastructure in the rural areas; and the limited 
capacity to monitor and enforce the land law The behaviour and/or modes of entry of these 
enterprises also appear to be influenced by informal constraints, embodieds in the customary 
land tenure system; formal rules such as the land law and political institutions; and 
enforcement mechanisms, the National Land Cadastre. This finding is in accordance with the 
concepts of institutions as developed by North and Williamson.  
6.5 Conclusion 
The analysis in this chapter has drawn a number of important conclusions. First, as far as the 
first research question is concerned, there are three factors determining the motivations of 
Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique: the ownership advantages held by 
Chinese agricultural enterprises in the form of technology and knowledge; their locational 
advantages in relation to investing in Mozambique in the form of access to fertile land, water 
and local markets; and the financial support that they receive from the Chinese government.  
Together these factors shape the motivations of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in 
Mozambique. These motivations are: 1) to acquire farmland in order to generate profits 
through farming activities; 2) to transfer agricultural commodities to China in order to supply 
Chinese markets with consumer goods and natural resources such as textiles, clothes and 
animal foods; and 3) to provide agricultural aid by introducing new varieties of crops 
imported from China, and providing training to farmers, students and technicians. However, 
the provision of agricultural aid is more a secondary objective of Chinese agricultural 
enterprises, since the aid projects primarily serve to enable Chinese agricultural enterprises to 
enter Mozambican markets. Chinese agricultural enterprises become involved in the growing, 
trade, processing and export of agricultural commodities as well as the testing of varieties of 
crops and the delivery of training.  The chapter has also argued that the activities of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique are generally consistent with China‟s 
foreign policy. This is particularly true with the activities of state-owned agricultural 
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enterprises running the aid projects or aiming to transfer agricultural commodities to China. 
Finally, it was claimed that Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique 
generally grow and sell food crops in local and foreign markets other than Chinese markets. 
However, this is with the notable exception of soybeans, which CGOG – and possibly other 
Chinese farmers who sought to operate from the Zambezi valley – attempted to export to 
China. This chapter has held that as the demand for food crops continues to rise in China, 
Chinese agricultural enterprises might opt in the medium to long term to get involved in the 
growing of food crops in Mozambique destined for Chinese markets. These findings are 
consistent with claims made by scholars such as Hairong and Sautman (2010) and Sun (2011) 
in the literature on China-Africa relations. At the same time, the above findings are also 
slightly different from the claims made by scholars such as Brautigam (2009), Brautigam and 
Xiaoyang (2009), Brautigam and Ekman (2012), in that they show that the prioritisation of 
commercial activities within the framework of the aid projects – as informed by China‟s 
foreign policy – casts doubt on the mutually beneficial character of these projects and leaves 
unresolved questions about the distribution of gains.  
With regard to the second research question, this chapter has held that the institutional 
context in Mozambique affects the behaviour and/or modes of entry of Chinese agricultural 
enterprises through three institutional features: the complexity of the process of gaining 
access to land; the poor delivery of infrastructure and weak capacity in monitoring and 
enforcement of the land law.  
The failure to provide infrastructure in rural areas appears to undermine the activities of 
Chinese agricultural enterprises, while the complex land acquisition system undermines 
investors‟ access to farmland. This situation appears to affect the modes of entry of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises in Mozambique, as they opt to outsource land and labour. 
Furthermore, the customary land tenure system – which in itself shapes the land acquisition 
system – appears to affect the perceptions of the ruling elites in the area of agricultural 
policy, which in turn hinders larger Chinese agricultural investments in Mozambique. Finally, 
the difficulty of gaining access to land is made worse by the lack of information on the 
availability and characteristics of land. At the level of the ministry of agriculture, the National 
Land Cadastre – as well as local research institutions – lacks the institutional and managerial 
capacity to monitor and enforce the land law. Such institutional weakness leads to an absence 
of information and guidance, which also appears to undermine the operations of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises, especially the larger ones.  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
145 
 
The above findings are consistent with claims made by Sun (2011) in the literature on China-
Africa relations. More importantly, however, three findings appear to make a new 
contribution to the literature.  The first is the analysis showing how the complex process of 
gaining access to land shapes the mode of entry of China-Africa Cotton Mozambique. The 
second is the finding related to the effects of the lack of information on the soil and its key 
characteristics on the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises – especially the larger 
ones. The third is the finding related to the effects of inadequate infrastructure on the 
activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises.  
Finally, most of the findings above are in line with Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm and new 
institutional theory. This is because, on the one hand, Chinese agricultural enterprises 
operating in Mozambique enjoy ownership, locational and internalization advantages. On the 
other hand, the institutional context in Mozambique, influenced by informal constraints, 
formal rules and enforcement mechanisms, affects the behaviour and/or modes of entry of 
Chinese agricultural enterprises into local industries.  
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CHAPTER 7:  CHINESE AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES IN THE DRC:       
ROLE AND BEHAVIOUR 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter consist of two parts. In the first part I discuss the motivations of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises operating in the DRC. In the second the focus fails on the effects of 
the institutional context on the behaviour and/or modes of entry of these enterprises into local 
industries.  
It is argued in this chapter that Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in the DRC are 
motivated by a number of objectives: 1) to acquire farmland in order to generate profits 
through farming activities; 2) to transfer agricultural commodities to China in order to supply 
Chinese markets with natural resources such as biofuels and cooking oil; and 3) to provide 
agricultural aid by introducing new varieties of crops imported from China and offering 
training to smallholders and students. However, the provision of agricultural aid by Chinese 
agricultural enterprises is a secondary motivation. The primary motivation of the enterprises 
running aid projects is to conduct profit-seeking activities. The aid projects funded by the 
Chinese government primarily aim to allow Chinese agricultural enterprises to establish 
themselves successfully in the DRC. Given that Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in 
the DRC primarily aim to access local markets and supply Chinese markets with agricultural 
commodities, their activities are consistent with China‟s foreign policy, as discussed in 
Chapter 5. Furthermore, it is held in this chapter that Chinese agricultural enterprises 
operating in the DRC are producing or aiming to produce food crops destined for local 
markets – rice, maize, vegetables and palm oil – as well as for Chinese markets – palm oil.  
It is also shown in this chapter that the institutional context in the DRC affects the behaviour 
and/or modes of entry of Chinese agricultural enterprises by way of three institutional 
elements:  difficulty of gaining access to land due to the duality in land ownership systems; 
the poor provision of infrastructure in rural areas; and conflicts over land ownership due to 
the inability of the state to effectively enforce land titles. To be more specific, the poor 
provision of infrastructure in the DRC appears to undermine further investments by Chinese 
agricultural enterprises. Conflicts over land control tend not only to discourage further 
investments, but also to compromise current investments. Moreover, the difficulty of gaining 
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access to land appears to hinder the operations of Chinese agricultural enterprises in the 
DRC. This is especially true for Chinese investments requiring large tracts of farmland. 
Finally, the harsh institutional context in the DRC appears to be shaping the model of 
business model of Chinese agricultural enterprises over time. For instance, the institutional 
context forced ZTE Agribusiness Congo to suspend its huge palm project in Equateur 
province and instead focus on small agricultural projects around Kinshasa.       
7.2 Chinese engagement in the DRC 
Chinese involvement in the DRC agricultural sector is not new. The agriculture cooperation 
between the People‟s Republic of China and the then Zaire was launched in 1972, when 
President Mobutu‟s government recognised Beijing as the sole representative of the Chinese 
people. From then, the agricultural cooperation between the two countries evolved under the 
banner of the Chinese agricultural mission. During that period China would dispatch 
agricultural experts, equipment and funds to the DRC to help develop the country‟s 
agricultural sector (Interview with supervisor of Hubei Dadi, Kinshasa 18 May 2011). In 
1991 the agricultural cooperation between the two countries was interrupted because of 
political instability and social unrest in Zaire.  Agricultural cooperation between the two 
countries resumed in 1995 and since that year it has been implemented by Hubei Dadi 
International Corporation for Economic and Technical Cooperation – a state-owned 
enterprise from Hubei province established in 1995 by the Hubei Administration for Industry 
and Commerce (Xinhua & Lihua, 2011). Officially, the aim of the enterprise is to manage 
and implement Chinese agricultural aid projects in Africa. Therefore, in the past two decades 
Hubei Dadi International Corporation has provided agricultural aid for nine projects in five 
countries: the DRC, Nepal, Congo-Brazzaville, Guinea-Bissau and Botswana. In addition, 
Hubei Dadi Corporation has also sent more than 1 500 engineers and agricultural experts to 
various countries such as Mali, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Mauritania and countries in the 
Mediterranean, in the process completing 30 project contracts to the value of 0.18 billion 
Yuan ( Xianzhu & Lihua, 2011). Currently, besides the DRC, Hubei Dadi International 
Corporation is also operating in Nigeria and Ghana (Interview with supervisor of Hubei Dadi, 
Kinshasa 18 May 2011).  
Table 7.1 below provides an overview of the nature and activities of Chinese agricultural 
enterprises operating in the DRC. This study has only been able to identify two Chinese 
agricultural enterprises operating in the DRC. Nevertheless, it should be noted that in the 
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course of the fieldwork, the researcher approached both the Office of the Economic 
Councillor of the Chinese Embassy in Kinshasa as well as the National Agency for the 
Promotion of Investments (ANAPI) – a body specialised in guiding and assisting foreign 
investors – and could not identify any additional Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in 
the country at the time.   In addition to these two companies, China Overseas Engineering 
Group Corporation (COVEC), a world leading Chinese state-owned construction enterprise, 
attempted to invest in the agricultural sector but failed because of institutional factors, which 
will be discussed in the second section of this chapter.  
Table 7.1 Nature and activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises in the DRC 
Enterprise  Year Location/Province Capital Invested Activities Size of concession 
(hectares) 
Hubei Dadi 
International 
Corporation    
2010 Kinshasa US$1.464 000 Provide training to 
smallholders and 
students Grow and 
sell rice and pigs. 
Plan to set up a 
mill factory in 
Kinshasa 
300              
(Mikonga)  
12 (Kingabwa) 
ZTE Agribusiness 
Congo 
2007 Kinshasa and Equateur US$5 million  Plant and process 
palm. Grow and 
sell maize. Plan to 
sell rice. Plan to 
provide training 
and conduct 
research  
100 000 (equateur) 
280 (Minkao) 
600 ( Nsele)         
75 ( Nsele) 
 
Source: Information obtained from fieldwork in the DRC (May-June 2011) 
As explained in Chapter 4, the researcher did not cover the entire Congolese territory during 
his fieldwork. Hence, this study does not claim to report a complete list of all Chinese 
agricultural enterprises operating in the country, nor to provide a complete and final 
understanding of the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in the DRC.  
Figure 7.1 below provides an indication of the areas of the DRC covered by the fieldwork.  
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Figure 7.1 Map of the Democratic Republic of Congo  
 
Figure 7.1 The region in colour was visited by the researcher during the fieldwork. 
7.3. Chinese agricultural enterprises’ motivations  
Figure 7.2 below outlines the conceptual framework, based on fieldwork data, which guides 
the discussion in this chapter on the motivations informing the activities of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises operating in the DRC.  As shown in Figure 7.2, the motivations of 
Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in the DRC are determined by three factors. The 
first factor is the specific assets or ownership advantages held by Chinese agricultural 
enterprises in the form of modern agricultural technologies, knowledge and capital. The 
second is the availability of arable land and suitable climate for particular crops as well as the 
existence of local markets for agricultural commodities. The third is the financial support 
provided by the Chinese government to its agricultural enterprises in the form of subsidies – 
direct support for costs – or through the China Development Bank as concessionary loans.  
As a result of the combination of these three factors, the motivations of Chinese agricultural 
enterprises operating in the DRC are to acquire farmland and embark on farming activities in 
order to generate profits; to transfer agricultural goods to China in order to supply Chinese 
markets with natural resources; and to provide agricultural aid by introducing new varieties 
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of crops brought from China and providing training to smallholders and students. In order to 
give effect to their motivations, Chinese agricultural enterprises intend to grow, trade, process 
and export agricultural commodities as well as to test new varieties of crops and provide 
training.  
Figure 7.2 Conceptual framework on the motivations of Chinese agricultural 
enterprises operating in the DRC 
Determinants of Investments                     Motivations                                   Activities    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.3.1 Determinants of the motivations of Chinese agricultural enterprises 
Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in the DRC rely on their ownership advantages in 
order to pursue their strategic objectives. The ownership advantages of Chinese agricultural 
enterprises are in the form of technology and knowledge – and capital in the case of ZTE 
Agribusiness Congo. Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in the DRC possess 
agricultural technologies that enable them to successfully establish themselves and operate in 
the country. These technologies are in the form of advanced seeds, machinery and knowledge 
arising from past experiences of operating in the same industry in China or elsewhere. For 
instance, as mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, Hubei Dadi International Corporation 
has a long history of running agricultural projects in several African countries. ZTE 
Agribusiness Congo has developed technical expertise over the years from the successful 
management of agricultural projects consisting of palm plantations and processing plants in 
Support from the 
Chinese government 
through the aid 
projects and the China 
Development Bank  
Generate profits by 
relying on local markets; 
supply Chinese markets 
with agricultural 
commodities; and 
provide agricultural aid 
to students and 
smallholders 
Access to land, 
suitable climate 
and local markets  
Possession of 
modern 
technology, 
knowledge and 
capital  
Grow, trade, process and 
transfer agricultural 
commodities; test new 
varieties of crops and 
provide training 
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China, Malaysia and Indonesia (ZTE Energy Company Limited, n.d; Interview with General 
Director of ZTE Agribusiness Congo, Kinshasa 20 May 2011).    
Besides their ownership advantages, Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in the DRC 
also enjoy locational advantages. These are in the form of natural resources and markets. 
These enterprises benefit from access to natural resources, in particular land, water and 
favourable climatic conditions; the DRC has abundant farmland and water. Climatic 
conditions are also suitable for growing crops such as rice, maize and palm, amongst others. 
For instance, palm trees can only be cultivated in regions located between a 10-degree 
latitude belt – 5 degrees north and 5 degree south of the equator. The localisation of the DRC 
within that range is the main reason that contributed to ZTE Agribusiness Congo‟s decision 
to invest in the country (Interview with General Director of ZTE Agribusiness Congo, 
Kinshasa 20 May 2011).  Moreover, Chinese agricultural enterprises also enjoy the 
availability of local markets, in particular for rice and palm oil (Interview with General 
Director of ZTE Agribusiness Congo, Kinshasa 20 May 2011; Interview with supervisor of 
Hubei Dadi, Kinshasa 18 May 2011). The DRC regularly imports rice in order to fill the gap 
in local production of that commodity (Food Security Portal, 2012). Likewise, as mentioned 
in Chapter 5, the DRC also often imports palm oil in order to satisfy local demands in 
vegetable cooking oil.  
Furthermore, Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in the DRC have access to financial 
resources that enable them to offset the costs of investing in the DRC.  These financial 
resources are made available to them by the Chinese government in the form of subsidies – 
pre-investment expenses and operating costs – within the framework of the aid projects 
(Interview with the supervisor of Hubei Dadi, 18 May 2011; Interview with consultant of 
ZTE Agribusiness Congo, Kinshasa 2 June 2011; Protocol of Accord between Hubei Dadi 
International Corporation for Economic and Technical Cooperation and the Congolese 
Ministry of Agriculture, March 2010; Letter of the General Director of ZTE Agribusiness 
Congo to the Minister of Agriculture, 28 February 2011  ).  In addition to that, ZTE 
Agribusiness Congo has access to loans from the China Development Bank. Moreover, ZTE 
Agribusiness Congo has also access to finance from non-Chinese banks (Interview with 
General Director of ZTE Agribusiness Congo, Kinshasa 20 May 2011).  
The combination of ownership and locational advantages as well as the support from the 
Chinese government enables Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in the DRC to 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
152 
 
establish their operations in the country. In addition, Chinese agricultural enterprises also 
possess internalization advantages as a result of the internalization of intangible assets – 
knowledge and technology – inside the firms and, at least for ZTE Agribusiness Congo, the 
internalization of palm oil inside the firm as well – featuring a vertical integration strategy.  
Therefore, Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in the DRC enjoy ownership, locational 
and internalisation advantages, as well as financial support from the Chinese government. All 
these assets enable Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in the DRC to implement their 
strategic objectives. These analyses are in line with Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm as discussed 
in Chapter 3.  
7.3.2 Motivations and activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises 
7.3.2.1 Generate profits through farming activities  
As mentioned above, a motivation of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in the DRC is 
to grow food crops, process and sell them in local markets in order to make a profit.  Indeed, 
these enterprises are involved in growing, processing and trading of agricultural commodities 
such as rice, rice seedlings, maize, palm oil and vegetables (Interviews with supervisor and 
employees of Hubei Dadi, Kinshasa 18 May 2011 and 27 May 2011; Interviews with General 
Director and Consultant of ZTE Agribusiness, 20 May 2011 & 2 June 2011). In doing so, 
Chinese agricultural enterprises seem to adopt several business strategies that point toward 
profit maximization behaviours. To start with, Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in 
the DRC appear to charge prices for their products that are at least equal to or even higher 
than prices charged at local market (Interviews with Supervisor and employees of Hubei 
Dadi, Kinshasa 18 May 20011 & 27 May 2011; Chaco, 2010). In addition to that, they tend to 
cultivate crops with significant local demand and for which they have modern technology – 
compared to local producers (Interviews with supervisor of Hubei Dadi, Kinshasa 18 May 
2011; Interview with Director General of ZTE Agribusiness Congo, Kinshasa 20 May 2011).  
Moreover, the superior agricultural technology of Chinese agricultural enterprises coupled to 
the availability of local markets enables Chinese agricultural enterprises to serve local 
markets with better and additional products (Interviews with supervisor of Hubei Dadi, 
Kinshasa 18 May 2011; Interview with General Director of ZTE Agribusiness Congo, 
Kinshasa 20 May 2011). Furthermore, ZTE Agribusiness Congo appears to push for a 
diversification of its products by producing more than one agricultural commodity – rice, 
maize, vegetables and palm oil (Interviews with General Director and Consultant of ZTE 
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Agribusiness Congo, Kinshasa 20 May 2011 & 2 June 2011). This move by ZTE 
Agribusiness Congo could be aimed at reducing production costs – economies of scope – or 
at minimizing risks. On top of that, these enterprises employ permanent and casual labour. 
Casual labourers are employed based on current needs and agricultural seasons (Interview 
with General Director of ZTE Agribusiness Congo, Kinshasa 20 May 2011; Protocol of 
Accord between Hubei Dadi International Corporation for Economic and Technical 
Cooperation and the Congolese Ministry of Agriculture, March 2010). The various strategies 
outlined above feature as part of the profit-maximisation strategy. Hence, they tend to 
strongly suggest that the motivation of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in the DRC 
is to generate profits through commercial activities.  
7.3.2.2 Supply Chinese markets  
Besides producing crops for local markets, it appears as if ZTE Agribusiness Congo also 
intends to transfer palm oil to its mother company in China. The General Director of ZTE 
Agribusiness Congo claims that his enterprise does not intend to export palm oil to China 
because, according to him, the international transportation is expensive. He claims that palm 
oil produced by his enterprise will first be sold in local markets and only the remaining 
quantity will be locally processed into biofuels (Interview with General Director of ZTE 
Agribusiness Congo, Kinshasa 20 May 2011). However, this argument appears to be 
misleading for a number of reasons. First, given the large size of the palm plantation that ZTE 
is trying to establish in the DRC – ranging from 100 000 to 3 million hectares (Interview with 
General Director of ZTE Agribusiness Congo, Kinshasa 20 May 2011; Interview with the 
General Director of Congo Agriculture Biotechnology, Kinshasa 13 June 2011), it is unlikely 
that ZTE Agribusiness Congo will have the technical capacity locally to process such a vast 
amount of palm oil into biofuels – even after satisfying local demand. This is because the 
production of biofuels on a large scale requires significant financial resources in order to 
build factories. In addition to that, in China too the demand for palm oil has been surging. 
This has been stimulated not only by firms but also by households for their daily 
consumption (Freeman et al., 2008). As a matter of fact, palm oil featured among the main 
agricultural commodities imported by China in 2008 (see Figure 6.3). Furthermore, it should 
be noted that ZTE Agribusiness Congo owns a factory for processing biofuels in China‟s 
Inner Mongolia province and that it is also constructing another biofuel processing factory in 
China‟s Tianjin province (Interview with General Director of ZTE Agribusiness Congo, 
Kinshasa 20 May 2011; Brautigam, 2010). Given all this, it is unlikely that ZTE Agribusiness 
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Congo‟s true intention is to sell palm oil to local markets and convert the rest into biofuel in 
the DRC. The statement of the General Director of ZTE Agribusiness Congo, reported above, 
might be due to the sensitivity in the DRC around the processing of palm oil into biofuel in 
the country. Upon its arrival in the DRC, ZTE Agribusiness Congo‟s palm project raised 
major concerns in the country, with many officials in the government and civil society 
opposing the project on the ground that the processing of palm oil into biofuels would impact 
negatively on the country‟s food security. Congolese officials feared that the processing of 
biofuels in the DRC will induce speculation and incite local producers of palm oil to sell their 
products to ZTE Agribusiness Congo in order to take advantage of higher prices (Interview 
with the General Director of Congo Agriculture Biotechnology, Kinshasa 13 June 2011; 
Interview with manager of agricultural projects at ANAPI, Kinshasa 30 May 2011).   
Thus, in light of the above analysis, it is likely that ZTE Agribusiness Congo plans – or 
planned when it arrived in the DRC – to transfer some of its palm oil to its mother company 
in China to be processed into biofuels as well as other manufactured products. In this way, 
the mother company of ZTE Agribusiness Congo can generate substantial profits by trading 
its products into lucrative Chinese markets, while at the same time contributing to the 
enhancement of the Chinese economy by providing cheaper and more environmental friendly 
energy.  
The opposition of several Congolese officials to the idea of processing palm oil into biofuels 
has an important implication for this study. It suggests that palm oil is perceived in the DRC 
not as a secondary food crop but rather as a primary one. The importance of palm oil for the 
Congolese population contradicts the views expressed by Sun (2011), who has considered 
palm oil and cassava as “minor crops” in contrast to staple food crops. The classification of 
key crops such as palm oil and cassava as secondary food crops can be understood in the 
context of the culinary habits of Chinese consumers. However, this classification is arbitrary 
for most sub-Saharan African countries, since, as argued in Chapter 5, palm oil and cassava 
are widely used every day by consumers in the DRC – as well as in many other African 
countries.  In this context, palm oil and cassava are considered as primary food crops in the 
case of the DRC.  Therefore, given that palm oil is a staple food crop in the DRC, the 
processing of this commodity into biofuels – locally or in China – could have adverse 
consequences for the food security of the country.   
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73.2.3 Provide agricultural aid 
Beside their commercial activities, Hubei Dadi International Corporation and ZTE 
Agribusiness Congo are also involved in the management of aid projects funded by the 
Chinese government. Hubei Dadi International Corporation is involved in the provision of 
training to students and rice smallholders around Kinshasa (Interview with supervisor of 
Hubei Dadi, Kinshasa 18 May 2011). ZTE Agribusiness Congo has been selected by the 
Chinese government to manage the agricultural demonstration centre at Nsele. The Nsele 
research centre will be shortly constructed through funding from the Chinese government 
(Interview with consultant at ZTE Agribusiness Congo, Kinshasa 2 June 2011; Interview 
with the head of the department of plants production and protection at the Ministry of 
agriculture, Kinshasa 2 June 2011).  
In its contract with the Congolese Ministry of Agriculture , Hubei Dadi International 
Corporation pledged to provide technical support to 5 000 rice smallholders and 300 
university students, and to continue with the demonstration of rice production techniques 
over an area of 1 000 hectares around Kinshasa. In return, the Congolese government 
promised to put at the disposal of Hubei Dadi International Corporation 300 hectares of land 
at Mikonga for rice production, 12 hectares of land at Kingabwa for rice production as well 
as 1.3 hectares of land for vegetable production, and a pigsty at Masina Abattoir (Protocol of 
Accord between Hubei Dadi International Corporation for Economic and Technical 
Cooperation and the Congolese Ministry of Agriculture, March 2010). The two sides signed a 
contract in 2010 for a five-year period. The activities of Hubei Dadi International Corporation 
are funded by the Chinese government.  
Since the signing of the contract, Hubei Dadi International Corporation has only been able to 
secure access to the 12 hectares of farmland in Kingabwa.  Access to the 300-hectare and 1.3-
hectare farms at Mikonga and Masina Abattoir have been undermined by land disputes with 
customary chiefs. As a result of this, Hubei Dadi International Corporation has not been able 
to provide agricultural aid as planned in the contract with the Ministry of Agriculture. Hubei 
Dadi International Corporation has only been able to provide training to local students. The 
technical support to smallholders and the demonstration activities have been abandoned 
(Interviews with supervisor and employees of Hubei Dadi, Kinshasa 18 May 2011 and 27 
May 2011; Interview with rice smallholders, Kinshasa, 20 May 2011).    
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Thus, it appears that the provision of technical supports to smallholders is contingent upon 
the successful implementation of the “business side” of the contract between Hubei Dadi 
International Corporation and the Congolese Ministry of Agriculture – access to and 
cultivation of farmlands in Mikonga, Kingabwa and Masina Abattoir. The prioritisation of the 
commercial activities of Hubei Dadi International Corporation over the provision of 
agricultural aid casts doubt on the mutually beneficial character of this aid project.   
For its part, ZTE Agribusiness Congo plans to manage the Nsele research centre for a three-
year period during which the activities of the centre will be funded by the Chinese 
government (Interview with consultant at ZTE Agribusiness Congo, Kinshasa 2 June 2011; 
Letter of the General Director of ZTE Agribusiness Congo to the Minister of Agriculture, 28 
February 2011). The Nsele research centre will cover 75 hectares of land. This will include 
classrooms, offices, accommodation residences, experimental and demonstration fields, rice 
field, husbandry and an agro-processing factory (Letter of the General Director of ZTE 
Agribusiness Congo to the Minister of Agriculture, 28 February 2011).  
The objective of the Nsele research centre will be to conduct scientific research through the 
introduction and adaptation of new varieties of crops imported from China (rice, maize and 
soybean), and to provide training to smallholders and technicians. However, for the moment 
there is no provision made for institutional mechanisms that would ensure an effective and 
structured collaboration between the Nsele research centre and local research institutions for 
the research activities (Interview with the head of the department of plants production and 
protection at the Ministry of Agriculture, Kinshasa 2 June 2011). Without strong institutional 
mechanisms to ensure scientific cooperation between the team of ZTE Agribusiness Congo 
and local research institutions, the prospect of transfers of Chinese agricultural technologies 
through the Nsele research centre will be strongly undermined.  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, China has adopted a new model of aid assistance that combines 
business with agricultural aid. Such a model encourages Chinese agricultural enterprises to 
provide agricultural aid and at the same time embark on lucrative commercial activities. 
Chinese officials have argued that such a model aims at ensuring the sustainability of aid 
projects and therefore their effective contribution to the development of African agriculture 
(Brautigam, 2009:247-249). However, in the case of the DRC the prioritisation of 
commercial activities over the delivery of agricultural aid by Hubei Dadi International 
Corporation and the poor planning of the Nsele research centre that ZTE Agribusiness Congo 
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intends to manage – especially concerning the absence of provision for scientific cooperation 
between the Nsele research centre and local research institutions – cast doubts on the scope 
and relevance of these aid projects. The limited scope and effectiveness of the aid projects, on 
one hand, and the financial contribution of the Chinese government to those projects, on the 
other, suggest that the aid projects run by Hubei Dadi International Corporation and ZTE 
Agribusiness Congo should primarily be perceived as subsidies from the Chinese government 
destined to enable these enterprises to establish their footprint in the DRC. This assertion is 
consistent with the analysis of Brautigam (2009). As indicated in Chapter 6, Brautigam 
(2009:249) argues that the aid projects funded by the Chinese government aim, among other 
things, to enable Chinese agricultural enterprises to successfully establish themselves in 
African countries. This finding in turn appears to explain the decision by the Chinese 
government to hand the management of the Nsele research centre to a private agricultural 
enterprise – ZTE Agribusiness Congo – with no prior experience in the delivery of 
agriculture aid.  
However, the conceptualisation of the aid projects as instruments for enabling Chinese 
agricultural enterprises to establish a footprint in Africa is neither unique nor exceptional. 
Indeed, the Chinese government is well known for using aid projects to enable its 
construction companies – state-owned – to establish themselves in Africa. For instance, 
drawing on fieldwork conducted in Angola, Zambia, Tanzania, Sierra Leone and China, 
Corkin et al. (2008) argue that Chinese construction companies – often state-owned – have 
relied on the aid projects funded by the Chinese government to establish themselves in 
African construction industries and gain first-hand knowledge and experience of local 
environments in order to identify additional opportunities. Corkin et al. (2008) claim that 
over time Chinese construction companies have been in a position to expand their activities in 
particular countries or even at the regional level – often through commercial ventures with 
governments for large projects, or the private sector for small-scale projects. Similarly, 
Grimm (2011) argues that the Chinese “going out policy” that started in the late 1990s  has 
altered the focus of China‟s foreign policy, which now centres on  access to natural resources 
for domestic development and the better positioning of Chinese enterprises – including 
through the awarding of large state grants tied to Chinese aid projects. Grimm (2011) argues 
that Chinese foreign aid has become an integral part of China‟s foreign policy and this reality 
makes the distinction between development assistance and commercial activities difficult. 
Grimm (2011) concludes that the aspect of mutually beneficial relations (a win-win situation) 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
158 
 
raises questions about the distribution of gains. It appears that the conceptualisation of the aid 
projects as instruments for supporting the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises in the 
DRC is part of China‟s foreign policy – as Hubei Dadi International Corporation and ZTE 
Agribusiness Congo aim to use the aid projects as springboards to expand their commercial 
activities in the country. The provision of agricultural aid is relegated to becoming a 
secondary objective.   
Just like in the preceding chapter, this section provides extensive elucidations of the linkages 
between the strategic motives of the Chinese government with those of Hubei Dadi 
International Corporation and ZTE Agribusiness Congo. In this perspective, the criticism 
enunciated by Macharzina and Engelhard (1991) against Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm tends 
once more to be unwarranted. The application of Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm together with a 
methodological approach that allows for an extensive investigation of several variables in 
conjunction with the context facilitates the identification of causal mechanisms through 
which the main determinants of the OLI paradigm, including the contextual variable, are 
linked.    
The discussions conducted in the above sections lead to the conclusion that the motivations of 
Chinese agricultural enterprises involved in the DRC are to acquire farmlands in order to 
generate profits through farming activities; to transfer agricultural commodities – secondary 
food crops – to their mother companies in China; and to provide agricultural aid to 
smallholders, technicians and students – although this is a secondary motivation. Thus, the 
activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in the DRC are generally consistent 
with China‟s foreign policy as these enterprises aim to better position themselves in local 
markets and access agricultural commodities for Chinese markets.  
These findings are comparable to that of Hairong and Sautman (2010), who hold that Chinese 
agricultural enterprises operating in Zambia – including state-owned enterprises – aim to 
generate profits through the acquisition of farmland and the subsequent trading of agricultural 
commodities in local markets. These findings are also consistent with Sun‟s (2011) analysis, 
according to which Chinese agricultural enterprises aim to access agricultural commodities in 
Africa in order to serve Chinese markets. These findings also tend to support the work of 
Brautigam (2009), and Brautigam and Xiaoyang (2009), who have alluded to a new mode of 
Chinese involvement in Africa‟s agriculture that combines business activities with 
agricultural aid. However, in contrast to Brautigam (2009), Brautigam and Xiaoyang (2009) , 
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Brautigam and Ekman (2012) and Sun (2011) , this study holds that Chinese agricultural aid 
projects are aligned with China‟s foreign policy, which mainly promote the profit-enhancing 
activities of Chinese enterprises. As such, the mutually beneficial character of these aid 
projects becomes dubious as it raises questions about the distribution of gains.  
Moreover, it appears that Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in the DRC – including 
COVEC which attempted to invest in the country‟s agriculture – intend to grow foodstuffs for 
local markets as well as for Chinese markets. On the one hand, Chinese agricultural 
enterprises are producing or aim to produce staple food crops – such as rice, maize and palm 
oil – for local markets. In addition to that, ZTE Agribusiness Congo is also planning to 
transfer palm oil to China to be further process into biofuels. 
Furthermore, as I argued in the preceding chapter, the demand for foodstuff in China is 
expected to continue growing at double-digit rates over the next 25 years (Freeman et al., 
2008). Therefore, in case prices of staple food crops – such as cassava, maize and vegetables 
– were to substantially increase in China over the long run, Chinese agricultural enterprises 
and farmers might also enter into the DRC in order to grow those crops for Chinese markets. 
Such a scenario is even more plausible given that ZTE Agribusiness Congo already intends to 
process and export  palm oil to China and, more worrisomely, China already imports some 
5 000 tonnes of cassava every year from Nigeria (Sun, 2011).   
7.4 Behaviour of Chinese agricultural enterprises   
As in the case of Mozambique, the institutional context seems to affect the behaviour and/or 
modes of entry of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in the DRC in three different 
ways: 1) poor provision of infrastructure; 2) complex land acquisition system; and 3) frequent 
occurrence of conflicts over land control in the DRC.  
Figure 7.3 below provides a conceptual framework accounting for the way in which the 
institutional context in the DRC affects the behaviour and/or modes of entry of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises. In Figure 7.3 institutions are divided between slow-moving and fast-
moving. Slow-moving institutions are the set of informal constraints and formal rules that are 
strongly embedded in the society‟s culture and tradition. These sorts of institutions change 
gradually over time, often over centuries (Williamson, 2000).  Figure 7.3 distinguishes two 
types of slow-moving institutions:  customary land tenure systems – informal constraints – 
and the land law – a formal rule. Both institutions tend to change gradually over time – 
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although the land law is expected to change faster than customary land tenure systems. Fast-
moving institutions are less embedded in the society‟s culture and tradition. In Figure 7.3, 
fast-moving institutions are political institutions. Recalling the discussion in Chapter 6, 
political institutions are defined as the set of formal political rules – including the constitution 
and laws – their governance structures and leadership (Levy, 2004).  Political institutions 
tend to change faster – over decades – than the institutions embedded in society and tradition 
(Willliamson, 2000).   Figure 7.3 expresses three key assumptions. First, customary land 
tenure systems shape the perceptions of political leaders on land issues. Second, the political 
leaders shape the content of the land law. Third, political institutions influence the 
effectiveness of the bureaucracy.   
Therefore, in the case of the DRC, the land law shapes the institutional context by 
determining complex land acquisition procedures. On their part, political institutions offer 
inadequate incentive structure to the bureaucracy that negatively affects the provision of 
infrastructure and the enforcement of contracts. As a result,  as shown in Figure 7.3, Chinese 
agricultural enterprises operating in the DRC encounter various obstacles such as difficulty of 
access to land, poor infrastructure in rural areas and frequent conflicts over land control.  
Figure 7.3 Conceptual framework on the behaviour of Chinese agricultural enterprises 
operating in the DRC  
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7.4.1 Dysfunctional political institutions 
The rather adverse institutional environment depicted in Figure 7.3 is partially the outcome of 
dysfunctional political institutions in the DRC.  However, as mentioned in the preceding 
chapter, in order to provide an understanding of the operations of political institutions in the 
DRC, the new institutional theory needs to be modified by integrating concepts related to 
African politics.  
As discussed in Chapter 6, in Sub-Saharan Africa neo-patrimonial systems of rule undermine 
the strength and effectiveness of political institutions through a combination of corruption, 
mismanagement and lawlessness (Englebert, 2000a, 2000b).  As a result, political institutions 
become unable to contain societal pressures and provide proper guidance to the bureaucracy. 
Thus, interest groups in the society are able to capture the bureaucracy, which is left without 
proper guidance and sufficient resources. This situation reduces the accountability and 
efficiency of the bureaucracy, including its ability to elaborate and implement policies as well 
as provide services. As argued by Levy (2004) and De Laiglesia (2006), the performance of 
the bureaucracy is not only the outcome of the technical and managerial capacity of agents, 
but also the product of the strength of political institutions and the nature of social norms.  
In 2006 the DRC held its first democratic presidential and legislative elections in four 
decades, ending a transitional period of three years. A year earlier the country adopted by 
means of a referendum a progressive constitution that envisioned the establishment not only 
of a checks-and-balances mechanism to curtail the power of the executive, but also the 
diffusion of power from the central government to the provinces  (International Crisis Group, 
2010; Africa Development Bank, 2009; Yav,2009). However, the successful implementation 
of the new constitution required essential institutional reforms, such as the implementation of 
the decentralisation process and the overhaul of the security sector (International Crisis 
Group, 2010). The aim of the new constitution as well as it associated institutional reforms 
was to enable the emergence of a democratic and stable country. Moreover, it was also 
intended to bring government closer to local people in order to enhance government‟s 
accountability and efficiency, especially in term of transparency over the use of resources, 
policy formulation and implementation as well as service delivery (Africa Development 
Bank, 2009).  
In 2008 the DRC president Joseph Kabila signed into law the bill on decentralisation that 
effectively set into motion the process of dividing the provinces. The law on decentralisation 
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envisaged the establishment within in 36 months of the new provinces with political, legal 
and financial autonomy (Yav, 2009).  Despite the adoption of the law on decentralisation, its 
effective implementation has been undermined by political factors. First, the 
conceptualisation of the decentralisation process in the DRC appears to be flawed. The 2005 
constitution envisaged increasing the number of provinces from the current 11 to 26. 
However, the establishment of the new provinces did not take into account more objective 
criteria such as the size of the new provinces, the size of the population and the availability of 
human and natural resources. On the contrary, the new provinces were designed according to 
ethnic or sub-regional affiliations (Interview with an academic from the University of 
Kinshasa, Kinshasa 27 May 2011; Yav, 2009). It appears as if the new provinces were 
conceptualised in the intention of distributing political power to the local segments of 
political elites rather than to provide effective services to local communities (Interview with 
an academic from the University of Kinshasa, Kinshasa 27 May 2011). As such, the creation 
of the new provinces has become politically sensitive, as it is seen by some observers as 
likely to ignite ethnically motivated conflicts over the control of natural resources (Interview 
with an academic from the University of Kinshasa, Kinshasa 27 May 2011; Yav, 2009). This 
issue can be compared to the analysis of Ake (1996) on the contradiction between the 
manifest and latent objectives of the policies elaborated by African political rulers in a 
context of a neo-patrimonial system of rule.  Second, political elites in Kinshasa have been 
unwilling to alter the existing balance of power in their favour by allowing provinces to 
deduct 40% of their revenues at the source as stipulated in the constitution (International 
Crisis Group, 2010).  
The 2005 constitution also envisaged the reform of the security services in order to 
consolidate democracy and political stability. Regarding security sector reforms, progress in 
that area has been disappointing (Melmot, 2008). As far as the reform of the judiciary is 
concerned, the constitution laid the foundation for an independent and efficient judiciary. 
However, the judiciary remains plagued with shortcomings in the form of low salaries for 
judges and a shortage of human and material resources (International Crisis Croup, 2010). In 
addition to that, the judiciary continues to suffer from political intrusion, which undermines 
its independence (International Crisis Group, 2010). As a result, the judiciary in the DRC is 
considered to be “privatised at the service of strong men” as justice is often denied to 
ordinary citizens (Association Congolaise pour l‟Acces a la Justice (ACAJ), cited in Radio 
Okapi, 2013).   
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As a result of the weakness and ineffectiveness of political institutions in the DRC, especially 
in term of leadership and governance structures, the bureaucracy suffers from inadequate 
policy guidance, control and support in material resources. In addition to that, the weakness 
of political institutions allows powerful interest groups in society to capture the bureaucracy 
and promote their sectarian interests. In this context, the bureaucracy is unable to fulfil its 
core responsibilities such as: the provision of infrastructure, especially in rural areas, and the 
enforcement of land titles. The above failures on the part of the bureaucracy appear to 
negatively affect the operations of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in the DRC.   
 7.4.2 Poor infrastructure 
The above discussion suggests that flawed political institutions are one of the main causes of 
the poor infrastructure observed in the DRC, especially in the rural areas. This is because the 
governance structure and political leadership appear to have failed to provide the right 
guidance, incentives and resources to the bureaucracy in order to provide basic services, in 
this particular case infrastructure. In Chapter 5 I argued that the poor state of infrastructure in 
the DRC affects the activities of agricultural enterprises and therefore undermine the 
development of the sector.  It appears that the inadequate infrastructure also affects the 
activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in the DRC. The poor state of 
infrastructure in the DRC, in particular transportation by road and river from Kinshasa to 
Mbandaka, has forced ZTE Agribusiness Congo to suspend its palm project in Equateur DRC 
(Interview in Kinshasa, 20 May 2011). For instance, the Director General of ZTE 
Agribusiness Congo claimed that transportation on the Congo River is primitive, since the 
channels are not cleaned. He held that he had planned to travel for three days on the Congo 
River from Kinshasa to Mbandaka, but instead he spent seven days on that river. He claimed 
that if ZTE Agribusiness Congo wants to establish a palm plantation in Equateur province, it 
has to transport all equipment, including machinery and fertiliser, from Pointe Noire in 
Congo Brazzaville and Matadi – the port cities – to Kinshasa and then to Mbandaka – the 
provincial capital.  He stated that it is very difficult to transport equipment from the port 
cities to the farm in Equateur (Interview with General Director of ZTE Agribusiness Congo, 
Kinshasa 20 May 2011).  Although for the moment ZTE Agribusiness Congo is the only 
Chinese agricultural enterprise that seems to have been affected by the constraint of poor 
infrastructure, given the huge problem posed by the inadequacy of infrastructure in rural 
areas, it is likely that in the future more Chinese agricultural enterprises will be affected by 
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this problem as the number of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in the DRC 
increases.   
Furthermore, it also appears that in light of the transportation problems encountered in 
relation to its palm project in Equateur – as well as the complex process of land acquisition – 
ZTE Agribusiness Congo has decided to focus on medium-scale agricultural projects of less 
than 1 000 hectares in the medium term. There seem to be two reasons for that decision 
(Interview with consultant at ZTE Agribusiness Congo, Kinshasa 2 June 2011). First, it is 
less costly in terms of time and financial resources to identify and negotiate with local 
communities when it comes to medium-sized rather than large farms. Also, for farmland 
below 1 000 hectares the investor does not need the approval of the head of state. Second, 
medium-scale farms can be operational and profitable in an environment affected by poor 
infrastructure, especially if they are located in close proximity to big cities. In contrast, large-
scale farms – which are usually located in remote areas – require good infrastructure to 
ensure the transportation of equipment and the transport – possibly for export – of large 
quantities of commodities. Thus, it appears as if the poor state of infrastructure in the DRC 
together with the complex process of gaining access to land has affected the business model 
of ZTE Agribusiness Congo. Again, the above finding is comparable to the analysis made by 
Sun (2011) on the negative impacts of institutional arrangements – which prevail in many 
parts of sub-Saharan Africa – on the abilities of smallholders and investors to get involved in 
wealth-creation activities.  
The above discussion shows how political institutions can affect not only the ability of the 
government to deliver infrastructure, but also the activities and business trajectory of 
enterprises. This case is an illustration of the way in which formal rules can affect economic 
performance.  
7.4.3 Complex land acquisition system  
 As in the case of Mozambique, the complexity of the land acquisition process in the DRC is 
the outcome of the constraining effect of customary land tenure systems – which were briefly 
discussed in Chapter 5 – on the formal land law.  The land law of the DRC implicitly 
acknowledges the ownership of local community over land by making it compulsory that 
local communities be consulted before the land to which they are associated can be granted to 
investors (Code Foncier Immobilier et Regime des Suretes , 2006). The implicit recognition 
of the rights of local communities in the formal law leads, in practice, to a superimposition of 
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informal and formal patterns of land tenure. This is because, investors first need to consult 
and negotiate with local communities before introducing formal requests with the authorities. 
However, as noted in Chapter 6, negotiations with local communities are complex processes, 
as they require ample time, information and financial resources. In addition to that, the 
difficulty of access to land for foreign investors also appears to be related to the weakness in 
the regulatory capacities of the Congolese Ministries of Agriculture and Land Affairs, which 
are unable to provide the necessary guidance and advice to foreign investors seeking to invest 
in the DRC. In Chapter 5 I pointed to the limited regulatory capacity of the Congolese 
Ministry of Agriculture as a result of a multitude of factors such as limited financial and 
material resources, ageing and low-paid officials and centralisation in the formulation and 
implementation of projects in the capital, Kinshasa. The Congolese Ministry of Land Affairs 
also appears to be affected by the same problems that inhibit its capacity to monitor and 
enforce the land law (Interview with General Director of Congo Agriculture Biotechnology, 
Kinshasa 13 June 2011). The limited regulatory capacities of the Congolese Ministries of 
Agriculture and Land Affairs appear to emanate from the dysfunctional political institutions, 
as politicians fail to provide the necessary guidance and resources to these units of the 
bureaucracy.  
The superimposition of informal and formal land tenure systems coupled with the 
institutional weakness of the Ministry of Agriculture has prevented COVEC from accessing 
land in the country. In 2007 COVEC lodged a formal application with the Ministry of 
Agriculture for 100 000 hectares of farmland in Bandundu province – East of Kinshasa – in 
order to grow rice (Interview with manager of agricultural projects at ANAPI, Kinshasa 30 
May 2011; Deqing, 2008, cited in Le Potentiel, 2008). However, COVEC ignored the fact 
that issues pertaining to land in the DRC, including for agricultural projects, are examined by 
the Ministry of Land Affairs and not that of Agriculture (Interview with manager of 
agricultural projects at ANAPI, Kinshasa 30 May 2011). More important, COVEC did not 
understand the land law of the DRC as it failed to travel to the countryside, identify 
potentially suitable farmlands and negotiate with local communities. Thus, after waiting for 
almost one year without getting feedback from the Ministry of Agriculture, COVEC 
abandoned it project in 2009 ( Interview with manager of agricultural projects at ANAPI, 
Kinshasa  30 May 2011; Deqing, 2008, cited in Le Potentiel, 2008) . 
The superimposition of informal and formal land tenure systems plus the institutional 
weakness of the Ministry of Land Affairs also delayed ZTE Agribusiness Congo‟s access to 
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land in Equateur province. When ZTE Agribusiness Congo arrived in the DRC it requested 3 
million hectares of farmland to establish palm plantations in several DRC provinces 
(Interview with General Director of Congo Agriculture Biotechnology, Kinshasa 13 June 
2011). However, the ZTE Agribusiness Congo request was turned down and the Ministry of 
Agriculture agreed instead to grant to the private Chinese agricultural enterprise 100 000 
hectares of farmland (Interview with General Director of Congo Agriculture Biotechnology, 
Kinshasa  13 June 2011). Then ZTE Agribusiness Congo approached the Ministry of Land 
Affairs for assistance in accessing land in Equateur province. After a long period of inaction 
from the Ministry of Land Affairs, ZTE Agribusiness Congo eventually took the initiative 
and conducted air surveys over the localities of Bikoro, Ingende, Basankusu and Mbandaka 
in Equateur province. Among these localities ZTE Agribusiness decided to focus its 
investigations at the site of Bikoro, located 40 km from Mbandaka.  ZTE Agribusiness Congo 
conducted several analyses of soil and vegetation samples as well as investigating the means 
of communication at Bikoro. In addition to that, ZTE Agribusiness Congo also held meetings 
with local leaders as well as the local community. The outcome of those investigations and 
meetings were positive, which enabled ZTE Agribusiness Congo to lodge a formal request 
for land with the governor of Equateur. The governor of Equateur province approved the 
request and asked ZTE Agribusiness Congo to start the formal process by getting in touch 
with the provincial ministries (Letter of the General Director of ZTE Agribusiness Congo to 
the Minister of Agriculture, 25 February 2011). 
These cases demonstrate how political institutions tend to influence the ability of agents at 
the Ministries of Agriculture and Land Affairs to provide guidance to Chinese investors as 
well as monitor and enforce the land law. The poor performance of these two ministries – 
rooted in dysfunctional political institutions – in turn appear to undermine the activities of 
Chinese agricultural enterprises. These cases demonstrate how informal and formal 
institutions – political leadership and processes – can determine the quality of enforcement 
mechanisms – the regulatory capacities of the Ministries of Agriculture and Land Affairs – 
and in turn affect the performance of economic agents. 
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7.4.4 Land conflicts      
Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in the DRC have encountered several conflicts over 
land control. First, the activities of Hubei Dadi International Cooperation have been 
hampered by conflicts over land in Mikonga and Masina Abattoir.  At Mikonga the 
supervisor of Hubei Dadi International Corporation in Kinshasa notes that the two customary 
chiefs in charge of the area demanded that his enterprise pays to them the sum of US$70 000 
and US$30 000, respectively – in addition to providing some goods – before it could start 
operating on the farm. He claims that Hubei Dadi International Corporation brought the 
matter to the attention of the Congolese government. However, the Congolese government 
was unable to successfully resolve the dispute (Interview with supervisor of Hubei Dadi, 
Kinshasa 18 May 2011). At Masina Abattoir, the sons of the customary chief in charge of the 
area contested the right of Hubei Dadi International Corporation over the 1.3 hectare 
concession and called in the police, who expelled the Chinese enterprise from the farm. As 
the result of the land dispute with the sons of the customary chiefs, Hubei Dadi International 
Corporation lost all of its products – vegetables and pigs. The Chinese state-owned 
agricultural enterprise no longer breeds any pigs at its Masina Abattoir pigsty (Interview with 
employees of Hubei Dadi, Kinshasa 27 May 2011).  
Second, ZTE Agribusiness Congo operations in Menkao have also been disturbed by 
conflicts over land. In 2010-2011 ZTE Agribusiness Congo was involved in two conflicts 
over the control of its Menkao farm. The first involved local farmers who claimed that some 
portions of ZTE Agribusiness Congo‟s farm belonged to them. The second involved the 
Reserve Strategique Generale – a structure of the presidency – which also claimed that some 
portions of ZTE Agribusiness Congo‟s farm belonged to the presidency (Interviews with 
General Director and Consultant of ZTE Agribusiness Congo, Kinshasa 20 May 2011 and 2 
June 2011; Letter of the General Director of ZTE Agribusiness Congo to the Minister of 
Agriculture, 25 February 2011). ZTE Agribusiness managed to resolve those conflicts after 
many months of court arbitration – for the first conflict – and negotiations – for the second 
one. The General Director of ZTE Agribusiness Congo holds that the enforcement of land 
contracts is a big issue in the DRC. He claims that out of every 100 legal disputes in the DRC 
60 are related to land disputes (Interview with General Director of ZTE Agribusiness Congo, 
Kinshasa 20 May 2011).  
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In the DRC the judiciary has the prerogative of resolving various types of conflicts, including 
conflicts over land control. As mentioned above, in the DRC the judiciary is neither efficient 
nor independent. The shortcomings of the judiciary are the outcome of the nature of political 
institutions, especially as ruling elites endeavour to maintain their grip on judges, on the one 
hand, and baulk at providing sufficient resources to the courts, on the other hand. However, 
political intrusion in judicial processes as well as shortage of resources within the judiciary 
might not be the only ways through which political institutions affect the ability of courts to 
resolve land conflicts. Political institutions themselves might be affected by informal 
constraints. As North (1990:59) argues, the enforcement of contracts is uncertain, especially 
in developing countries, not only because of ambiguities in legal doctrine but also because of 
uncertainty with respect to the behaviour of agents such as judges and lawyers. In other 
words, North holds that the perception of judges and lawyers is influenced by their 
ideologies. In the case of the DRC, the influence of the customary land tenure system on the 
land law makes it possible for this system to influence the perception of judges when 
presiding over issues related to conflicts over land ownership. Judges might share the belief 
that the land belongs primarily to local communities. Therefore, when conflicts over land 
control arise, investors are often expected to negotiate with local communities in order to find 
consensual solutions. This finding demonstrates how informal constraints – customary land 
tenure systems – influences formal law – land law– and enforcement mechanisms – the 
perceptions of judges – affect the performance of economic agent. This analysis is 
comparable with the analysis made by Brautigam (2009) concerning the inability of the 
Sierra-Leonean government to successfully enforce the contract that it signed with Complaint 
– the Chinese Sugarcane enterprise operating in Sierra-Leone – which was engulfed in 
conflict over land control with the local community.  
Conflicts over land control have prompted Hubei Dadi International Corporation to adopt a 
new business model. It has decided to open a milling factory in Kinshasa in order to buy 
maize from surrounding smallholders, process it and sell it to local customers (Interview with 
supervisor of Hubei Dadi, Kinshasa 18 May 2011). In this way the enterprise hopes to 
generate profits by dodging the constraints imposed by the uncertainties over access to land. 
Again, this case demonstrates how informal constraints, formal law and enforcement 
mechanisms can impact on the economic trajectory of agents.  
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 The findings outlined in the second part of this chapter demonstrate that the institutional 
context in the DRC is affecting the behaviour and/or mode of entry of Chinese agricultural 
enterprises. Specifically, the findings show that this occurs through a combination of three 
institutional factors: the poor state of infrastructure; the complexity of the land acquisition 
system; and the occurrence of conflicts over land control. Furthermore, these findings also 
demonstrate that the institutional context in the DRC is also shaping the business model of 
Chinese agricultural enterprises over time. Therefore, the behaviour and/or modes of entry of 
Chinese agricultural enterprises appear to be influenced by informal constraints – in the 
customary land tenure system – formal rules – such as the land law and political institutions – 
and enforcement mechanisms – the judiciary. This finding is in accordance with the concepts 
of institutions developed by North and Williamson.  
7.5 Conclusion 
The analysis in this chapter has illustrated a number of pertinent observations. Concerning the 
first research question, it has argued that there are three factors that determine the motivations 
of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in the DRC: the ownership advantages of 
Chinese agricultural enterprises – mostly in the form of modern agricultural technology, 
knowledge and capital ; the locational advantages – in the form of arable land and a suitable 
climate for particular crops as well as the existence of markets for agricultural commodities 
in the DRC; and the financial support provided by the Chinese government to its agricultural 
enterprises via the aid projects or indirectly through the China Development Bank. Together 
these three factors determine the motivations of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in 
the DRC. These motivations are: 1) to acquire farmlands in order to generate profits through 
farming activities; 2) to transfer agricultural commodities to China in order to supply Chinese 
markets with natural resources such as biofuels and cooking oil; and 3) to provide agricultural 
aid by introducing new varieties of crops imported from China and providing training to 
smallholders, students and technicians. However, the provision of agricultural aid is a 
secondary motivation, since Chinese agricultural enterprises running the aid projects funded 
by the Chinese government primarily aim to promote and expand their commercial activities. 
This chapter has also established that the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises 
operating in the DRC are in line with China‟s foreign policy, as Chinese agricultural 
enterprises aim to better position themselves in local markets and access natural resources. 
Therefore, it was held that Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in the DRC aim to grow 
food crops destined for local markets – rice, maize, vegetables and palm oil – as well as for 
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Chinese markets – palm oil. This chapter has further argued that as the demand for food crops 
is expected to continue rising in China, Chinese agricultural enterprises might in the medium 
to long term decide to grow and transfer food crops – other than palm oil – from the DRC to 
China.   
These findings are comparable with the claims made by scholars such as Hairong and 
Sautman (2010) and Sun (2011) in the literature on China-Africa. Moreover, this study has 
also observed that the above findings are somewhat different to the claims made by scholars 
such as Brautigam (2009), Brautigam and Xiaoyang (2009), Brautigam and Ekman (2012) 
and Sun (2011). This is because the alignment of the aid projects with China‟s foreign policy 
– that gives impetus to the commercial activities of Chinese enterprises operating abroad – 
discredits claims about their mutually beneficial nature and points to an uneven distribution 
of gains in favour of Chinese agricultural enterprises.  
Concerning the second research question, it was argued that the institutional context in the 
DRC affects the behaviour and/or the mode of entry of Chinese agricultural enterprises 
through three institutional characteristics: the poor provision of infrastructure, the complex 
land acquisition system; and the conflicts over land control. First, the failure to provide 
adequate infrastructure appears to undermine the activities of Chinese agricultural 
enterprises. Second, the complex land acquisition system – coupled with the inability of the 
Congolese Ministries of Agriculture and Land Affairs to monitor and implement the land law 
and provide guidance to investors – prevents or delays Chinese agricultural enterprises in 
accessing land in the DRC.  Third, conflicts over land control in the DRC also appear to 
undermine the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises. Finally, the institutional context 
in the DRC also appears to be shaping the business model of Chinese agricultural enterprises 
over time. This happens as Chinese agricultural enterprises attempt to adopt a new business 
model in order to respond to adverse institutional arrangements.   
In conclusion, this chapter has maintained that most of the findings outlined above are in 
conformity with the Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm and new institutional theory. On the one 
hand, Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in the DRC enjoy ownership, locational and 
internalization advantages. On the other hand, the institutional context in the DRC, shaped by 
informal constraints, formal rules and enforcement mechanisms, seems to affect the 
behaviour and/or mode of entry as well as the business model of Chinese agricultural 
enterprises.  
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The above findings are consistent with the claims made by scholars such as Sun (2011) and 
Brautigam (2009) in the literature on China-Africa relations. . More importantly, however, 
three findings appear to make a new contribution to the literature.  The first is related to the 
effects of inadequate infrastructure on the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises. The 
second is the effects of the complexity of the land acquisition process on the activities of 
Chinese agricultural enterprises. The third is the way in which the institutional context in the 
DRC shapes the business models of Chinese agricultural enterprises.  
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
8.1 Introduction 
This study aimed to investigate two main research questions. The first concerned the 
motivations informing the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in 
Mozambique and the DRC. The second focused on the way in which the institutional context 
related to the agricultural sectors in Mozambique and the DRC affects the behaviours and/or 
modes of entry of Chinese agricultural enterprises. Therefore, this study had two main 
research questions: 1) what are the motivations informing the activities of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique and the DRC?  2) In which manner do the 
institutional contexts in Mozambique and the DRC affect the behaviours and/or modes of 
entry of Chinese agricultural enterprises into local industries?  
The chapter is divided into three main sections. In the first I present the main findings for 
each country. I then proceed to the comparison of the findings for both countries and draw 
the necessary conclusions in term of theoretical generalisations. In the second I provide an 
assessment of the theoretical framework and the research methodology applied in this study 
by focusing on their strengths and limitations. I then offer some suggestions and avenues for 
future theoretical development and the application of a new research methodology in order to 
enhance our understanding of the research questions posited in this study. Lastly, I engage in 
a discussion on institutional reform – centred on the decentralisation process and the 
scientific agricultural cooperation between China, on one hand, and Mozambique and the 
DRC, on the other. The recommendations put forward in this chapter aim at enabling the 
governments of Mozambique and the DRC to improve their institutional contexts in order to 
serve the interests of the state, local communities and the ecosystem, while at the same time 
facilitating investments by Chinese agricultural enterprises. They also aim to encourage these 
two countries to develop indigenous institutional models that would ensure effective transfers 
and adaptation of Chinese agricultural technologies.  
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8.2 Summary of the main findings 
8.2.1 Mozambique 
The main findings for Mozambique are divided into two issues: one on the motivations 
informing the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises and the other on the way in which 
the institutional context affects the behaviours and/or modes of entry of Chinese agricultural 
enterprises into local industries. Regarding the first issue, the initial results obtained from this 
study suggested that the motivations informing the activities of these agricultural enterprises 
are: 1) to acquire farmland in order to generate profits by growing and selling food crops such 
as rice and maize, and processed products such as cooking oil in local and adjacent markets; 
2) to transfer agricultural commodities such as soybeans and cotton to their mother company 
in China in order to supply Chinese markets with natural resources and consumer goods such 
as textiles, clothes and animal foods; and 3) to  provide agricultural aid by testing new 
varieties of crops brought from China and offering training to local farmers, students and 
technicians. However, the contention of this study is that the provision of aid is a secondary 
motive of Chinese agricultural enterprises, since Chinese agricultural enterprises rely 
primarily on the aid projects to establish their footprint in Mozambique. Chinese agricultural 
enterprises running the aid projects intend to use them as springboards from which they can 
adapt and expand their commercial activities. 
This study has also argued that Chinese agricultural enterprises rely on the complementarities 
between their specific assets embodied in their technologies and knowledge, the locational 
advantages in the form of arable land and local markets, and financial support from the 
Chinese government in the form of subsidies. This study has concluded that the activities of 
Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique are generally in accordance with 
China‟s foreign policy as they aim to access local markets and secure natural resources. 
Finally, this study has held that Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique 
generally produce food crops destined for local markets as well as for South African and 
European markets. However, the notable exception was CGOG, which attempted to grow 
soybeans destined for Chinese markets. Still, in the context of Mozambique, soybeans should 
be considered more of a secondary food crop than a staple food crop, as it is primarily used in 
the processing of animal foods. Thus, this study has held that for the moment Chinese 
agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique do not transfer or aim to transfer staple 
food crops to China. Nevertheless, this study has concluded that as demand for foodstuffs is 
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expected to continue rising in the medium to long term in China, Chinese agricultural 
enterprises might decide to grow foodstuffs in Mozambique in order to supply Chinese 
markets.         
Concerning the second issue, the initial results obtained from this study suggested that the 
institutional context in Mozambique affects the behaviour and/or modes of entry of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises into local industries in three ways:  through the complex process of 
gaining access to land; the poor delivery of infrastructure; and weak state capacity in 
monitoring and enforcement of the land law. In particular, this study has held that the poor 
quality of infrastructure – particularly the failure of the irrigation system – tends to 
undermine further investments by Chinese agricultural enterprises. In addition, this study has 
also argued that the difficulty of gaining access to land resulting from the superimposition of 
traditional and formal land tenure systems appears to hinder Chinese agricultural investments, 
especially for large agricultural investments. The difficulty of gaining access to land is 
compounded by the poor monitoring and implementation capacity of the state – especially the 
National Cadastre of Land and local agricultural research institutions – which are unable to 
provide information on the availability and main characteristics of soils in different regions of 
the country. The inability to provide such crucial information seems to compromise the 
operations of Chinese agricultural enterprises, especially the large ones.   
8.2.2 Democratic Republic of Congo 
As in the case of Mozambique, the main findings on the DRC are also separated in two 
issues: one is related to the motivations informing the activities of Chinese agricultural 
enterprises and the other to the way in which the institutional context shapes the behaviour 
and/or the entry of these enterprises into local industries.  
Starting with the first issue, the preliminary results collected in this study suggested that the 
motivations of these enterprises are: 1) to acquire farmland in order to generate profits 
through farming activities; 2) to transfer agricultural commodities to China in order to supply 
Chinese markets with natural resources such as biofuels and cooking oil; and 3) to provide 
agricultural aid by introducing and adapting new varieties of crops imported from China and 
providing training to smallholders, technicians and students. However, this study has noted 
that the provision of agricultural aid is a secondary motive of Chinese agricultural enterprises 
operating in the DRC. Instead, the aid projects funded by the Chinese government aim 
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primarily at enabling Chinese agricultural enterprises to better position themselves in the 
DRC by gaining access to local markets. 
Moreover, this study held that these motivations are determined by the complementarities of 
three factors: the ownership advantages of Chinese agricultural enterprises embodied in their 
modern technologies, advanced knowledge and accessible capital; the location advantages of 
the DRC in the form of the availability of huge tracts of arable land, the suitable climate and 
the local markets for rice, maize and palm oil; and the financial support provided by the 
Chinese government to Chinese agricultural enterprises, mainly in the form of subsidies. 
Overall, this study has argued that the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating 
in the DRC are consistent with China‟s foreign policy as these corporations aim to access the 
DRC‟s markets and natural resources. In addition, this study has held that Chinese 
agricultural enterprises operating in the DRC grow or intend to grow and trade food crops 
destined for local and Chinese markets. While the rice, maize and vegetables are destined for 
local markets, palm oil is destined both for local and Chinese markets. Given this situation 
and taking into account the expected gradual rise in the demand for foodstuffs in China in the 
medium to the long term, this study has claimed that Chinese agricultural enterprises might 
operate in the DRC to produce food crops other than palm oil for Chinese markets.  
Concerning the second issue, the preliminary findings from this study have suggested that the 
institutional context in the DRC affects the behaviour and/or the modes of entry of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises through three institutional characteristics: the poor provision of 
infrastructure, the complex land acquisition system, and the conflicts over land control.       
The poor provision of infrastructure in the DRC – especially roads and transportation – 
appears to undermine further investments by Chinese agricultural enterprises. In addition, 
conflicts over land control resulting from the inability of the state to enforce land titles tend 
not only to discourage further investments, but also to compromise current investments. 
Moreover, the difficulty of gaining access to land – coupled with the inability of the 
Ministries of Agriculture and Land Affairs to monitor and implement the land law – appears 
to hinder the operations of Chinese agricultural enterprises in the DRC. This is especially true 
of Chinese investments requiring large tracts of farmland. Finally, the institutional context in 
the DRC also seems to be shaping the business model of Chinese agricultural enterprises over 
time. Chinese agricultural enterprises seem to be changing their business model in order to 
cope with the harsh institutional context prevailing in the DRC. In this context, Chinese 
agricultural enterprises operating in the DRC tend to adopt smaller-scale agricultural projects 
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of less than 1 000 hectares or move from farming into the processing of agricultural 
commodities in order to avoid the institutional constraints associated with poor infrastructure, 
difficult access to land and inadequate enforcement of land titles.      
8.2.3 Comparison between Mozambique and the DRC 
This study was a comparative case study of Mozambique and the DRC. As mentioned in 
Chapter 4, these two countries were selected because of their significant agricultural potential 
and their similar institutional contexts in relation to the agricultural sector. The researcher 
anticipated that the results of the motivations informing the activities of Chinese agricultural 
enterprises in both countries and the way in which the institutional contexts shape the 
behaviour of those enterprises would be similar. The preliminary results obtained in this 
study corroborate the researcher‟s projection. 
On the issue on motivations, it appears from the initial results generated in this study that the 
motivations informing the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises in Mozambique and 
the DRC are fairly analogous. That is, in both countries Chinese agricultural enterprises aim 
to acquire farmlands and to generate profits through farming activities. Chinese agricultural 
enterprises operating in both countries also intend to transfer agricultural commodities to 
China in order to supply Chinese markets. In addition to that, they provide agricultural aid to 
farmers, students and technicians in Mozambique and the DRC. However, the provision of 
agricultural aid is a secondary motive. Furthermore, it also appears that in both countries the 
motivations of Chinese agricultural enterprises are consistent with China‟s foreign policy, as 
they aim to better position themselves in local markets and secure natural resources – palm 
oil, soybeans and cotton. Chinese agricultural investments in Mozambique and the DRC do 
not appear to be fundamentally different from Chinese investments in the oil, mining and 
infrastructure sectors of African economies, as all these investments aim to access and secure 
natural resources or local markets – as discussed in Chapter 2 of this study.   
However, the preliminary findings on their motivations show slight differences concerning 
the markets of destination for food crops produced by Chinese agricultural enterprises. In the 
case of Mozambique, they generally produced food crops generated for local markets and to a 
lesser extent for South African and European markets – this is the case for brown rice and 
prawns. In addition, Chinese agricultural enterprises also attempted to grow soybean for 
Chinese markets. However, while soybean is a food crop, it is widely considered as a 
secondary food crop in Mozambique, as it is primarily used to produce animal foods.  Thus, 
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the initial evidences from this study show that these enterprises operating in Mozambique are 
not yet transferring or aiming to transfer staple food crops to China. In the case of the DRC, 
they generally produce or attempt to produce staple food crops for local and Chinese markets. 
While food crops such as rice, maize are destined for local markets, palm oil appears to be 
destined for both local and Chinese markets. The initial results from this study show that the 
enterprises operating in the DRC are aiming to transfer a staple food crop – palm oil – to 
China. 
 However, it remains to be seen whether the differentiation between the Chinese agricultural 
enterprises operating in Mozambique and the DRC is relevant in term of markets of 
destination for staple food crops, given that in the medium to long term they might also get 
involved in the growing of staple food crops in Mozambique destined for Chinese markets.  
The effects of the institutional context on the behaviours and/or modes of entry of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises also appear to be quite similar in Mozambique and the DRC.  In both 
countries three elements of the institutional context seem to negatively affect the behaviour 
and/or modes of entry of Chinese agricultural enterprises: the poor quality of infrastructure, 
the difficulty of access to land, and the weak capacity to monitor and implement the land law.  
However, while conflicts over land control seem to be an important element in shaping the 
behaviour of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in the DRC, no incident related to 
land conflicts involving Chinese agricultural enterprises has been reported in Mozambique 
during the course of this study. Perhaps the most important difference in the effects of the 
institutional context noted in this study is the way in which it shapes the business model of 
Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in the DRC. Such interaction between the 
institutional context and the business model of Chinese agricultural enterprises has not been 
identified in Mozambique.  
The similarities of the motivations informing the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises 
operating in Mozambique and the DRC, on the one hand, and of the effects of the 
institutional contexts on their behaviour and/or modes of entry, on the other, could have one 
important implication. They might imply that the results obtained in this study could be 
generalised to other sub-Saharan African countries along the same theoretical lines. In other 
words, the motivations informing the activities of these enterprises operating in these two 
countries specifically might be generalised to sub-Saharan African countries with significant 
arable land and water available as well a tropical climate. Equally, the impacts of the 
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institutional contexts in Mozambique and the DRC on the behaviour and/or modes of entry of 
Chinese agricultural enterprises might be generalised to sub-Saharan African countries with 
similar customary land tenures systems, land laws and political institutions.  
8.3 Theories and methodology applied and new areas for research 
8.3.1 Reflection on theories and methodology applied  
This study has relied on Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm to understand the motivations 
informing the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique and the 
DRC.  Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm has for long been the best analytical framework for 
understanding the determinants of firms‟ FDI. This is because Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm    
is not a theory but rather an envelope of several competing and complementary theories of 
international business that draw the attention of the researcher to the most relevant theories 
for the problem at hand.  In addition to that, the contextual variable featured in Dunning‟s 
eclectic paradigm enhances its explanatory power by drawing the attention of the researcher 
to specific contexts of firms‟ FDI. It is precisely because of its ability to integrate competing 
and complementary theories and its contextual embeddedness that Dunning‟s eclectic 
paradigm has provided such a powerful theoretical framework for this study. Dunning‟s 
eclectic paradigm enabled the researcher to include in a single analytical framework concepts 
informed by competing theories applied in the literature on China-Africa relations. As such, 
the researcher was able to include and compare concepts informed by mercantilism, 
liberalism and structuralist approaches of International Political Economy. In the context of 
China‟s involvement in Africa‟s agriculture, the mercantilist approach would argue that 
Chinese agricultural investments aim at promoting China‟s national economic interests. The 
liberal approach would hold that Chinese agricultural enterprises aim at realising profits for 
the benefit of these enterprises as well as the host countries by providing jobs and 
contributing toward attaining food security. The structuralist approach would claim that 
Chinese agricultural enterprises intend to help African countries develop their agricultural 
sectors and ultimately their economies in order to boost the power of developing countries 
and so change the world order. The results obtained in this study tend to demonstrate that the 
motivations informing the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in 
Mozambique and the DRC are primarily determined by concepts informed by the liberal and 
mercantilist approaches, while those informed by the structuralist approach play a secondary 
role.  
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This study has also relied on the new institutional theory of microeconomics to study the 
impacts of institutional contexts in Mozambique and the DRC on the behaviours and/or 
modes of entry of Chinese agricultural enterprises. New institutional theory aims to 
understand the way in which informal constraints, formal rules and enforcement mechanisms 
shape the external environments that humans derive and how these in turn affect the 
economic performance of a particular society. Therefore, new institutional theory is strongly 
contextual as it focuses on a society‟s culture, norms and tradition, formal laws, political 
hierarchical structures, the ability of agents to enforce the laws, and how all of them generate 
the institutional contexts that constrain the actions of economic agents. New institutional 
theory was ideal to study the impact of the institutional contexts on the behaviours and/or 
modes of entry of Chinese agricultural enterprises. While the focus of the analysis was on the 
institutional contexts, new institutional theory allowed the researcher to demonstrate how 
informal constraints in the form of customary land tenure systems, and formal rules in the 
form of land laws and political hierarchical structures, and enforcement mechanisms 
including the ability of agents to enforce land laws or land titles produce the particular 
institutional environments prevailing in Mozambique and the DRC. New institutional theory 
enabled the researcher to conduct more in-depth analyses of the impacts of the institutional 
contexts in Mozambique and the DRC on the behaviours and/or modes of entry of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises.   
8.3.2 New areas for research 
While Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm has enabled this study to assess the respective weight of 
the concepts of the three perspectives of IPE in explaining the problem at hand – the 
motivations informing the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in 
Mozambique and the DRC – it is still unable to provide an explanation as to why Chinese 
agricultural enterprises provide agricultural aid in Mozambique and the DRC regardless of 
the secondary nature of this motivation. Perhaps this is because the provision of agricultural 
aid is more a motive of the Chinese government than of the Chinese agricultural enterprises. 
Indeed, the provision of agricultural aid appears to be inconsistent with the theory of the firm, 
to the extent that this theory generally associates the strategic goal or motive of the firm with 
the realisation of profits. Therefore, a single theory is needed in order to account for all the 
motivations of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Africa. Such theory should seek 
to integrate concepts of economic science – or international business – with those of political 
science.    
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In the attempt to build a single theory, one could be inspired by the work of Peng et al. (2008) 
and Lu et al. (2010), who have developed a conceptual framework – the strategy tripod – to 
explain the strategy and performance of firms from emerging countries. Peng et al. (2008) 
argue that traditionally the industry-based view and the resource-based view have been used 
to explain firms‟ strategy and performance. The industry-based view argues that the strategy 
and performance of a firm are mainly determined by conditions within its industry – such as 
the level of technology and competition (Lu et al., 2010; Peng et al., 2008). The resource-
based view claims that it is a firm‟s specific assets – resources that are rare and valuable and 
sometimes not imitable and not substitutable – that to a large extent determine the strategy 
and performance of that firm. Such resources can take the form of capital, technology, 
knowledge and so on (Peng et al., 2008; Priem and Butler, 2001). However, for the strategy 
tripod, Peng et al. (2008) and Lu et al. (2010) include a third perspective – the institution-
based view – in order to explain the strategy and performance of firms from emerging 
economies – such as that of China. The institution-based view builds on work produced by 
scholars such as North, Williamson and Hart, and defines institutions as the set of formal 
rules and informal constraints that structure human interaction. Peng et al. (2008) and Lu et 
al. (2010) claim that in emerging economies institutions play a greater role in determining the 
strategy and performance of firms – given the weakness of market-supportive institutions as 
well as the heterogeneous internal resources and capabilities of firms . Peng et al. (2008) and 
Lu et al. (2010) hold that in emerging economies the strategy and performance of firms are 
better explained by the combination of the three perspectives:  the industry-based view, the 
resource-based view and the institution-based view. 
The strategy tripod could serve as a good point of departure in the process of constructing a 
theory on the motivations informing not only the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises 
operating in Africa, but also of Chinese state-owned corporations operating in the oil, mining 
and infrastructure industries in Africa. In particular, it will be important to assess whether 
concepts of political science or international relations could be integrated with the institution-
based view.   
As mentioned above, the primary interest of the researcher lies in understanding the impacts 
of the institutional contexts on the behaviours and/or modes of entry of Chinese agricultural 
enterprises. The researcher accordingly devoted limited attention, especially in the course of 
the fieldwork, to the causal mechanisms through which political institutions structure the 
institutional contexts in Mozambique and the DRC. Therefore, in future research endeavours 
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it would be interesting to seek an understanding of the process through which political 
institutions structure institutional contexts.  
Furthermore, it is important to recall that this study has relied entirely on a qualitative method 
to collect data on the motivations and behaviour of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating 
in Mozambique and the DRC. As discussed in Chapter 4, a quantitative approach can only be 
used when the cases are of a similar nature and are involved in analogous activities. 
However, when this study was launched, the researcher possessed little information on the 
number, nature and activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises in Mozambique and the 
DRC.  In this sense, this study was also an exploratory project. However, as information on 
the number, nature and activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Africa 
begins to increase, it would be important to combine the qualitative approach with a 
quantitative method in order to enhance the credibility of the findings. Case studies of three 
to four countries combining a qualitative and quantitative approach would be a good start. 
Ultimately, as more information emerges on the nature and activities of Chinese agricultural 
enterprises operating in Africa, a survey design might be warranted to study the motivations, 
behaviour and impacts of Chinese agricultural enterprises in a dozen or more of African 
countries.  
Finally, it is worth reminding the reader that this study did not rely on any of the three 
traditional perspectives of IPE because of their lack of utility so far as the main research 
questions posited in this study are concerned. As mentioned in chapter 3, the traditional 
perspectives of IPE were not suitable to investigate the motivations of Chinese agricultural 
enterprises operating in Mozambique and the DRC because of the complexity of this 
phenomenon, as it embodies several dimensions. Equally, the perspectives of IPE were not 
relevant to understand the behaviour of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in 
Mozambique and the DRC, since the study of human behaviour entails the investigation of 
more abstract notions – such as norms, traditions and perceptions – as well as the formal rules 
of the game.   
However, it is the view of this study that Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm can somewhat 
contribute to the consolidation of the main perspectives of IPE. Since the end of the cold war 
and particularly the beginning of the twenty first century, issues such as trade, FDI, global 
warming and terrorism have increasingly gained pre-eminence within the field of IPE. While 
the main perspectives of IPE are well equipped to deal with the more traditional macro-issues 
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related to the behaviour of states and the structure of the inter-state system, they are 
nevertheless limited when it comes to the more meso issues related to the motivations of 
MNCs operating in foreign countries or of terrorist groups operating across states‟ borders. In 
this perspective, the main perspectives of IPE could borrow some concepts from the OLI 
paradigm to enhance their assessments of the motivations and impacts of MNCs operating in 
foreign countries. Of specific interests, IPE perspectives could integrate the static and 
dynamic approaches to FDI as defined by Dunning to understand the diverse and 
contradictory natures and impacts of FDI across countries.     
8.4 Policy suggestions  
8.4.1 The decentralisation process 
The decentralisation processes in Mozambique and the DRC have been stalled by series of 
political problems related to the neo-patrimonial system of rule discussed in Chapters 6 and 
7.  In the case of Mozambique, these problems have mainly taken the form of political 
rivalries between the two main political parties, Frelimo and Renamo.  In the DRC the 
problems have been caused by selfish political ambitions and political rivalries for control of 
resources. The sound formulation and implementation of a decentralisation process is 
important for the establishment of legitimate governments at local and provincial levels. As 
local and provincial governments become more representative, accountable and closer to 
local communities, they will be more effective in providing services to local communities, 
promoting development at grassroots level and in resolving local conflicts.  
Legitimate and effective local and provincial governments will also be able – in close 
collaboration with national governments – to monitor and enforce the land laws and 
formulate and implement policies that facilitate access by Chinese agricultural enterprises to 
farmlands, while sustaining the interests of local communities and the environment.  Local 
communities are unlikely to oppose policies granting access to land to Chinese agricultural 
enterprises when such policies are formulated and implemented by legitimate and effective 
local and provincial governments, who are careful in ensuring that the activities of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises are aligned to the interests of local communities, especially in terms 
of the preservation of customary lands, the preservation of forest areas, jobs creation, 
agricultural inputs, markets for farmers‟ outputs and even construction of infrastructure.  
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As a matter of principle, the policies should encourage Chinese agricultural investments only 
in areas with sufficient land. The policies should focus on addressing the competition 
between food and cash crops by ensuring that even when Chinese investors are growing cash 
crops, their activities concomitantly promote the cultivation of food crops by smallholders. 
Such paradoxical objectives can be achieved through contractual arrangements between 
investors and local communities. In this way, Chinese agricultural enterprises aiming to 
invest in the growing of cash crops must be encouraged to enter into contractual 
arrangements with smallholders in order to promote the cultivation of food crops by the 
latter.  
Furthermore, while policies should encourage Chinese agricultural enterprises to produce 
food crops for local markets – in order to curb food insecurity – the local processing of food 
crops, especially primary staple foods such as palm oil and cassava or maize, into biofuels 
should be discouraged. Indeed, the processing of food crops into biofuels in Mozambique or 
the DRC could push prices of these crops up and aggravate the food insecurity prevailing in 
those two countries. Finally, local or provincial and national governments should restrict the 
cultivation of land-intensive crops – such as cotton and palm plantations – in order to 
preserve the forests. Perhaps, and especially relevant in the case of the DRC, governments 
should encourage national and foreign investors to recuperate and rehabilitate old farms that 
have been abandoned – instead of destroying the forests in the search of new tracts of land.  
8.4.2 Scientific agricultural cooperation  
The provision of agricultural aid in the form of training by Chinese agricultural enterprises 
operating in Mozambique and the DRC is limited in scope. At the Umbeluze research centre 
in Mozambique the number of Chinese personnel in charge of delivering aid is limited. 
Second, in the case of the aid project managed by Hubei Lianfeng Mozambique in Xai-Xai, 
Mozambique, and the one run by Hubei Dadi International Corporation in Kinshasa, DRC, 
the provision of training and other services to smallholders is also limited.  The provision of 
agricultural aid by Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique and the DRC in 
the form of research support is ineffective, given the absence of institutional mechanisms to 
ensure scientific collaboration between managers and technicians of Chinese agricultural 
enterprises running the aid projects and local agricultural research institutions.  
Given the limited scope and effectiveness of the provision of agricultural aid by Chinese 
agricultural enterprises, it is unlikely that Chinese agricultural technologies will be effectively 
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transferred, adapted to the need of smallholders and disseminated to smallholders under the 
so-called aid projects funded by the Chinese government.    
Several studies such as those by Eicher (1999), Roling and Fliert (1988), the World Bank 
(World Bank: Independent Evaluation Group, 2001) and the AATF (2010) have insisted on 
the need for developing countries to build strong agricultural research centres, agricultural 
extension services and universities (faculties of agriculture or agricultural colleges) as a 
prerequisite for the emergence of a modern agricultural sector. They argue that strong 
collaboration between agricultural faculties of universities, agricultural research centres and 
extension services is necessary in order to develop and disseminate agricultural technologies 
that are suitable to meet the needs of smallholders and agri-business corporations.  
Therefore, in order to develop new agricultural technologies and adapt them to the needs of 
smallholders and disseminate them to the latter, Mozambique and the DRC should mainly 
aim to build and consolidate their universities (the faculties of agriculture), their agricultural 
research institutions and extension services. In addition to that, the two countries should 
develop institutional models in order to operationally link universities, agricultural research 
institutions and extension services. Such an agricultural triangle (Eicher, 1999) would enable 
them to respond to the particular needs of smallholders in their respective countries. 
However, for the institutional models to be relevant to the needs of smallholders, they will 
have to be indigenously conceived in order to be consistent with the agro-ecological and 
geographical conditions as well as other particularities of each country (Eicher, 1999). 
While Mozambique and the DRC should first rely on their own efforts in order to raise 
financial resources to consolidate the agricultural triangle, these two countries should also 
establish scientific cooperation with China in this area. Perhaps China could be more useful 
in transferring its agricultural technologies in Mozambique and the DRC by helping to build 
capacity within universities‟ faculties of agriculture and agricultural research institutions. 
More specifically, China could provide scholarships to Mozambican and Congolese students 
to further their post graduate education in agriculture in China. Such a contribution would be 
even more significant given that Africa‟s traditional donors have reduced the number of 
scholarships offered to African students since the 1990s (Eicher, 1999). Furthermore, China 
could also send its scientists to Mozambique and the DRC for short-term visits in order to 
work with local scientists on common research projects. Surely such scientific cooperation 
extended over a long period of time will make a significant difference in the modernisation of 
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Mozambican and Congolese agriculture – provided that the right institutional models are in 
place and soundly operational.  However, China, Mozambique and the DRC should avoid a 
situation where too many scientists and students are trained in a short period of time, while 
the expansion of organisations such as universities and agricultural research institutions is not 
able to keep pace with the growth in human resources.  If this is allowed to happen, the 
inability of existing organisations to absorb or reward new staff members will surely result in 
the exit of competent and ambitious researchers and scientists to the private sector. Indeed, 
this is what is currently happening in Mozambique, where technicians employed and trained 
by the extension services often subsequently leave the organisation for greener pastures in the 
private sector.   
8.5 Conclusion 
The main motivations informing the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in 
Mozambique and the DRC is to better position themselves in local markets and access 
agricultural commodities for the benefit of Chinese markets. As such, the motivations of 
Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in the two countries are not fundamentally different 
from those of Chinese mining, oil and construction companies operating on the African 
continent in the sense that they are all aligned with China‟s foreign policy. However, Chinese 
agricultural enterprises are currently struggling to operate successfully in Mozambique and 
the DRC as a result of unfavourable institutional contexts. The dilapidated infrastructure, 
difficulty of gaining access to land, weak capacity in monitoring and enforcement of the land 
law, and insecure land titles discourage further investments, hinder current investments and 
even lead to cancellation of investments.    
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ANNEXURES 
Annexure 1 Interview schedules 
Semi-structured interviews 
Questionnaire 1: Managers of Chinese agricultural enterprises  
1)  When did your corporation establish itself in this country and for which reason(s)? 
2) The nature of the corporation; 
 What does it produce? 
 For which market (s) are the goods destined? 
 What is the size of your farm? 
 Is the business profitable? 
 Others 
3) Behaviours on the ground 
 Has your enterprise encountered any problem related to the implementation of its 
objective? 
 If yes, specify 
 Does your enterprise abide to the land and environmental laws of this country? 
 Is the government providing you with the necessary assistance in ensuring the 
implementation of the contract and the smooth running of your business? 
4) The type of linkages with the local population: 
 Do your corporation employ local workers? 
 If yes, what is their proportion compared to Chinese workers? 
 Do you think your corporation is contributing to the development of this 
country? 
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 Do you have a good relationship with the rural population?  
 Others 
5) The type of relations with the Chinese government 
 What is the nature of the contractual relationship between your corporation‟s  
management and the headquarter in China ( in term of autonomy in decision-
making, sharing of profits and employment of local staffs) 
 Does your enterprise receive any support from the Chinese government or the 
Chinese banks such as EXIM Bank and CDB 
 Others 
Questionnaire 2: managers of Chinese agricultural enterprises managing aid projects 
1) What is the aim of your project? 
2) What is the scope and nature of services you provide to farmers (smallholders)? 
3) Specify,  
4) Do you work or collaborate with local research institutions? 
5) Specify 
6) Have you encountered any problem related to the implementation of your objective? 
7) Do you have a good relationship with the rural population?  
8) Is the government providing you with the necessary assistance in ensuring the smooth 
implementation of your project? 
9) Others 
10) The type of relations with the Chinese government 
 What is the nature of the contractual relationship between your corporation‟s 
management and the headquarter in China ( in term of autonomy in decision-
making, sharing of profits and employment of local staffs)? 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
204 
 
 Do your corporation receive any support from the Chinese government or the 
Chinese banks such as EXIM Bank and CDB? 
 Others 
Questionnaire 3: Researchers and NGO’s managers  
1) What is your general assessment of the contemporary relationship between China and 
your country? 
 Others 
2) Are you aware of the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises in your country? 
 If yes, what are the number and activities of those Chinese agricultural 
enterprises?  
3) According to you, what are the motivations of Chinese agricultural enterprises 
operating in your country? 
4) What are the challenges encountering Chinese agricultural enterprises on the ground? 
5) How do they react to these challenges? 
6) Do Chinese agricultural enterprises abide by the land and environmental laws of your 
country? 
7) According to you, in which manners can China help develop your country‟s 
agriculture sector? 
8) How do you compare the level of salary paid by Chinese agricultural enterprises with 
those offered by firms of other nationalities? 
9) Others 
 
 
Questionnaire 4: Government officials at the department of Agriculture 
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1) What are the Chinese organisations (i.e. state-owned/private enterprises, research 
institutions) currently involved in agricultural projects in your country? 
2) Do you have an idea of the number and activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises 
operating in your country 
3) According to you, what are the motivations of Chinese agricultural enterprises 
operating in your country? 
4) What are the challenges encountering Chinese agricultural enterprises on the ground? 
5) How do they react to these challenges? 
6) Do Chinese agricultural enterprises abide to the law of your country? 
7) As the government of this country, what is the scope and nature of support you expect 
from Chinese agricultural enterprises in order to develop your country‟s agriculture 
sector? 
8) So far, are you satisfied with the implementation of the contracts signed with Chinese 
agricultural enterprises? 
9) Specify,  
Questionnaire 5: Private agribusiness corporations 
1)  When did you start your business in this country? 
2)  Which goods does your corporation produce and for which markets are they 
destined? 
3) Are you aware of the presence and operations of Chinese agricultural enterprises in 
the country? 
4) If yes, provide more information on their number and activities 
5) According to you, what are the motivations informing the activities of those Chinese 
agricultural enterprises?  
6) In your view, what are the problems these Chinese agricultural enterprises are 
encountering on the ground? 
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7) How do they react to such problems? 
8) Do Chinese agricultural enterprises abide by the laws (land and environmental) of 
your country? 
9) Others 
Questionnaire 6: Interviews with farmers (preferably smallholders) 
Main issues to be discussed (The aim here is to obtain the assessment of the activities of 
Chinese agricultural enterprises from farmers „perspectives): 
1) Do farmers receive training from the Chinese agricultural enterprises? 
2) If yes, specify 
3) Do farmers receive new varieties of seeds, fertilisers and equipments from the 
Chinese agricultural enterprises? 
4) If yes, specify 
5) Have Chinese agricultural enterprises invested in infrastructures work in the area? 
6) If yes, specify  
7) Are farmers‟ communal lands protected from arbitrary acquisition by Chinese 
agricultural enterprises?  
8) What is the general level of collaboration between Chinese managers on the one hand 
and rural populations on the other hand? 
9) Have the social conditions of farmers improved as a result of the presence of Chinese 
agricultural enterprises? 
10) If yes, in which manner? 
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Annexure 2  
Code book  
Acquisition of land 
 Size of concession ( SC) 
 More land  (ML) 
 Export food to China + (EFC+) 
 Export food to China – (EFC-) 
 Import of Chinese labourers + (ICL+) 
 Import of Chinese labourers -  (ICL-) 
 Enforcement of land act +(ELA+) 
 Enforcement of land act – (ELA-) 
 Grasp Land (GL+) 
 Grasp Land (GL-) 
 Status of Land (SL) 
 Utilisation of Land for food crops (UL) 
 Utilisation of Land for cash crops (UL-) 
 
1) LOCATIONAL ADVANTAGES 
 Market size (MS) 
 Quality of land & amount of water (QLW) 
 Geographical location (GL) 
 Cheap local labour (CLL) 
 Climatic conditions (CC) 
 Competitiveness (C) 
 
2) INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT  
 Land disputes (LD) 
 Infrastructure problems (IP) 
 Rent seeking (RS) 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
208 
 
 Scientific information ( Information on soil quality, type of seeds, fertilisers) (SI) 
 Political stability (PS) 
 Cultural differences (CD) 
 Cadastral system ( LPP) 
 Legal and administrative problems (LAP) 
 Collusion of Interests (CL) 
 
3) PROFIT DRIVEN ACTIVITIES  
  Good transactions (GT) 
 Service transactions (ST) 
 Repatriation of profit (RP) 
 Vertical integration (VI) 
 Profit seeking strategy (PSS) 
 Adaptability Behaviour (AB) 
 Market Destination (MD) 
 
4) TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
 Introduction of seeds (IS) 
 Introduction of hybrids (IH) 
 Provision of seeds +(PS+) 
 Provision of seeds – (PS-) 
 Provision of hybrids + (PH+) 
 Provision of hybrids – (PH-) 
 Cooperation with local institutions + (CLI+) 
 Cooperation with local institutions – (CLI-) 
 Provision of equipments + (PE+) 
 Provision of equipments- (PE-) 
 Training local +(TL+) 
 Training local – (TL-) 
 Sustainability of project +(SP+) 
 Sustainability of project – (SP-) 
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 Objective of Project (OP) 
 Future objective (FO) 
 Provision of technology (PT+) 
 Provision of technology ( PT-) 
 Provision of Fertiliser and Pesticides (PFP) 
 General Support ( GS+) 
 General Support (GS-) 
 Government Officials opinion (GOO) 
 
5)  SCARCE FINANCIAL RESOURCES 
 Limited funding (LF) 
 
6) Past Chinese Project 
 Past Provision of Seeds (PPPS+) 
 Past Provision of Seeds (PPPS-) 
 Past Provision of Equipments (PPE+) 
 Past Provision of Equipments (PPE-) 
 Past Training Local (PTL+) 
 Past Training Local (PTL-) 
Annexure 3 Contingency table  
CONTINGENCY TABLE  
MOZAMBIQUE 
Main Concepts Sources 
Flaws in the cooperation with local institutions (CLI-)  Ecalistas Bias 
 Ferdinand  Songane 
 Jose Gaspart 
Inability to Enforcement of the land law (ELA-)  Felix Kosa 
 Raphael Uaiene 
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Grapping of Land (GL+) ( Risk)  Castel Carlos 
 Jose Gaspar 
 Wen Cheng 
 Joao Mosca 
 Sergio Chichava 
 Ping 
Grapping of Land ( GL-) ( Risk)  Felix Kosa 
 Ferdinand Songane 
 Jose Gaspar 
 Joao Mosca 
 Castel Carlos 
Transaction of agricultural commodities (GT)  Wen Cheng 
 Lee 
 Ping 
 Veronica 
 Marino 
Introduction of hybrids (IH)  Lee 
 Ping 
 Veronica 
Infrastructure problems (IP)  Castel Carlos 
 Wen Cheng 
 Xiangyun 
 Raphael Uaiene 
 Sergio Chichava 
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 Veronica 
Cadastral system (LPP)  Wen Cheng 
 Raphael Uaiene 
Market destination of commodities ( MD)  Wen Cheng 
 Xiangyun 
 Ping 
 Veronica 
Objective of the projects (OP)  Jose Gaspar 
 Ferdiand Songane 
 Ecalista Bias 
 Castel Carlos 
 Lee 
 Ping 
 Marino 
Profit Seeking Strategy (PSS)  Chen Weng 
 Xiangyun 
 Raphael Uaiene 
 Ping 
 Veronica 
Provision of technology (PT+)  Veronica 
 Marino 
 Meneses 
 Chen Weng 
 Xiangyun 
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 Ping 
Rent Seeking (RS)  Veronica 
 Marino 
 Wen Cheng 
Size of the concession (SC)  Wen Cheng 
 Raphael Uaiene 
 Ping 
 Lee 
Scientific Information (SI) ( Access to information)  Wen Cheng 
 Raphael Uaiene 
Training of locals (TL+)  Wen Cheng 
 Xiangyun 
 Ping 
 Veronica 
Vertical Integration (VI)  Xiangyun 
 Joao Mosca 
 
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO  
Main concepts Sources 
Flaws in the cooperation with local institutions (CLI-)  Mvi Macramen 
 Innoncent Bashige 
 Andre Lusakweno 
  Xu 
Grapping of Land (GL+) ( Risk)  Nzumi Mumpene 
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 Andre Lusakweno 
 Mutombo Bilolo 
 Michel Kipundo 
 Xu 
 Philippe Buyoya 
 Jean Omasombo 
Grapping of Land ( GL-) ( Risk)  Kewen Wang 
 Xu 
 Michel Kipundo 
 Mukenge Betu 
Transaction of agricultural commodities (GT)  Nzumi Mumpiene 
 Mvi Macramen 
 Kewen Wang 
 Mutombo Bilolo 
Introduction of hybrids ( IH)  Nzumi Mumpiene 
 Kutala , Mabanza 
 Landu 
Infrastructure Problems (IP)  Kewen Wang 
 Andre Lusakweno 
 Xu 
 Michel Kipundo 
Land disputes (LD)  Nzumi Mumpiene 
 Kewen Wang 
 Innoncent Bashige 
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 Kutala, Mabanza 
 Mutombo Bilolo 
 Mukenge Betu 
Cadastral System (LPP)  Michel Kipundo 
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